CONTENTS

PART ONE
ETHICS AS THE SCIENCE OF GOOD CONDUCT

CHAPTER I The Subject-Matter of Ethics — Conduct

1. The Meaning of Conduct.--2. Essential Features of Voluntary Action.--3. Voluntary Action Defined.--4. In Voluntary Action an Object Is Conceived as End.--5. Is Distinguished from Present Actuality.--6. And Chosen in Preference to Other Ideal Possibilities.--7. Because of Its Appeal to the Character of the Agent.--8. Which Gains Expression Through Its Attainment.--9. Ethics Is Concerned with the Whole of Human Conduct.--10. Objections to This View.

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CHAPTER II The Method of Ethics — A Practical and Normative Science
1. Ethics as a Practical Science.--2. Ethics as a Normative Science.--3. The Human Will the Ground of Moral Value. --4. Other Practical Sciences: (a) Technical,--5. (b) Intellectual, and--6. (c) Aesthetic.--7. Other Normative Sciences.--8. Conclusion	. . . 16

CHAPTER III The Problem of Ethics — The Discovery of the Summun Bonum
1. How Determine What Is Good Conduct?--2. Many Ends Actually Sought Are Good only as Means.--3. To Satisfy the Will an Object Must Be an End in Itself.--4. The Problem of the Summum Bonum.--5. The Summum Bonum as the Moral Ideal.--6. The Formation of the Moral Ideal. --7. Characteristics of the Ideal.--8. Source of the Power of the Ideal	. . . 29

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CHAPTER IV Knowledge of the Good, or Conscience

I. Conscience Not a Separate Faculty but a Species of Judgment.--2. Conscience as Judgment of Moral Value. --3. The Ground of Moral Judgment Is Usually Emotional Rather than Rational.--4. Intuitional and Empirical Theories of the Origin of the Moral Sentiments.--5. Experience as the Source of the Moral Sentiments.--6. The Idea of the Highest Good as the Rational Ground of Moral Judgment.--7. Moral Enlightenment.--8. Importance of Conscience in Human Life--9. Remorse

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CHAPTER V The Appeal of the Good or Moral Obligation

1. Objects Appeal to the Will Through the Feelings They Arouse.--2. Appeal of the Good as Inclination.--3. Appeal of the Good as Obligation.--4. Conditions Under Which Feeling of Moral Obligation Arises.--5. Significance of the Feeling of Moral Obligation -6. Kant's View of Moral Obligation.--7. Goodness Not Always Different from Inclination.--8. The Duties of Morality Command Not as Categorical but as Teleological Imperatives.--9. The Summum Bonum Alone Has the Authority of a Categorical Imperative

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CHAPTER VI The Motive of Good Conduct

1. The Appeal of the Summum Bonum as the Motive of Good Conduct.--2. Possible Discrepancy Between the Intention and the Consequences of Conduct.--3. Good Intentions When Accompanied by Adequate Knowledge Are Usually Productive of Good Consequences.--4. Good Consequences in Most Cases Indicate Corresponding Degree of Goodness in Intention--5. But Good Motive Does Not Absolutely Insure Good Consequences Because of Inability of Reason to Foresee Future Developments

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PART TWO

THE NATURE OF THE GOOD

CHAPTER I The Nature of the Good — Conduct or Character
1. The Supreme Importance of the Subject.--2. The Good as Determined by Custom.--3. The Good as Discovered by Reflection.--4. Socrates' View of the Good.--5. Merits of the Socratic Conception of the Good.--6. Defects of the Socratic Conception of the Good.--7. The Good as Action or the End of Action.--8. The Good as Conduct or Character.--9. The Good as Duty or Virtue	Page . . . . 83

CHAPTER II Theories of the Good — Hedonism
1. Pleasure as the Good.--2. Cyrenaicism.--3. Element of Truth in Cyrenaicism.--4. The Inadequacy of Cyrenaicism. --5. Epicureanism.--6. Value of the Epicurean Theory of the Good.--7. Arguments in Support of Hedonism.--8. Error of Psychological Hedonism.--9. Criticism of Ethical Hedonism.--10. Transition to Rationalism	. . . . 96

CHAPTER III Theories of the Good — Rationalism

1. The Standpoint of Rationalism.--2. Extreme and Moderate Rationalism.--3. Cynicism.--4. Stoicism.--5. The Truth of Rationalism: Reason (a) as a Distinctively Human Faculty. (b) As Extending the View of Man to Include a World of Objects and Events.--7. (c) As enlarging the Experience of Man to Embrace the Lives and Personalities of Others.--8. The Faults in Rationalism (a) It Encourages Injurious Asceticism.--9. (b) It Justifies Extreme Intellectualism.--10. (c) It Is Individualistic in Tendency.

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CHAPTER IV Volition as an Organizing Agency

1. Volition as an Organizing Agency.--2. Volition as the Synthetic Activity Comprehensive of Feeling and Thought. --3. Development of Volition: involuntary Action.--4. Voluntary Action: (a) From Desire.--5. (b) From Purpose--6. (c) From Ideal.--7. Volition as Creative of Self-Conscious Personality.--8. Volition Does Not Always Effect Complete Organization.--9. But to That Extent Is Not Fully Developed.

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CHAPTER V The Good as Self-Realization or Freedom
1. The Good as Self-Realization.--2. Self-Realization Through the Instrumentality of Volition: (a) The Present Self.--3.(b) The Natural Self.--4. (c) The Personal Self.--5. The Possibilities of Selfhood as Actualized by Volition. 6. Self-Realization Identical with Self-Determination.--7. Libertarianism.--8. Determinism.--9. Freedom as Self-Determination.--10. Objections to This View.	Page . . . . 151

CHAPTER VI The Conditions of Self-Realization in Human Life
1. Form and Content in Self-Realization.--2. The Incidental and the Essential in Human Nature.--3. Man as a Natural Being.--4. His Native Instincts.--5. Man as a Conscious Self. His Spiritual Capacities.--7. Necessary Stages in Self-Realization.--8. (a) Individual.--9. (b) Social.--10. (c) Universal.	. . . . 169

PART THREE

THE GOOD AS SELF-REALIZAION

CHAPTER I The Conception of Self-Realization
1. The Relation of the Good to the Existing Human Individual.--2. The Good as External to the Individual.--3. The Good as Identical with the Interest of the Individual.--4. These Two Aspects of Goodness Explained by the Principle of Self-Realization.--5. Arnold's Contrast of Hebraism with Hellenism.--6.--Hebraism.--7. Hellenism.--8. Relation of Christianity to Hebraism and Hellenism.	. . . . 193

CHAPTER II Self-Realization and the Standard of Goodness

1. The Idea of the Good as Furnishing a Standard of Moral Judgment.--2. Self-Realization Criticized as Failing to Supply Such a Standard.--3. The Ideal of Self-Realization as the Standard of Moral Judgment.--4. This Standard When Applied to Human Life Yields Further Principles of Moral Distinction.--5. The Principle of Individual Interest.--6. The Principle of Social Welfare.--7. Maxims of Individual Interest: (a) Maxim of Prudence.--8. (b) Maxim of Idealisin.--9. Maxims of Social Welfare: (a) Maxim of Altruism.--10. (b) Maxim of Humanitarianism.

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CHAPTER III Self-Realization and Self-Sacrifice

1. The Problem of Self-Sacrifice.--2. Self-Sacrifice, if a Duty, Must Be of Ultimate Benefit to the Individual.--3. Self-Sacrifice, if Genuine, Must Involve Real Loss to the Individual.--4. The Conception of Organization Furnishes Solution of the Problem.--5. All Organization Involves the Sacrifice of Part to the Whole.--6. Self-Mastery.--7. Self-Sacrifice.--8. Is Self-Sacrifice Due to Merely Temporary Maladjustment?--9. On the Contrary, It Is a Necessary Factor in Self-Organization.--10. Optimism and Pessimism.--11. Conclusion.

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CHAPTER IV Self-Realization and the Motive of Goodness
1. The Motive of Good Conduct.--2. The Egoistic Motive: Self-Interest.--3. Inadequacy of the Egoistic Motive.--4. The Altruistic Motive: Sympathy.--5. Inadequacy of the Altruistic Motive.--6. The Religious Motive.--7. Self-Realization as the Motive of Good Conduct.--8. Self-Respect.--9. Philanthropy.--10. Reverence.--11. Mixed Motives.	Page . . . . 262

CHAPTER V Self-Realization and Happiness

1. Pleasure as an Element in Self-Realization.--2. Self-Realization Not Identical with the Greatest Sum of Pleasures.--3. But Rather with a Harmony of Pleasures, or Happiness.--4. Happiness Thus the Feeling That Accompanies the Organization of Conduct.--5. Happiness Not to Be Accepted as the Good, Because It Is Unduly Subjective in Its Referene.--6. And It Implies a State of Passive Enjoyment.--7. Is the Pursuit of Goodness Certain to Result in the Greatest Happiness?--8. It Is, on the Assumption That Moral Purpose Is Supreme in the Universe.--9. And That Man May Complete His Moral Development in a Future Life.

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CHAPTER VI Self-Realization and the System of Virtues

1. Intuitional and Empirical Conceptions of Virtue.--2. Virtue as Interpreted by Self-Realization.--3. The Classification of the Virtues.--4. Historic Methods of Classifying the Virtues.--5. Other Methods of Classifying the Virtues.--6. Defects of These Classifications Illustrated by Pre-evolutionary Classification of Living Forms.--7. Classification of Virtues as Stages in Self-Organization Illustrated by Evolutionary Classification.--8. Classification of Virtues in Accordance with Method of Self-Realization.--9. Advantages of Such Classification.

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PART FOUR

THE LIFE OF SELF-REALIZATION

CHAPTER I The Individual Virtues
1. The Exercise of Volition as the Pre-supposition of All Moral Development.--2. Temperance.--3. Prudence.--4. Courage.--5. Idealism.	. . 321 321

CHAPTER II The Social Virtues
1. The Social Adjustment.--2. Kindness.--3. Friendship.--4. Justice.--5. Benevolence.	. . 369

CHAPTER III The Religious Virtues
	416

Index	423