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1. The Social Adjustment.--2. Kindness.--3. Friendship.--4. Justice.--5. Benevolence.

1. The Social Adjustment.-Besides the adjustment of impulses in the individual, self-organization involves the adjustment of the individual himself to others in society. The social adjustment does not wait until the organization of individuality is completed, however; the two processes proceed simultaneously and in close connection with one another. AU the individual virtues have an important social bearing as we are aware-even a man's temperance or thrift affects in a decided way his relations to others; but this social reference becomes more explicit in the case of the higher virtues of the individual which concern the pursuit of the universal ends of personality, ends whose attainment requires the cooperation of many individuals. Conversely, as we shall now see, the social qualities-such virtues as friendship and justice, for example-exert a determining influence upon the development of individuality. Nor are we to think, moreover, that the consciousness of others is secondary to, or derived from, the consciousness of self, in the sense of being the result of an inference based upon the observed analogy between their behavior and our own in the same circumstances. On the contrary, as recent studies in genetic psychology have conclusively shown, the consciousness of ego and that of alter grow up together they are mutually dependent-the ego learning of himself

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from the imitation of others and then interpreting their experiences in terms of his own. Despite these indubitable facts, the organization of individuality is the condition and pre-requisite of the adjustment of individualities in society. Of the promptings of impulse, of the satisfying of desire, of the forming of, ambition, the individual has immediate experience only in himself; upon this experience will therefore depend his ability to enter into the lives of others and to understand their desires and purposes. The individual can only imagine the purpose and ambitions of others, while he realizes his own and, although sympathy may give warmth and urgency to the other's interests as they are imagined, still the individual's understanding of their character is necessarily limited by the range of his own experience. Evidently , then, the individual must have learned to control his own desires, must have succeeded in subordinating them to some inclusive and unifying purpose, before he can appreciate the presence and supremacy of similar purposes and ambitions in the lives of others. Again we must be on our guard against going to an unwarranted extreme. The human self does not first have to go to the limits of egoism before it can begin the practice of altruism. The view is erroneous which conceives of moral development in the human individual as beginning with the absolute egoism of childhood, passing through the prudential stage of youth, and finally arriving at altruism in maturity. The child is not an absolute egoist. His conduct is not sufficiently organized to permit of the definition of his individuality; he is conscious of no interests as his own, in distinction from the interests of others; he cannot, therefore, manifest a genuine egoism. The child is selfish, however; the ego interest is growing more rapidly than the alter interest. The conduct of the child is occupied with the satisfaction of a number of desires--only partially

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controlled, and very imperfectly adjusted to one anotherin an environment in which other individuals are taken for granted as necessary and important factors. The child does not think of distinguishing his interest from the interest of the family; he is absorbed in gratifying his desires in and through the family. But with the organization of impulse effected through the training of childhood, individuality emerges; clear consciousness of self and selfinterest arises. This result is usually accomplished during the period of adolescence when the powers of intellect, imagination, and emotion, are quickened and strengthened. Then the individual does for the first time become fully conscious of himself in the uniqueness of his individuality, and of the interests and ambitions peculiar to his individual nature. This is the period really favorable to egoism, that of youth and early maturity, when the young person is wholly wrapped up in his own plans and either entirely neglects, or totally disregards, the interests of others. But this stronger and more adequate consciousness of self gives the individual his first true conception of individuality in others -- his first appreciation of individual purposes and ambitions among his fellow-men. Then there becomes possible -- and necessary -- an adjustment of these different and conflicting individualities, as the next step in self-organization. The social adjustment, whose end is the integration of all individual interests in one inclusive human good, is effected in two distinct steps or moments. In the first, the individual adjusts his own interests to the interests of other individuals with whom he comes into personal contact. When we emphasize the negative side of this adjustment, thinking of the self-abnegation which must be practised if we are to make common interest with our fellows, we derive the virtue of kindness, the first of the social virtues.

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Full Screen Mode Clear Search Highlights Zoom In Zoom to Actual Size Zoom Out Page: 372 of 429 'Page Down' or 'Right Arrow Key' AddThis Social Bookmarking Widget This page has been bookmarked. Previous Page 2. Kindness. -- Kindness is the practice of subordinating self-interest when this is seen to conflict with the good of others. The "kind" person, in the popular understanding of the word, is the person who is willing to "put himself out" for others; and these words express extremely well the true nature of kindness. A willingness on the part of the individual to suffer personal discomfort, to incur private disadvantage, is the first requirement made of him on entering the life of social relationships. He who is so absorbed in his own plans as to be oblivious of the desires of others, or so bent upon his own ambitions as to disregard the welfare of others, can never hope to enjoy the larger satisfactions of the social life or to realize his own greater social self. Now the actual sacrifice demanded of the individual in adjusting his own to others' interests in the different relationships of the social life, varies in amount from denying a passing desire to violating a lifepurpose or endangering a personal ideal. Where the cost to the individual is least, in the sacrifice of present comfort or momentary pleasure -- as when, for instance, a man gives up his chance of securing a comfortable seat in order to assist an aged or infirm person in boarding a car -- kindness is usually recognized as Courtesy. Courtesy is simply kindness -- kindness displayed in the details of social intercourse, and shown in an habitual attention to others' wishes and welfare at the expense of some trouble and inconvenience to oneself. The courteous person is the "considerate" person, the one who constantly considers others' feelings as well as his own. It is true that courtesy usually concerns the minor matters of life. No great interest is endangered, no momentous issue involved; the question is generally one of modes of speech and manners of action, and relates to one's temporary convenience or passing pleasure. Yet courtesy requires effort, nevertheless. It is not easy always to summon

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the smile of welcome for the friendly caller who comes inopportunely and interrupts the progress of an important piece of work, or to cut short an enjoyable conversation with an old friend in order to say a word of greeting to an uninteresting stranger. Courtesy is exacting in its demand that the individual be always on his guard -- always ready by word or by act to assist and encourage his fellows in the many and often irritating details of the daily walk in life. It consequently exposes the individual to vexatious interruptions in the prosecution of his own plans and, not infrequently, to serious disadvantage. But whatever its cost, the value of courtesy in social life can hardly be overestimated. It is the oil which makes the machinery of social intercourse run smoothly, removing causes of friction and thus preventing the parts from becoming so worn and weakened as finally to break and throw the whole machine out of gear. Courtesy adds an element of cheer and encouragement to life, which does much to lessen the nervous fatigue and dispel the discouragement which our modern civilization, with its haste and its complication, produces in many individuals, and thus to increase human efficiency and enlarge the possibilities of human achievement. But kindness often costs more than temporary inconvenience; it interferes with the realization of our leading life-purposes. Its exercise, in helping neighbor or acquaintance who is in need, requires the sacrifice of time, money, or reputation. Because money as the universal medium of exchange, is convertible into so many benefits, it constitutes in a large proportion of cases the most effective instrument at the disposal of the individual for relieving distress or ministering to the welfare of his fellows. Kindness in this form of the surrender of the "natural" goods of life for the assistance of others, is usually denominated Generosity. Of the subordination of wealth to the larger

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spiritual concerns of life, something has already been said in the discussion of courage; but we were interested there in the sacrifice of wealth primarily as a means to the greater personal freedom of the individual, and here in expending it for the good of others. The obligation resting upon those who have money in excess of their present needs to give at least a portion of their surplus to relieve the distress of others who through illness, misfortune, or even through their own neglect are suffering from lack of the necessities of life, is universally admitted. The amount which one ought in a particular case to give should be determined on grounds of the personal welfare of the individuals concerned. One individual has no right to jeopardize his own personal usefulness and social efficiency in order to give another enjoyments which he cries for but can do without. Nor has any one the right, through his generosity, to avert entirely from another the consequences of his own laziness and self-indulgence, thus preventing him from acquiring the self-reliance and thriftiness which are the foundation of a stable character. Because the generosity of individuals prompted by sympathy for the sufferings of others in distress, often leads to this latter result, it has recently fallen into considerable disrepute; and the proposal is to replace it altogether by systematic charity organized upon a scientific basis, which aims through a study of social and economic conditions to remove the causes of poverty and make the expenditure of money a means to the real personal betterment of the recipients and not to their temporary enjoyment. But while organized charity promises to do more for the relief of chronic poverty it by no means takes the place of individual generosity. The immediate contact of giver and recipient in the kindly offices of relief affords to both an opportunity for personal expression and a spur to moral betterment which cannot be dispensed with if all the possibilities of

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our human life are to be realized. The reason why so much well-meant charity fails to accomplish any real good is that it is limited to the bestowing of money, while-in addition to pecuniary relief-advice, encouragement, and even companionship, are needed to put the unfortunate one on his feet again. But-as it may happen-such friendly attention can only be given at the further expense of the agent. The needy person frequently owes his distress. to his own indolence, folly, or wrongdoing; in consequence he has incurred the contempt and odium of his fellows. One who would give him the companionship and counsel which kindness demands must cross the social line drawn against him by the community, and be prepared to injure his own reputation for good judgment, if not for good intention. Thus many who are willing to spend their money to help others, are unwilling to go further and risk their reputation. The released convict who needs healthful companionship, sound advice, and hearty encouragement, as he never needed it before, finds that every one shuns him; no one is willing to be seen walking or talking with him; all persons are reluctant to have him live or work in their vicinity. Small wonder that he is drawn back to evil pursuits! Surely that reputation is a cheap and sorry thing, which will be injured if we extend a helping hand to a fallen fellow-man. Kindness demands the sacrifice of nothing that is essential to our own self-realization, when it requires-us to subordinate such considerations to others' welfare.

The practice of kindness may involve still greater sacrifices than any as yet described. It may require the individual to. neglect his own personal development and the exercise of his higher psychic capacities-to give up his opportunity for continued education or to deny his ability for original achievement-for others' benefit. Here kindness becomes genuine self-sacrifice. Fortunately, kind-

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spiritual concerns of life, something has already been said in the discussion of courage; but we were interested there in the sacrifice of wealth primarily as a means to the greater personal freedom of the individual, and here in expending it for the good of others. The obligation resting upon those who have money in excess of their present needs to give at least a portion of their surplus to relieve the distress of others who through illness, misfortune, or even through their own neglect are suffering from lack of the necessities @of life, is universally admitted. The amount which one ought in a particular case to give should be determined on grounds of the personal welfare of the individuals concerned. One individual has no right to jeopardize his own personal usefulness and social efficiency in order to give another enjoyments which he cries for but can do without. Nor has any one the right, through his generosity, to avert entirely from another the consequences of his own laziness and self-indulgence, thus preventing him from acquiring the self-reliance and thriftiness which are the foundation of a stable character. Because the generosity of individuals prompted by sympathy for the sufferings of others in distress, often leads to this latter result, it has recently fallen into considerable disrepute; and the proposal is to replace it altogether by systematic charity organized upon a scientific basis, which aims through a study of social and economic conditions to remove the causes of poverty and make the expenditure of money a means to the real personal betterment of the recipients and not to their temporary enjoyment. But while organized charity promises to do more for the relief of chronic poverty it by no means takes the place of individual generosity. The immediate contact of giver and recipient in the kindly offices of relief affords to both an opportunity for personal expression and a spur to moral betterment which cannot be dispensed with if all the possibilities of

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our human life are to be realized. The reason why so much well-meant charity fails to accomplish any real good is that it is limited to the bestowing of money, while-in addition to pecuniary relief-advice, encouragement, and even companionship, are needed to put the unfortunate one on his feet again. But-as it may happen-such friendly attention can only be given at the further expense of the agent. The needy person frequently owes his distress to his own indolence, folly, or wrongdoing; in consequence he has incurred the contempt and odium of his fellows. One who would give him the companionship and counsel which kindness demands must cross the social line drawn against him by the community, and be prepared to injure his own reputation for good judgment, if not for good intention. Thus many who are willing to spend their money to help others, are unwilling to go further and risk their reputation. The released convict who needs healthful companionship, sound advice, and hearty encouragement, as he never needed it before, finds that every one shuns him; no one is willing to be seen walking or talking with him; all persons are reluctant to have him live or work in their vicinity. Small wonder that he is drawn back to evil pursuits! Surely that reputation is a cheap and sorry thing, which will be injured if we extend a helping hand to a fallen fellow-man. Kindness demands the sacrifice of nothing that is essential to our own self-realization, when it requires-us to subordinate such considerations to others' welfare.

The practice of kindness may involve still greater sacrifices than any as yet described. It may require the individual to neglect his own personal development and the exercise of his higher psychic capacities-to give up his opportunity for continued education or to deny his ability for original achievement-for others' benefit. Here kindness becomes genuine self-sacrifice. Fortunately,

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kindness does not commonly demand such sacrifices; although they are not so rare, perhaps, as we imagine. There is no record kept of the young men who have resolutely turned their back upon college or university with the alluring prospects of professional distinction which they held forth to a youth certain of his ability, in order to support aged or enfeebled parents; of the young women who have missed honorable careers as teachers, or the happiness of wedded life, that they might spend years and exhaust their youth and vitality in caring for a fretful invalid mother or sister; of the ministers and teachers who have denied abilities for scholarly research in their increasing devotion to the welfare of parishioners or students. If such a roll is anywhere kept it is certainly an honor roll. 'While such instances of self-sacrificing kindness awaken a deep admiration that is akin to reverence in every sober mind, still they present serious difficulty to the student of morality, and particularly to the Self-realizationist. This problem has been already touched upon in the chapter upon self- sacrifice. We believe that those practices which are required for the complete realization of the self are virtuous and, conversely, that whatever is a duty does thus contribute to Self-realization. Now we all recognize that thus to forgo the opportunity for personal development in order to benefit others is at times a duty for the human individual-although we may doubt whether we ourselves should have strength to perform it -and consequently we should expect to find it a most effective means of Self-realization. But, is it? Theoretically, we might expect that the very severity of the struggle which preceded such self-sacrifice,suddenly uprooting plans which had slowly grown and matured during years of time, and tearing down the aims and ambitions whose rearing had taken much painstaking thought and effort-would discover new springs of hope in the individual, and bring to light capacities in himself

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whose possession he had never dreamt of; as a great convulsion of nature, rending the rocks and shaking the mountains to their foundation, might disclose new sources of pure water and lay bare hidden veins of precious ore. Certainly this is what happens with many individuals when under such stress of sacrifice; they reveal a sweetness of temper, a depth of insight, a capacity for achievement quite unsuspected in them before. Yet in other cases, and they are not few, the heroic kindness does not seem to promote Self-realization and cannot be made by any stretch of the imagination to appear to do so. The unavoidable sorrow and disappointment over the failure of individual ambitious often leave the person soured and embittered; or the withdrawal of all stimulus and incentive to individual achievement renders hin@dull, prosaic, and commonplace; or constant association with his own intellectual inferiors develops a mean, captious, or tyrannizing spirit within him. What can the Self-realizationist say to such cases, which are of undoubted occurrence? He cannot pretend to have a full solution for,all the problems here involved. Two considerations should not be neglected, however, which when brought to bear upon the difficulty make it appear somewhat less formidable. In the first place, when the opportunity for individual achievement is sacrificed in kindness to another, it should not be forgotten that it is ,only the opportunity to achieve that is sacrificed. Perhaps the individual would have failed to succeed even had he had the opportunity for education, technical training, or whatever the preparation was which he craved; perhaps he promised more than he could have fulfilled under any conditions; his own inherent weakness was merely exposed by his inability to profit by his resolute and heroic sacrifice for another's benefit. Secondly, while we must believe that such kindness is a means to Self-realization, there is no reason to suppose that one such deed-as splendid as

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it is--will bring Self-realization. The individual must continue to do his duty, to observe the conditions of self- development. Many times this is what he does not do, one fears; instead he allows the temporary exhaustion of his will, after the supreme effort, to become a settled condition or habit, thus sinking into a moral lethargy and permitting his faculties to atrophy and decay from disuse and inaction. Of course the ultimate result is then not Self-realization but self-degeneration.

3. Friendship.

When, moved by sympathy or love, the individual sacrifices his own 'interest, the end sought is the welfare of another. The practice of promoting another's welfare with disregard for one's own self-interest is friendship. Friendship is the. positive aspect of kindness and one of the most important factors in moral development. As such it has received extended treatment in ethical literature, although it has not always been included in the list of the virtues. There is excellent reason for making it coordinate with benevolence, and considering them as the two positive social virtues, however; because clearness requires us to distinguish two steps in the social adjustment-devotion to single persons or acquaintances, and service of all persons or humanity. It is indeed an evidence of the unique position and surpassing importance of friendship in our lives, that we are accustomed to think of its practice not as a duty but as a rare privilege-one of the priceless boons of human existence. But friendship is not merely a beautiful ornament of human life; it plays a necessary part in the process of Self-realization. No more potent instrument of self-expansion exists than the practice of friendship, understood as whole-souled devotion to another's good. In such devotion to others there is no question of the individual's overstepping the boundaries of his own life and experience in pursuit of something quite foreign and external to

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himself. Others' lives and others' interests are already present in his experience, essentially related to his own existence and individuality. The only question is, therefore, shall these other interests and individualities with which he is inseparably connected, remain ill-adjusted to his own, and thus constitute conflicting and discordant elements in his selfhood, or shall he adjust his interest to theirs, integrate their lives with his own, thus increasing the unity of his conscious selfhood and enriching the content of his own personality? Through the promotion of another's plans, the realization of another's purposes, the individual enlarges his own interest, acquiring new ambitions on his own account and discovering in himself hitherto unrecognized abilities. Through such service of others, the individual as it were multiplies his own individuality, finding in the personality of each friend a new self with different interests, fresh enthusiasms, and original aspirations. Moreover, the possibilities for self-development in thus ” taking an interest “ in another human being seem quite endless; the potency for good. of the relation here involved is self-augmentation. Through devotion to my friend my own interests are extended, my own personality enriched; as the result of my self-development I am able more effectively to aid him in realizing the possibilities of his own nature and situation, which in its turn reacts still more favorably upon my own character, and thus, the mutual benefit derived from the friendship grows at a constantly increasing rate. Thus under the influence of truth friendship persistently cultivated, the personalities involved develop and expand as plants grow under the warming and vitalizing rays of the sun. Of course, if friendship is to realize all its possibilities as a means of moral development, it must involve mutual devotion. To the love and devotion of one the other must respond with an equal affection and loyalty. Such is the

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ideal friendship which has been celebrated in poetry and song, and which is generally regarded as one of the greatest, if not the greatest, blessing vouchsafed by God to man. What then is the basis of such love and devotion among persons? Aristotle believes that it differs in the different kinds of friendship; that in fact friendships fall into three classes, according as they are based on the -utility or convenience of the relationship, the pleasure it affords, or the goodness of the persons concerned. The first order of friendships springs from a recognition by the individuals of an advantage which comes to both from their relation, and a desire to preserve this advantage; it is commercial in character. The second is based upon the pleasure which arises from the acquaintance and is best exemplified by the friendships of young people. The third is hence the only one in which the personality is sought for its own sake, in which there is real personal devotion. It is grounded upon the ” good,“ upon`â personal worth of the individuals concerned, with a recognition of this worth, and consequent reciprocal love and devotion. The last type is, Aristotle admits, the only perfect friendship, and it alone merits our serious consideration as involving that genuine devotion to another's life and interest which is a necessary condition of Self-realization. The first two sorts of friendship may be regarded as types of association between individuals preparatory to true friendship, as forms of social life which lead up to its only perfect and idequate expression in human experience. As a matter of fact, they do indicate in a general way the changes which the attitude of the individual towards his fellows undergoes in the course of moral development. In the first stage of individual development he is interested in other individuals as they serve his convenience or promote his advantage, in his efforts to provide for his own natural wants; reputation is sought as one of the natural goods and a means to

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comfort and security. Then in the second stage of individual development when the personal capacities find expression, the individual is led by his awakening aesthetic sensibility to take pleasure in the appearance, actions, and conversation of certain others, whose acquaintance he cultivates in order to prolong this pleasure. But through the pursuit of the ideal ends of Truth and Power and Beauty, which are universal in their appeal, he comes to value the human personalities in which he finds these ideals realized, and thus is rendered capable of real devotion to them. Friendship is based on personal worth; it springs out of the reciprocal recognition by two persons of this worth in each other and leads to mutual love and devotion. In what does such personal worth consist? Our recent study of the conditions of individual development supplies us with the answer to this question. The personal worth of an individual consists in the development within him of the spiritual qualities of wisdom, efficiency, and refinement. It is measured by the extent to which the individual has made his natural existence and resources. instrumental to the exercise of his psychic capacities for thought, action, and feeling. To the fact that a single person may realize in an individual, and hence unique way, ends of universal value, is due his worth for other persons. It is this which makes him an end in himself to his fellow-men; for it is obvious that the more such individual expressions of universal reality the human self can include in the system of its own life and interests, -the more comprehensive will be its grasp on reality. Now the personal development which gives human individuality its worth and is the ground of friendship has two. sides, an extensive and an intensive. It involves the harmonious cooperation and interplay of all the spiritual faculties of man, with consequent extension of interest and increase of ability in

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every important field of human experience. Such a broad and liberal culture tremendously increases the value of the human individual as an object of friendship. He is capable of varied responses to different situations; his many interests and wide proficiency make him always an instructive and stimulating companion. But the development of character in the person most worthy of friendly devotion must be intensive as well as extensive. He must have so far achieved in some particular field as to give him firm hold on the fundamental principles of this field, on its permanent and abiding truth; since achievement like this is required to give an individual the stability and poise which he needs to make him reliable and trustworthy. And above all others, these qualities are required in persons who deserve our love and devotion. Such complete personal development we cannot expect to find realized in all our friends, to be sure; it is an ideal for others' lives as well as our own. Yet it is helpful to define our standards of personal worth so that we may discriminate intelligently in choosing our friends. From the nature of friendship itself, it follows that the number of persons to whom the individual can loyally devote himself as a friend, is strictly limited. Grounded on personal worth, friendships take time to spring up, to grow, to reach their full fruition. True friendships in most cases are formed slowly and at the cost of some effort. The personal worth of human beings is not apparent to the eye; it does not reveal itself to the passing glance; it is not made plain by manner of dress or even by facial lineaments. It manifests itself only in course of acquaintance, by word, by deed, by response of feeling, and by countless other tokens. Such revelation of personal character must be awaited, however, before we can even intelligently consider the individual in question as a possible friend. For this is a question that should be intelligently considered

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in every' case. We should not be led by chance into our friendships; they should represent our free and deliberate choices. Surely every reason exists to choose slowly and with care, for we make no more important choices in our earthly journey. After having chosen our friends we 'must be prepared to devote time and labor to cultivating them. Only through continuous personal association and mutual service can the possibilities of any friendship be fully realized. Absence does not make the hearts. of friends grow fonder; instead, continued separation will kill all but the strongest and most durable attachments. Constant personal association, in which the two individualities involved are brought into contact at every point, is necessary if the friendship is to yield its full benefit as a means of Self- realization. To the personal intercourse with its exchange of opinion and harmony of feeling, must be added the ready assistance and willing service. which friends give to one another, and which must be reckoned as one of the most precious as well as most essential factors in true friendship. When we take all this into consideration we see that a friendship is not a light or easy thing; at its best it is a long, an arduous, and a serious undertaking. There is not time or opportunity in a natural lifetime for an unlimited number of such friendships. To set any number as a limit, however, is of course impossible; the capacity for friendship varies greatly with individuals. . The only limit we need observe in making friends is that set by the nature of friendship itself, and every human individual should endeavor to form as many true friendships as he can actually maintain. Reference has been made to need of taking time and trouble to come into contact with a friend's personality at every important point. Thought and study are required to share in interests which are unfamiliar to us, and appreciate achievement in fields of which we are ignorant. It

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is one of the beneficial results of friendship that it does thus awaken new interests in us and makes us aware of the value of achievements hitherto unrecognized; thus the narrowing effects of concentrating our attention upon a particular pursuit are counteracted and we are lifted out of the ruts of professional habit and routine into which we tend to s@ak. Yet the conditions of successful achievement for the individual in his own special line, impose strict limits upon the thought and attention he can give to others' interests, even those of his closest friends. Hence comes the great advantage of a community of interest and ,endeavor between friends. When the minds of two persons are preoccupied with the same subject, when they are both working to realize the same end, we have conditions most favorable to the rapid growth and firm cementing of friendship between them. No preliminary effort is then required to learn of new things, to-understand unfamiliar undertakings. Instead, each individual by pressing forward with his own achievement is strengthening the common interest which binds him to his friend. In such circumstances it is possible for a person actually to cultivate another's friendship while wholly absorbed in the work of his own vocation; for he may derive added inspiration from the consciousness of his friend's eager and constant interest in what he is doing, and the expectation of sharing with that friend the advantages of his discoveries and success. Hence friendships among professional colleagues are natural; with the exception of attachments between husband and wife, parent and child, where there is also a massive common interest, they yield the richest returns. Doubtless it is possible to go too far in emphasizing the advantages of likeness between friends; differences in temperament and ability add to the charm and increase the benefit of friendship. Yet identities of interest and sentiment are more important in making it solid and enduring. An unreasonable prejudice

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exists to the effect that “talking shop” does not constitute the ideal of friendly intercourse. Yet what is more normal or deeply satisfying than that two friends who have the same trade should spend a social hour discussing the concerns of their common occupation, or that two mothers who are friends should take the evening for an exchange of opinion and information regarding the welfare of their children? True friendship, Aristotle holds, is permanent; because it is based on virtue, and virtue is a permanent quality. Human thought has generally agreed in finding this quality of permanence in genuine friendship--something of eternal reality which enables it to resist all influence of change and decay, and makes it triumph over death itself. In all ages men have willingly endured death for the sake of their friends, firmly convinced that the friendship was more real than the accident of natural existence, and cheerfully confident of continuing it in a future life. Good reason exists for this belief in the permanence of friendship, if we have correctly described its nature. For we understood it to be grounded in personality, and personality consists in the realization, through a particular individual, of principles and purposes (such as Truth and Beauty, Power and Goodness) which are universal in their scope and permanent in their value. Being thus rooted in universal and permanent reality, the true love of friends abides, unaffected by change in physical appearance, in financial fortune, in reputation among men. Founded upon personality, the only agency which can destroy such friendship is one that destroys personality itself. Aside from death, or mental decay due to physical disease or enfeeblement, the only danger threatening the integrity of personality and hence the permanence of friendship is that of moral degeneration. What should be the effect upon a friendship, of wrongdoing leading to vice, and

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finally to complete loss of self-control, on the part of one of the persons concerned? Certainly, it will be the duty of a friend to check such a course of wrongdoing if possible at the start and, in later days, to exercise greater forbearance, and make more zealous efforts than any one else to bring about reform. If all such endeavors are fruitless, however, all friendly intercourse must cease. But no matter how low one of the individuals concerned may sink, the bond of friendship is never entirely destroyed. The one fallen must always remain a former friend and, while he lives and the faintest possibility of restoration remains, must receive some thought and care. Naturally, friendships are first formed within the family- circle. The physical relationships of sex and parenthood are not always accompanied by real love, to be sure; since love or friendship is a personal relation. The reason why so many marriages fail of permanence is that they are based merely on physical attraction which is certain to pass in the course of years. The real love which marriage should but express is a personal attachment which is permanent and bids defiance to the changes and vicissitudes of life. Such love between a man.and a woman, with the mutual devotion and self-surrender which it involves, can receive adequate fulfillment only under conditions of monogamous marriage. The principle on which friendship is based-that of treating all persons of one's acquaintance as ends in themselves and never as means of selfish gratification-when observed in one's relations to the opposite sex constitutes the virtue of Chastity. This principle of reverence for personality, if always observed, would cure all sexual vice and remove entirely the so-called “social evil” which has ever been a dark blot upon human society. To the relations of parent and child the same considerations apply. The instinctive attachment which depends

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upon blood kinship is not enough of itself to produce genuine love. It is necessary here too that the attachment have a personal ground if it is to last. Parents must take trouble to make friends with their-children, learning their personalities, sharing their interests, and participating in their experiences, if they expect to have a permanent influence over them and guide their further development. With all its shortcomings and failures the life of the family as it is organized in civilized countries to-day furnishes the soil most favorable to the growth of true friendship. The existence of the blood-tie pre-disposes the individuals thus bound, to love and serve one another; and the constant association in daily life gives that knowledge of others' personalities which is essential to the formation of friendship. The human individual receives his first lessons in the pains and the joys of unselfish love in his early life with parents and brothers and sisters in the home. Very soon, however, the circle of acquaintanceship begins to widen. Among his playfellows acquaintance progresses and friendships are begun some of which are likely to last a lifetime. In young manhood and womanhood, when the powers of thought and imagination come into play, emotions and enthusiasms are aroused, and the capacity for sympathetic understanding of others greatly enlarged, we reach the period when friendships are the most easily and eagerly formed. The tides of life run high romantic love and altruistic sentiment are readily awakened., But because personality is not yet organized by any settled purpose or given stability by any continuous or consistent achievement, attachments formed at this time are many of them transitory and uninfluential. Nevertheless, it is probable that some friendship will be formed during-say, the college or university years-which will wield a determining influence upon the life of the individual. When finally maturity is reached, the range of

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the individual's acquaintance tends to enlarge-through .trade union, professional societies, and business associations, religious and philanthropic organizations, clubs for culture and amusement-until it is practically co-extensive with the local community itself, and then by various channels extends to individuals scattered throughout the nation, and even over the whole world. Not that the circle of any individual's friends may be as wide as this. That, as we understand true friendship, would be impossible; a dozen lives would be required to make so great a number of friends. The circle of acquaintance is merely the field in which one may choose his friends. But it is possible throughout the range of the widest acquaintance to exhibit a spirit of friendly devotion and, at opportunity as one moves among acquaintances in the daily walk of life, to say a helpful word or give needed assistance, and receive in passing an inspiring touch of another personality. But beyond the limits of the widest acquaintance lies the great mass of mankind whose lives are none the less real in their aspirations and disappointments, their thinking and their striving, than those of our nearest neighbors. Into personal contact with these the individual can never come; yet his life may influence theirs-his ideas, his inventions, his achievements, may affect for better or for worse the general human welfare. An illustration of this fact is afforded by the participation of the individual citizen in the government of a democracy like our own. Although he may know but a few hundred of the hundred million people composing this nation, still he may, through his ballot, exert an influence, very slight it is true, upon the welfare of these myriads. Complete self-organization calls, therefore, for a second activity of adjustment within the social sphere- the adjustment by the individual of his own interest, along with those other interests which have become identified with his own, to the welfare of

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humanity. Here again we must guard against conceiving of the human individual as an isolated being who first defines his own interest and then sacrifices it to a cause quite outside himself-i.e. the general good. Such a view has its root in an entirely false conception of the individual. What Self-realization actually demands to complete the organization of human life, is the integration of all lesser private interests within the larger personal good which all individuals as rational beings share in common. The sacrifice, which is here involved, of the limited and exclusive aims of individuality to the comprehensive good of human personality, as such, is identical with the virtue of justice. 4. justice.-Justice is the habit of subordinating individual interest, whether of self or of others, to the good of humanity. This virtue is the recognition in practice of the right of human personality always to be treated as an end, to which all private interests whatsoever must be subordinated. The subordination in question applies not merely to the individual's exclusive aims and desires but also to those of the family, friends, or social class with which the individual has consciously identified his interest. Often the fact that the individual seeks not his own private interest but the interest of family or friends or class or party, constitutes in his opinion a justification for his neglect of the good of humanity as a whole, or even his violation of general human rights. Justice condemns all favoritism, however; whether it is himself whom the individual favors or a selected group of his acquaintances. Justice forbids men ever to employ human personality as a means to the furtherance of their private schemes and ambitions; it insists upon the duty of making all lesser interests of different individuals means to the promotion of total human welfare. Justice thus maintains the right of human personality always to be sought as an end and never to be employed

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as a means. It is negative in character inasmuch as it defends this right by prohibiting any violation of it for private interest or through special privilege. Now to make human personality always an end is to aim at its free development and full expression in the lives of all human beings. As complete Self-realization is man's highest good, the opportunity thus freely to realize his personal capacities is man's moral right. But, as we know, complete Self- realization is possible in human life only under certain conditions--the preservation of bodily and mental health; the possession of some property; the education of the higher faculties, intellectual, technical, and aesthetic; the establishment of ties of family and friendship; the maintenance of a certain position and standing in human society. The same right with which a human individual may demand the opportunity for self-development extends to the conditions necessary for such development. Every man has therefore the right to the possession and preservation of his bodily organism, to the ownership of property, to an education, to family care and friendly love, to citizenship and occupation-in the degree and to the extent required for his own Self-realization. This right, belonging to every human individual as a free person, brings with it an obligation also absolute and universal, that of respecting the rights of all other human beings to the conditions necessary for free self-development. Justice defends the ethical right -of human personality to develop in accordance with its freedom, by enforcing upon all individuals the moral obligation equally authoritative-that they refrain from any interference with the exercise of this right by ,others. Hence the demands of justice have naturally found ,expression in a series of prohibitions: Thou shalt not kill; Thou shalt not steal; Thou shalt not bear false witness; Thou shalt not commit adultery, etc.

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POLITICAL JUSTICE The end of human society is the fullest possible development of the powers of human personality in all its members -in other words, the realization of the highest human good. To this end it aims to establish the conditions requisite to Self-realization among human beings. But since these conditions-health and security, private property, education, etc.-can be made conditions of self-realization only through the volition of the individuals concerned, the primary function of society is the protection of its members from any interference in the exercise of this, their right to avail themselves of the means necessary to their own personal development. The state, or body politic, is society acting as a unit in defense of the rights of its members, through the use of physical power; it is society exercising force in the attainment of its end, which is the promotion of the highest human welfare. With the means at its disposal, i.e. force, the state cannot directly affect the wills of its members and produce either the intention to exercise the right of self-development, or the acknowledgment of the obligation to respect this right in the case of others. All it can do is to remove hindrances to self-development by protecting its members from interference or encroachment while exercising this right. In thus “removing hindrances” the state is compelled again to act in an indirect and negative way. It cannot force its members to respect each other's rights; but by the inflicting of penalties it can interpose obstacles which effectually hinder all violation of others' rights through outward action. Thus Professor Bosanquet¹ finds the function of the state most adequately expressed in the principle of “hindrances to hindrances.” This phrase well expresses the limitation imposed on all state action, as long as it 1    Cf. BOSANQUET: Philosophical Theory of the State.


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acts through the instrumentality distinctive of it, physical force. For force can only determine outward action. This does not mean, of course, outward movement alone, since all voluntary actions proceed from intention. But the state can only enforce such intention as is necessary to bring about compliance with requirements stated in terms of outward movement; it cannot make sure that the action will be performed from a motive that would give it moral value. Thus the state can produce in the minds of individual citizens the intention to 'keep hands off others' property; it cannot, however, make sure that such honesty will proceed from a regard for others' welfare; in the case of many individuals it will be due to a fear of the law's penalties. Hence there are decided limits to the profitable use of force by the state in the promotion of human welfare. No one would think of enforcing by law the finer expressions of courtesy, loyalty and devotion to friends, courage in the defense or rescue of the weak and afflicted; for to appeal to the lower motive in the case of these actions would tend to prevent their performance by the higher motive, the one which gives them greater moral value. Thus is has been said that only those acts should be enforced by public power which it is better to have done from any motive, than not to have done at all. Even though we adopt the principle of “hindrances to hindrances” as expressing the distinctive function of the state in the moral development of man, if we understand its ultimate aim to be, not the happiness of separate individuals but the highest personal development of humanity, the sphere in which it may legitimately exercise its power remains, nevertheless, a large one. As human societies grow in experience and intelligence they gain an ever increasing insight into the essential conditions of personal development. In consequence, they are able in a growing degree to secure for their members an opportunity for Self-realization, by removing the

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obstacles which have hitherto deprived them of this opportunity, either as a whole or in part. Thus it is apparent that sufficient food and proper training in childhood are necessary to the later development of the distinctively human faculties, and it is now seen to be the duty of the state to provide care and education, if need be, at the public expense. It is obvious that if working men are to enjoy the benefits of a truly human life, they must be guaranteed as much safety in their work as the character of their occupation permits, with the added assurance of support for self and family if injury results in occupations particularly hazardous; nations are now enacting laws by which these fundamental human rights are secured for workers largely at the expense of those who profit directly by their industry. And indeed when we consider the work of the state in the large-its office in furthering the highest human good- the line we have drawn between a negative activity in the hindrance of hindrances and a positive work for human betterment, seems abstract and artificial. While it is true that the state in enforcing its laws can only determine external actions, still the existence of laws and the machinery for their enforcement tend to create a social sentiment and public opinion, both of which act as a direct stimulus to moral development. The human individual, who is a citizen of a state, has therefore legal in addition to moral rights. A legal right is a claim upon the public power to be protected from interference in free personal development. These legal rights are enforced by the state and represent the conditions of Self-realization in so far as the social community is able to secure them for its members. In the strict and impartial enforcement of all laws enacted to maintain the rights of citizens, consists, then, political justice. Of course, the human individual has moral rights which extend beyond his legal rights. He has a moral right to the

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companionship and sympathy of his fellows which he, as a social being, craves, yet this is not and cannot be a right enforced by law; to recognize and observe this right must remain for the higher sense of justice in his fellows. But in gaining legal rights the citizen also incurs legal obligations. He is bound to respect the rights of others as these are defined by the law; in thus complying fully with the law he meets the demands of legal justice. ' Justice as a moral attribute, however, requires that he respect the rights of his fellows out of a genuine regard for their welfare and not from fear of the penalties of the law; the law may nevertheless influence him in his. conduct towards other men, by making clear to him their rights, and bringing home to him his duties towards them. But moral justice must necessarily go farther than legal justice in its requirements; man's full duty to his fellows' welfare cannot be enforced by law. As Paulsen says: “A legal system attempting to enforce the complete realization of the idea of justice in the acts of men would, as may readily be seen, necessarily lead to a most intolerable state of insecurity and tyranny. Hence the legal order confines itself to enforcing that minimum of righteous acts without which the human social life would not be possible. It thereby of course leaves a wide margin for injuries and -unjust assertion of individual interests at the expense of those of others.”² The law forbids murder and assault but it does not forbid the renting at a profit of unsanitary and flimsily built houses which cause the death of their occupants by disease and fire. The -law forbids robbery and burglary, forgery and embezzlement, but not sharp business practices which deprive men of their honest savings and hard-won financial standing. The law forbids libel and slander but not malicious gossip and mischievous tale-bearing, which ruin reputations and produce discouragement and despair. 2    PAULSEN: Op. Cit., P. 633.


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The law forbids the violation of the marriage vows and seduction of the youthful and inexperienced, but not the secret disloyalties of mind and heart nor the pollution of immature minds by improper plays, stories, and conversation. But these latter actions as well as the former-and they are, of course, only examples-the practice of justice as a virtue prohibits as a matter of course, since they hinder the development of human personality. CORRECTIVE JUSTICE The state enforces its laws enacted to maintain the fundamental rights of citizens, by punishment of those who transgress them. This exercise of force in defense of its enactments is a right belonging to the state, representing as it does the general will and common interest of its citizens. Punishment in a civilized state takes the form of fine, imprisonment, or, in extreme cases., of death. Now since the ultimate aim of that system of rights enforced by the public power is the self-development of humanity within its boundaries, it is clear that the aim of punishment is the promotion of human welfare. After the offense is committed punishment is necessary to conserve that social order and security which are required for further human development. This end it subserves primarily by hindering others, and the criminal himself, from committing such offenses in the future. In the second place, it contributes to the same end, of social well-being, by bringing home- to the criminal the serious and self-destructive character of his act and thug turning him back into the paths of -useful citizenship and personal rectitude. All this is so clear that it seems strange that any other view of the aims of punishment should have arisen or gained currency. Yet the reason for this becomes plain in its turn if we

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consider the origin and development of the institution of public justice in course of social evolution. Methods of corrective justice have their natural root in an instinct possessed by animals as well as men. When injured, or threatened with injury the animal instinctively defends itself by retaliating upon the aggressor and seeking to inflict similar injury upon him. Such instinctive resentment or retaliation is at first man's only means of defending his life, person, and property, from attack. The evolution of justice as a social institution begins when individual injuries are taken up by the clan or tribe of the injured individual, which revenges itself not upon the offender alone but -upon his tribe or clan. The ” blood- feud “ being defined and regulated by custom grows into a recognized social institution but in its purpose remains entirely retaliatory. When society becomes sufficiently organized to have chiefs or sovereigns of admitted and permanent authority we have the beginnings of justice administered by the public power. But justice as meted out by the sovereign in his decrees is at fir`âltogether retaliatory; for the sovereign punishes offenders not because they have violated the rights of their fellows but because they have transgressed his authority-have violated the “king's peace.”³ Gradually the idea gains ground that the political authority in inflicting punishment is not wreaking private vengeance but is acting for society and is defending the rights of subjects or citizens. But still the idea of retaliation survives and lingers; for the punishment of the criminal is looked upon as the just retaliation upon him of the social order which he has injured, as the retribution which his fellows, acting through the duly constituted political authorities, have a right to exact from -him. This view that the first purpose of punishment is retribution still prevails among many, probably the majority of people, 3    HOBHOUSE: Morals in Evolution, Vol. I, Chap. III.


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even in civilized countries, and is subscribed to by not a few political theorists and Moralist's.⁴ According to the retributive theory punishment in its primary function does not look forward to social progress which it aims to promote, but backward towards the offense which it aims to requite. The suffering of the offender when punished is conceived as something that he owes to the social order which he has injured, as a debt which he is obliged to pay. In harmony with this view it is further believed that punishments should be graded in their severity according to the gravity of offenses. The hold -which the retributive theory has on the popular mind is not difficult to explain; it gives articulate expression-and vertical justification-to the instinct of revenge which is still a part of our nature; nearly every one of us feels the instinctive craving for vengeance when a particularly cruel and cowardly crime is brought to his attention. But the influence which this view still has among intelligent students of human life and society-an influence which is growing steadily less--is due mostly to the influence of several great modern thinkers who have sought to find an ethical or even a metaphysical justification for retributive punishment. Most notable in this connection are the views of Hegel. According to this philosopher a crime, while it is actual as an external event, possesses no positive reality; rather it is essentially naught, the negation of the real will, the true self, of the wrongdoer. The realization of his true will, then, his own right in fact, demands the negation of this negation. This is what occurs in punishment and therefore punishment is logically necessary-made so by the crime itself. Even capital punishment is, in extreme cases, owed by society to the criminal as his own right. An element of truth may be recognized in this conception 4    Cf. SHARP: “Popular Attitude Toward Retributive Punishment,” International Journal of Ethics Vol. XX, p. 341.


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of punishment, without at the same time admitting any truth in the retributive theory. No doubt the criminal does by his own act negate his own larger self; but punishment is not needed to establish this fact. Nay, the less conscious he is of his own guilt, the more insensible to the suffering he has inflicted, the more completely self-destructive is his act. It is undoubtedly necessary, furthermore, to bring home to the criminal consciousness the nullifying and self-destructive effect of his act upon his own character as a social being. But this is necessary as the condition of his reform and not as the consequence of his crime. Thus we are brought around again to the teleological theory of punishment, which has as its aim always the self-development of humanity. If punishment is to accomplish its true. aim the first object which must be sought by the society which inflicts it, is the prevention of crime. The degrees of punishment prescribed and inflicted for different offenses must be determined with a view to this object. It is a mistake to think, however, that the severer the punishmei@t the more efficacious it is as a deterrent to crime. The experience of past ages has shown-ages when the direst penalties, even death itself with torture, were inflicted for what appear to us now as minor offenses, such as, for instance, the picking of pockets or the stealing of horses and cattle-that when the severity of the punishment is increased beyond a certain point it tends to defeat its own purpose by breeding among those individuals of the populace who have criminal proclivities a spirit of recklessness and indifference to their own life and safety, as well as to the life and safety of others. Much more important than severity of punishment in the prevention of crime is the speed and certainty of detection and conviction whenever crime is committed. But besides the office of prevention punishment has a work of reformation to accomplish. Aiming as it does at the

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highest human good, punishment cannot neglect the personal well-being of the offender. And by forcing upon the criminal's attention the seriousness of his offense from the standpoint of the society of which he is a member punishment may be, as we have,seen, a most effective instrument of reform. In this reformative work, however, our present methods of punishment are most inadequate. Our prisons and penitentiaries are in all too many instances schools of crime instead of true reformatories. This is particularly true in the case of youthful offenders. Close confinement and enforced inactivity have further checked the normal development of capacities for achievement, and association with older and more hardened criminals has contributed to a further corruption of character and perversion of motives of action. That prisons should become institutions of reform does not mean, however, that they shall be converted into pleasant sanitariums or schools of moral instruction. The convicts in such institutions need to gain new ideals of conduct, to be sure. But more than preaching they need training-more than new conceptions of life they need new habits of living, habits of industry and application, and perseverance. And the continued effort which is required for the learning of a trade or the development of a capacity is none the less beneficial because exceedingly irksome and distasteful. Often it is because the individual, through weakness of will or unfavorable surroundings, has been unable to endure the tedium and drudgery incidental to learning a legitimate trade, that his activity has been turned into evil channels and he has been prevented from becoming a useful citizen. That deficiencies in early training should thus be remedied by the teaching of trades in our penitentiaries, and that additional incentives to faithful effort in this direction should be provided in the way of opportunities for further development and of earlier release, seem to be in every way wise and salutary. Many new and

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promising methods of reformative work in prisons have been devised in recent years and their prompt and thorough trial should be encouraged by all those interested in human welfare. There is certainly no field where humanitarian zeal may be more pro@tably exercised than that of prison reform. DISTRIBUTIVE JUSTICE Human societies are concerned with the distribution not only of penalties, but of ” rewards.“ By rewards, in the present connection, we mean external possessions and prerogatives, such as wealth and public recognition, whose use and enjoyment in some degree are necessary to the human individual if he is to attain self-realization. To the extent in which wealth and fame are required as means of Self- realization, their possession is of course man's moral right. And if the supply of these ” goods “ were unlimited we might, conceivably, leave it altogether to the conscience of the individual to decide how much effort the interests of his own personal development would allow him to devote to the pursuit and enjoyment of them. As we well know, however, the quantity of wealth available for man's use and the amount of honors which human societies can bestow is not unlimited; the supply is in both cases so far limited that such amount as is appropriated by any one individual for his own exclus`âuse is the
drawn from the quantity available for others. In these circumstances human society, in the pursuit of its own proper end, cannot afford to overlook the question of the distribution of these rewards among its members; it must endeavor through its authorized agencies to secure such distribution of wealth and honors as will most effectually further the development of human personality. But this task is by no means easy; it is beset with many difficulties, both theoretical and

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practical. Indeed, we encounter radical disagreement among authorities at the very outset-in respect to the principle upon which this distribution should be effected. This disagreement is at present most clearly seen in the conflict between the principle generally accepted by European thought since the time of Aristotle, that reward should be apportioned to individual ability and accomplishment, and the “socialistic” principle which has lately gained wide acceptance that external goods should be distributed among men according to their needs which are fundamentally alike, leaving superior ability and greater efficiency to be their own reward. That the private ownership of property is, under the conditions of human life, a means necessary to man's Self- realization, can scarcely be disputed. The value of the institution of property as an instrument of self-development in enabling the individual to provide for his own material well-being, present and future, and thus encouraging him in the exercise of foretght, industry, and self-control, has already been shown. The possession of wealth contributes to Self-realization also by enabling the individual to provide himself with the tools and equipment necessary to the advantageous exercise of his abilities. But the ownership of property even in excess of the amount needed to supply all these wants now and to come-property which belongs to the individual to dispose of at will in the realization of his purposes-seems required for complete self-development. How is the total wealth available for human use to be distributed in order that these fundamental rights of human personality shall be fully observed f What principle of distribution is prescribed by the ideal of Self-realization? To this question we may answer with some assurance that Self-realization would distribute wealth among men in accordance with what is needed to make their individual capacities most effective in promoting human, welfare. To

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make clear the meaning of this principle, let us indicate in a word what it does not admit as a just basis for the distribution of external goods among human beings. In the first place, it does not propose to distribute wealth among individuals in.accordance with their differences in native ability. The possession of superior capacity by certain individuals constitutes no rightful claim to superior reward. It is certainly the height of injustice to increase the advantages which some individuals possess by giving them a larger share of the fruits of labor; extraordinary ability is certainly its own reward. Nor, on the other hand, is it proposed to apportion the amount of reward to the value of the service which the individual renders society. It is practically impossible to determine the comparative value to society of the various human activities. Indeed there is reason for holding that all human capacities honestly exercised have equal value to society; since all are factors equally necessary in the development of human personality. Who shall say that the work of the miner has less value to society than that of the artist, the work of the navigator less than that of the lawyer or merchant? But our principle does recognize differences in the amount of wealth which must be expended in the training and exercise of different human capacities if they are to attain full development. The achievements of house-builder and architect are equally necessary and valuable to human society, .yet the training and exercise of distinctive capacities of the latter require the expenditure of much more money in study, travel, and equipment. Instead of the words “if they are to attain full development” we might with the same truth have said “if they are to be of greatest social service,” since we may assume that the various capacities of man receive their full development only when they co-contribute most to the personal well-being of humanity. In fact, the principle which Self-realization prescribes for the

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distribution of rewards is difficult to grasp because of its very concreteness which forces us to consider at once the many aspects of the human situation-the amount of reward which the individual is to receive being determined not solely by the degree or kind of ability which he possesses, nor alone by the value of the service he renders to, society, but by the requirements which the exercise of his, particular capacity makes, if it is to be of largest service in the personal development of man. Justice requires that rewards be so distributed among men that all individuals shall be given an equal opportunity for self-development. In the expenditure of public money to provide facilities of education and training the needs of all individuals should receive the same consideration. This does not mean that all individuals shall be given an education, equally costly, a training equally prolonged; but rather that the kind of education provided for each individual shall be determined by the character of his distinctive abilities, as these abilities are manifested in his early development. When the preliminary period of training and education is past and the individual is put in full possession of his personal powers, wealth should be distributed among individuals in accordance with the demands which their different capacities make if they are to achieve their utmost for human welfare. It is obvious that different @( callings ” equally honorable and alike necessary for human well-being require for their successful pursuit the employment of widely varying amounts of wealth. For the work of both diplomat and teacher, for example, a preparatory training prolonged and costly is required but the activity of the former, when his career is actually begun, makes much larger demands in the way of external emoluments than that of the latter. Certain important positions in human life, if they are to be so filled as to contribute their utmost to social welfare, require the expenditure of

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wealth far above the average, in securing for their occupants freedom from material discomforts and inconvenience, the opportunity for leisure and travel, and the intellectual stimulus which congenial companionship affords. To such positions should attach incomes proportionate to their needs. An equitable distribution of incomes would be based, as a recent writer has said, upon ” the individual necessities of livelihood (essentially the same for all men) and the added needs which the position itself imposes. “ This principle of distributive justice which seems to be implied in the Moral Ideal gives to us, to be sure, no formula for calculating precisely what the incomes of different men in different walks of life shall be. It partakes of the nature of an ideal, very general in character, and whose application to particular cases is difficult to see, because of the many and perplexing details which must be considered. Yet it affords us a standard by which existing economic systems may be criticized and their justice estimated. And when we measure our present system of distributing wealth by this standard it falls far short of the requirements of justice. Doubtless the system of free competition which now prevails in civilized societies is much more just than the system which preceded it, by which the opportunity of personal development accorded to the individual as well as that of sharing in the fruits of human industry was strictly limited by his hereditary status. With the injustice of the older system fresh in memory it is not strange that men believed that if they were accorded the liberty to labor in a chosen field in competition with ,others, and to dispose at will of the products of their labor, the ends of justice would be attained. But the system of “unlimited competition, unlimited accumulation, and unlimited inheritance” has, in actual practice, been attended with great injustice. Free competition in business and industry has bestowed upon a certain few capacities having

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but a narrow range-those of technical proficiency in one or two departments of practical life-a reward far in excess of their own demands for fulfillment, or of the contribution they are able to make to human welfare. An artificially high premium has been set upon shrewdness, foresight, and enterprise, when exercised in the manufacture and distribution of material commodities. It has permitted the accumulation of wealth in the hands of those possessing these qualities which, privately owned and employed as capital, has given them such enormous advantage as practically to deprive others of the right of free competition which on theoretical grounds they possess in equal degree with the capitalists. Finally, unrestricted inheritance of vast sums of wealth and its further use as capital by those who receive it, gives this great and unfair advantage to individuals who cannot claim even to have ” earned “ it by the exercise of any personal capacity whatsoever. The result of all this has been the growth `âonopoly, the concentration of wealth in the possession of a few, and the comparative impoverishment of the many. No wonder cries of protest are raised against the social injustice of such a system; and that men are everywhere seeking a new principle for the distribution of wealth which shall remedy these abuses. Flagrant examples of the injustice of the present system come to attention daily. In the reports of the death of a real estate agent recently published in the newspapers of his city it was stated that his income had frequently reached $50,000 a year owing to the special ability he possessed of closing large ” deals “ in real estate which had for long been pending but not brought to the point of decision. Surely a large reward for the capacity exercised; yet the present system is responsible for just such cases as this 1 The capacity for shrewd prevision along with the possession of some capital enables certain individuals, through the buying and selling of houses and land, to reap

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profits so huge from the labor of others in the up-building of cities and the settling of localities that they are led to pay commissions proportionately large and undeserved to all the intermediaries in their transactions. A railway ,official was lately quoted in protest against the review and revision, by a state officer paid $2,500 a year, of rates fixed by a railway traffic officer paid $25,000 a year. Certainly the ability requisite for reviewing and adjusting railway rates in the interest of all the inhabitants of a state demands for its training and development the use of as much wealth, and in its exercise makes as great a contribution to human welfare, as that required to fix charges with reference solely to the profit of a single corporation. There is no questioning the fact that if the ends of democracy are to be realized and every individual is to be given an equal opportunity for self-development, a new and truer method for the distribution of wealth and the adjustment of incomes must be put in practice. 5. Benevolence.-The end which is sought through all the various restrictions imposed upon individuals by the practice of justice is the development of human personality itself, recognized wherever and whenever it exists as an -end of absolute moral worth. The habit of promoting the well-being of all fellow-men in the community, in the nation, and in the world, through individual effort and initiative, is the virtue of benevolence. Benevolence is, therefore, justice with emphasis laid upon the positive end towards which this latter virtue is directed. It is a more comprehensive and hence a higher virtue than friendship; in the ideal which it sets before the human individual it indicates the goal of self-organization in the social sphere. The duty which benevolence imposes upon us is the service of humanity. -This means the human self as such humanity as a whole, with no limitation of age or sex, race or nationality, time or place. There, is no blinking the wide

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and sweeping character of the obligation which the Moral Ideal lays upon us as the final step in Self-realization. It demands the development of the capacities of human personality universally; it will brook no discrimination or restriction whatsoever among individuals or among peoples. It includes the most unattractive individuals, the most unpromising peoples. Benevolence, in fact, is humanitarianism in practice. To insist upon this point may seem to some minds to be discrediting benevolence; for humanitarianism is often compared unfavorably with less comprehensive virtues like patriotism and ridiculed or denounced as vague, impracticable, and hypocritical. If pretensions of humanitarianism are used as a cloak to hide a lack of neighborly kindness or sympathy, or if ineffective and foolish methods are employed in efforts to further its ends, surely these faults are not to be charged to the account of the ideal itself. The truth remains that complete self- organization requires the adoption and pursuit of an ideal no less comprehensive than that of total human welfare. If, therefore, the individual is justified, from the ethical standpoint, in cultivating especially a few chosen friends and in failing of the same devotion in case of all other human beings it must be, and is, because the development of his own capacities for human service, under the conditions of human existence, make such limitations of his activity necessary. Or if a man strives for the good of his own country and neglects, by comparison, the well-being of other nations-if he, consents to the continued development of the more civilized at the expense of the less civilized peoples,-it must be because he understands in the former case that the good of his own country includes the performance of a helpful office in the family of nations, and believes in the latter case that the uninterrupted development of the civilized peoples is necessary to the best interests of future humanity. Doubtless, in case of such judgments,

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too, there is a peculiar danger that self-interest may lead to self-deception or insincerity, yet man's short-sightedness or the impurity of his motives should not be allowed to reflect discredit upon the ideal whose realization is required for the complete and permanent satisfaction of his will. If we are to understand aright what the “service of humanity” means we must guard against a prevalent misconception of social well-being in its relation to individual interests. A misunderstanding on this point may cause the ideal of benevolence to appear as a mistake and an absurdity. If human society be conceived as an aggregate of individuals each of whom has his own private and exclusive good, then such service of others, as benevolence contemplates, must mean that every individual shall deny to his own nature the satisfaction it craves, and devote himself to the fulfillment of others' desires. Suppose benevolence to be practiced universally and we have all individuals abandoning their natural pursuits and occupied with the interests of others, each of whom is likewise busy with the affairs of his neighbor rather than with his own individual interest,. Such a social life would of course be quite empty and worthless. That “life of humanity” whose development is the end sought by benevolenceltogether different from this. It is truly conceived not as a sum of individual lives and interests but as a spiritual whole of which individual selves - are the differentiations. It is an organization of personalities in which each individual may perform his peculiar function in effective adjustment to all the rest. The development of this, the personal life of humanity, is the end whose attainment is required for the complete satisfaction of the human will. It is the comprehensive ideal which underlies and correlates all lesser interests. As Hobhouse says: “That the individual is member of a spiritual whole with a common life and a general interest, is the axiom which gives the needed

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coherence to the multitudinous sympathies, susceptibilities, reluctancies, that guide the moral life of the unreflecting man.”⁵ The inclusive social well-being to the furtherance of which benevolence is directed is, therefore, not a monotonous and empty round of futile self-sacrifice; it possesses content inexhaustibly rich and infinitely varied. It consists in the maximum development of all the personal capacities of its members exercised in complete organic adjustment. But how shall the individual with his limited range of acquaintance and influence, affect for better-or for worse -the well-being of humanity? Is not this end, through the vastness of its range and the magnitude of its content, so far beyond the scope of any individual's a@etion as to cause whatever effort he may devote to its realization to be entirely wasted, and, as withdrawn from lesser interests nearer at hand, to be positively injurious in result upon his life? Is not the humanitarian ideal an impracticable dream? The best answer to all these really perplexing questions in regard to the method whereby the end of benevolence may be realized, is found in the idea of vocation. The individual best serves humanity who most faithfully and fully develops the capacity that is greatest within him, in effective cooperation with the efforts of his fellows to realize their distinctive capacities. One who does this may rest assured that his achievements, although they make no apparent difference to humanity are nevertheless real contributions to human progress. In the present age, moreover, with its improved methods of transportation and communication the value to all existing humanity of productions of the individual need not remain a matter of faith with him; he may hope to see his original achievements appropriated by all his fellow-men and made means to general human betterment. By railway and steamship, printing-press and postal. 5    HOBHOUSE: Morals in Evolution, Vol. 11, p. 219.


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service, telegraph and telephone, the individual's illuminating ideas, his life-saving remedy, or his labor-saving invention, are, in the course of a few days, or months, or years, made the property of humanity. This idea of vocation, by which is meant the call to each human individual yo make, through the exercise of the capacity most marked in his nature, his own unique contribution to human development, is of utmost ethical importance. For the “welfare of humanity,” as we have seen, is not an undifferentiated mass, a great sum-total of happiness, say, homogeneous in character. It resides rather in the union and communion of personalities, each different, each in fact unique in the combination of abilities that it possesses. The development of such spiritual system takes by a necessity of its nature the form, not of an obliteration of distinctions between its constituent members, but of further differentiation accompanied by increasing organic interdependence. It is now a commonplace of social philosophy that the progress of human society depends upon growth in organization with an ever more complete division of labor among the individuals involved. Thus every person will achieve what he is best fit to achieve, dedicating to the use of humanity the products of his labor. In the meantime he will avail himself of a share in the achievements of all other individuals in their respective fields of action. The physician contributes his skill to the relief of his sick and suffering fellows. He enjoys the better methods of government devised by legislators and administered by executives, the superior educational opportunities provided by teachers, the conveniences and comforts originated by inventors, technicians, and engineers, and so forth. From these facts it follows that the choice of a vocation is a momentous events in the life of the individual. So fraught is it with the possibilities of good and ill that its significance cannot be exaggerated. Such choice should be

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based upon the knowledge which the individual has of his own capacities, and also upon a consideration of the different kinds of activities which are recognized by men as contributing to human welfare. Most important certainly is the knowledge which each person alone possesses of his own abilities and of that which, because strongest and most urgent in its demands for expression, holds forth the greatest promise of achievement. Much assistance,is given to the individual in thus sounding the depths of his own nature, however, by a study of the various pursuits which have acknowledged social value. For the occupations and institutions of society are but the objective expression of the powers of human personality itself; in them the individual may see realized on a larger scale the capacities of his own nature. Hence it may well be that his own distinctive ability will be revealed to him by the compelling attraction of some department of social service rather than by the stirrings of some special potency within him. Besides these fundamental criteria which should govern the individual in his choice of a profession, are minor considerations of a practical nature which must exert a varying influence in different cases. Mr. Rashdall, who, in his profound and penetrating study of the moral life,⁶ gives an important place to the idea of vocation, mentions a number of such practical considerations which, he holds, must set limits to the requirement of the Ideal⁷ that each person should choose the most useful and laborious calling. These practical considerations are in substance as follows.⁸ (1) A person should hesitate before embarking under the influence of high motives upon a course of action calling for 6    RASHDALL: Theories of Good and Evil.
7    The Ideal of Social Welfare, when conceived abstractly, i.e., as requiring the individual to sacrifice his own preferences and enjoyments altogether, in the service of his fellows. Op. cit., Vol. II, 121.
8    Ibid., p. 122 ff.


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severe labor and constant self-sacrifice when he is not sure that the inspiration to carry it through will be forthcoming. (2) Certain social functions require to be performed in a certain spirit which cannot always be summoned at will. Unless the individual possess the qualities of mind and heart that produce this spirit he should avoid such pursuits. (3) As a general rule a man cannot hope to do Weil@ and hence is not qualified to perform successfully, a work for which he has not a natural liking. (4) All men cannot engage in the most altruistic and self-sacrificing pursuits; consequently it must be the duty of some men to continue in the more worldly and self-profiting occupations. (5) Some men require more ease and amusement than others if they are to work to best advantage in any line; they have a right to consider this fact in choosing a vocation. (6) A person's own happiness is part of that social good which he should aim to promote through the discharge of his vocation; it ought not, therefore, to be sacrificed to promote a less amount of it in others. (7) That differentiation in modes of life which is necessary to social progress must lead to inequalities in the amount of luxury and enjoyment possible to different individuals; this fact may in certain circumstances justify the individual in choosing the easier and pleasanter career. (8) Some kinds of work which call for less self-sacrifice are as socially useful as those which call for more; thus a moral justification exists for choosing them.-These considerations contain much truth and practical wisdom, and it is without doubt helpful to bear them in mind. Yet whatever truth they contain seems to have been already comprehended in the principles we have adopted to govern the choice of a vocation-that the individual should choose that line of activity in which he is best fitted by his distinctive capacity to achieve permanent results, considering the actual state of human society and the existing division of.labor within it. In accordance with

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these principles, having chosen a vocation as the most effective means of promoting human welfare, the individual is constrained by all the force and authority of the Moral Ideal to prepare himself as thoroughly and perfectly as possible for its discharge and then, when preparation is complete,.to devote all his strength and ability to the fulfillment of this, his vocation. The choice and practice of a vocation by no means removes all the difficulties, it must be confessed, from the path of one who sincerely desires to realize the larger possibilities of his nature in the service of humanity. Innumerable perplexities remain regarding the relation of legitimate individual interest and the social well-being which the individual is bound morally to promote. No one can pretend that every actual, and apparently necessary, occupation in our social economy is a true vocation, or that every genuine human capacity can find satisfactory expression in some acknowledged form of social service. We can only hope that the further diversification of activities which must accompany continued social progress will make some place for the talents of those individuals for whom the world seems at present to have no use, and that industrial progress will so alter methods and conditions of work as to make the occupations of machine operatives, domestic servants, and ” day laborers “ truly h`â vocations-which, in too many cases at present, it must be admitted with regret, they are not. Allusion has already been made to the hard fact that, at present, economic pressure, by driving individuals forth in search of the means of subsistence before their faculties have had development or training, prevents many from discovering what their distinctive abilities are, and prevents others who are aware of their own aptitudes, from entering those occupations in which alone their special capacities can find realization. It is a demand of simple justice that these conditions should be removed which deprive our

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fellow-men of their fundamental moral right-the opportunity to attain Self-realization through participating in the personal life of humanity. But these reforms await the coming of a clearer vision of the larger social welfare, a more sincere devotion to the self-development of human personality, a stronger feeling of the essential unity of all-intelligent beings within the one universal life. At the end of the previous chapter an outline of the various fields of human activity was given, based upon that classification of the capacities which has been followed in the present book. In connection with this outline a list of human vocations may be made which, though it can make no pretensions to completeness or finality, may be useful for purposes of illustration.

			NATURE                  Scientist 

INTELLECTUAL 		MAN                     Humanist 
			UNIVERSE,               Philosopher 
						Mining Engineer 
					Land  	Mechanical Engineer 
						Civil Engineer 
			INORGANIC               Electrical Engineer 

					Water 	Navigator 

					Plant  	Farmer 

			ORGANIC     	Animal  Breeder 

TECHNICAL                                  	Physician 
					Human   Surgeon 
						Dentist
						Medical Technicians, etc. 




					Law and	Statesman 
			SOCIAL          Gov't	Diplomatist 
						Lawyer 
					War     Soldier




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					Industry Manufacturer 
						Distributor 

					Education Teacher 
					Religion  Clergyman 


						Architect 
			VISUAL                 	Painter 
						Sculptor 

AESTHETIC           	AUDITORY              	Musician 
						Composer


						Poet 
			VERBAL                  Dramatist 
						Novelist