PREFACE

The writer on Ethics at the present time is fortunate in having at his disposal the valuable results of two important movements in the science which took place in the nineteenth century. The one idealistic, originating in Germany but culminating as far' as Ethics is concerned in Great Britain, formulated the clearest conception which human thought has yet attained of the spiritual activities that cooperate in personal development. The other naturalistic, continuing the tradition of English Utilitarianism under the illuminating influence of evolutionary science, furnished us with the most complete description that we possess of the actual conditions, natural and social, under which morality has developed. Now while these two schools are sharply opposed in standpoint and method, their conclusions, in so far as these are well-founded, do not contradict but rather supplement one another. Hence the moralist of today, if he wishes to profit by the results of previous ethical reflection, must aim to make his theory a synthesis of these two different bodies of truth. has been my aim in the present volume. The form of the Moral Ideal I have endeavored to ground in the essential nature of volition, understood as the controlling agency in personal development; its content I have sought to derive from the actual conditions of human existence as these have been discovered by empirical study. In carrying out this program I was made to recognize anew my heavy obligations to the leaders of the two schools above mentioned. Among idealists I owe most to Hegel, particularly to the pregnant suggestions in the Encyclopedia of a moral ” dialectic “ whereby the

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individual through self-negation overcomes the limitations of his finitude and realizes his greater self, to Green's Prolegomena, and to the works of Edward Caird. The representatives of the other school to whom my debt is largest are, perhaps, Leslie Stephen, Herbert Spencer--and Darwin himself.

In the arrangement of my material I have without doubt been influenced decisively by the example of a book very well known and highly esteemed by me--Professor James Seth's Ethical Principles. To introduce the principle of Self-realization by a preliminary study of the opposing theories of Hedonism and Rationalism, in which the one-sidedness and inadequacy of each is clearly shown, has always seemed to me a logical procedure and one well suited to the purposes of a text-book. I should be indeed remiss if I failed to take the opportunity here presented of expressing my deep gratitude to the author of this book. As my first instructor in Ethics, Professor Seth rendered me that high service which is in the power of only the greatest teachers to perform--he produced in my mind a conviction of the importance and dignity of his subject and awakened in me an enthusiasm for its further study which has never waned.

Of late a growing tendency is noticeable among writers on Ethics to avoid the abstractly formal, the purely theoretical, and to make their expositions concrete and practical. The desire which thus finds expression, to keep ethical principles in close and vitalizing contact with the facts of actual morality, and thus to facilitate their application to conduct, is in every way commendable and promises well for the development of ethical science. But this desire, in itself wholly praiseworthy, should not in my opinion lead to such neglect of theory as to make the ethical treatise merely a series of discussions of different moral problems. Of course the question concerns mainly the

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method of presentation; any scientific treatment is bound to be systematic and in order to be systematic must have a framework of theory. How prominent then should the theoretical framework be made in a text-book of Ethics? My belief is that it should be made sufficiently prominent to organize the material presented into a well-articulated body of doctrine which can be grasped in its unity and whose parts are so related that one implies and thus leads on to the others. Such formulation is justified, I think, both on logical and pedagogical grounds. These considerations apply particularly to the treatment accorded to the several virtues. Classifications of the virtues have been ,out of fashion for some time in ethical literature. The reasons usually given for abandoning th6 attempt thus to classify the fundamental forms of good conduct are that no classification can hope to be final or help being schematic and arbitrary. Now such objections seem to me altogether inconclusive and whatever force they may possess is in my opinion far outweighed by the advantages which promise to follow from a systematic exposition of the leading virtues. The system of the virtues, each clearly defined in its relation to all the rest may with truth be said to complete the science of Ethics, since it exhibits principles and ideals in their application to daily conduct and as yielding a program for actual living.

In conclusion, I wish to acknowledge my indebtedness to friends in Lake Forest for helpful suggestion and criticism; especially I desire to thank Professor J. M. Clapp of Lake Forest College for assistance in proof-reading, and my wife whose loyal cooperation in all my endeavors has made this work possible.

HENRY W. WRIGHT. LAKE FOREST, ILL.,

March 10, 1913.