CHAPTER V SELF-REALIZATION AND HAPPINESS
1. Pleasure as an Element in Self-Realization.--2. Self-Realization Not Identical with the Greatest Sum of Pleasures.--3. But Rather with a Harmony of Pleasures, or Happiness.--4. Happiness Thus the Feeling That Accompanies the Organization of Conduct.--5. Happiness Not to Be Accepted as the Good, Because It Is Unduly Subjective in Its Reference.--6. And It Implies a State of Passive Enjoyment.--7. Is the Pursuit of Goodness Certain to Result in the Greatest Happiness?--8. It Is, on the Assumption That Moral Purpose Is Supreme in the Universe.--9. And That Man May Complete His Moral Development in a Future Life.
1. Pleasure as an Element in Self-Realization.
Reference has previously been made to the fact that just as on the level of sentient, life pleasure is an accompaniment of all action which is beneficial to the organism, so on the higher plane of intelligence and personality, pleasant feeling is attendant upon all unimpeded and successful activity. Such activity, having its source in self-conscious volition, is directed not merely upon those objects which natural instinct makes attractive because required for the continued preservation and well-being of the human organism; it is directed also upon the ideal objects which are likewise necessary for the satisfaction of man's psychic capacities of thought, emotion, and practice. Pleasure is thus the normal accompaniment of all voluntary action when successful in attaining its object, and equally whether this object be material or spiritual. Now Self-realization as the Highest Good is just the fullest possible satisfaction of all the capacities of intelligent personality, natural and spiritual. It is evident, therefore, that pleasure is an
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essential element in Self-realization, an integral part of the Good. We have then to take account of the place occupied by Pleasure in the good life.2. Self-Realization Not Identical with the Greatest Sum of Pleasures.
If it is true that pleasure accompanies the gratification of every desire, the fulfillment of every purpose, and Self-realization consists in the fullest possible satisfaction of all purposes and desires, the question arises-- May not the Good then be conceived as the maximum of pleasure, i.e. the greatest amount of pleasure obtainable by the individual during his life? If we grant this, we find ourselves in practical agreement with the Hedonist whose contention we lately rejected as erroneous. But, further thought shows us that the logic of Self-realization compels no such surrender to the claims of Hedonism: the two positions remain distinct throughout and, in certain points, fundamentally antagonistic. For the recognition that pleasure is a necessary constituent of Self-realization, the highest human good, is by no means identical with the assertion that man's good is the greatest amount of pleasure. Pleasures can thus be added only when reduced to a common denominator. And this could be accomplished solely through a separation of pleasures from the objects in connection with which they arise. Then, indeed, all qualitative distinctions would disappear and we would have left only specific instances of the same type of consciousness, the pleasant as distinguished from the unpleasant. These instances of pleasant feeling would differ only in quantity, i. e. in duration and intensity. The consistent Hedonist separates pleasures in this way from their objective conditions, admitting no qualitative differences and proposing such a calculation as will bring the individual the greatest amount of pleasure. But thus to separate pleasures from the objects and activities that produce them is to falsify the facts of experience. A pleasure thus cut
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away from its objective source is a psychological abstraction, not a part of our concrete experience. Pleasure always comes to us as one element in a unitary experience, it being the inner, the subjective aspect, to which the object, as the outer or external factor, is essential and complementary, the two being strictly inseparable in their intimate and organic union. When pleasure is thus conceived--not as an abstract psychological entity, mere pleasure--but concretely, as the pleasure of this object or that action, they do differ qualitatively. The pleasure of poetry has a different quality from that of eating, and the pleasure of benevolence from either of the other two. Now Self-realization implies the recognition of a difference in quality among pleasures, and along with this qualitative difference a difference in moral value. According to this principle, the moral value of any form or feature of conduct is, as we know, determined by the degree to which it contributes to the realization of all the capacities of the self. But, in this very respect, pleasures differ widely. Certain pleasures, although in themselves comparatively intense, tend to destroy the capacities out of which they arise and to lessen the amount of satisfaction possible to other capacities. On the contrary, other pleasures, not in themselves strong, are self-augmenting and create conditions favorable to a fuller exercise of the other capacities. Compare, for instance, the pleasures arising from action to satisfy two instincts, both natural and hence having a legitimate claim to expression, that of resentment and that of curiosity. The pleasure, of anger and retaliation, if sought after or frequently enjoyed, so affects the disposition of the agent, deadening his powers and warping his faculties, that his possibilities for satisfaction in other lines of endeavor are greatly lessened. The other pleasure, though less vivid and absorbing, increases with repetition, develops into the joy of intellectual attainment and, through the addedSELF-REALIZATION AND HAPPINESS
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knowledge which accompanies it, assists in the fulfillment of all other aims and purposes. Measured, then, by the standard which Self-realization applies, some pleasures deserve to be approved, within this class distinctions being made of good, better, and best; while other pleasures equally deserve to be condemned as bad. From the good life the latter class of pleasures is, of course, entirely excluded; while pleasures of the former class enter in a degree proportionate to their moral value. Since Self-realization thus-recognizes qualitative distinctions among pleasures and provides a criterion whereby the place of each pleasure in the good life may be determined, it is obviously in radical opposition to Hedonism, which ignores all differences in quality and proposes, by adding quantities of pleasure, to secure the greatest amount.3. But Rather with a Harmony of Pleasures, or Happiness.
The Good as interpreted by Self-realization is not to be identified with a sum of pleasures but rather with a harmony or system of pleasures. To such a harmony of pleasures the word Happiness may appropriately be applied. When thus used, the term has a meaning quite distinct from pleasure or a sum of pleasures since pleasures may be so joined as to constitute a true synthesis entirely different from the mechanical aggregate which results from combining them externally. Such a synthesis, as has been pointed out, is based upon an insight into the qualitative differences between pleasures, differences in the content and meaning through which one pleasure has implicit reference to another. For it is a fact that pleasures have these inner relationships and in consequence of them some pleasures reinforce and supplement one another while other pleasures are conflicting and discordant. To read an interesting novel and to stroll in the park on a summer's evening are both pleasant diversions and, when they are taken out of their setting in the life of a particular person,
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there is little to choose between them. Yet the character of each is such as to make it harmonious with certain activities and enjoyments and discordant with others. For the bookkeeper whose eyes are strained and muscles cramped by the day's labor the pleasure of strolling in the park is much to be preferred of the two, because it both affords greater present satisfaction through its contrast with the mode and scene of his daily employment and also will prepare him to discharge more efficiently and enjoyably the duties of his occupation on the morrow. The other pleasure, on the contrary, would have afforded less present enjoyment through its unfavorable relation to the day's labor just past and would have diminished future satisfaction because affecting prejudicially the activity of the coming day. The case is typical and shows that the question as between pleasures cannot be settled simply by comparing the amount of enjoyment each will furnish, but involves instead a consideration of each in the total context of the individual's life, and a discovery of which one harmonizes most completely with all his other activities and enjoyments. Happiness may be understood as a harmonious arrangement of pleasures, a system or synthesis in which each of the constituent pleasures supplements and strengthens the rest. Within such a system, no pleasure--no matter how intense--which conflicts with and weakens others, thus tending to destroy the unity and upset the equilibrium of the whole system, can find a place. But, on the contrary, pleasures in themselves weak and faint enough may be given an important place because reinforcing and reviving others. Paradoxical as it may seem, unpleasantness or even pain may have its part in producing the harmony of happiness just as a discord may enter into and, in a way, increase the harmony of a musical composition. Thus the happiness of a great love or friendship may be increasedSELF-REALIZATION AND HAPPINESS
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by the pain of temporary separation from the beloved, or by the suffering that may be undergone in serving him. Of course it is not true that in such cases sorrow is transformed into joy, or pain into pleasure, in the literal sense; but it is true that the unpleasant experience is intimately connected as an essential part in, or necessary means to, the realization of an object which is a fertile and inexhaustible source of pleasure, and for this reason is continually directing the attention to this object which proves on thought to be so agreeable as to cause the present pain to be forgotten. Thus the pain of separation causes the lover to think of his friend and immediately his pain is replaced by greater pleasure in the thought of their love: the suffering of the mother from weariness of her long vigil over the sick child is constantly arousing a deeper joy as she thinks that through these painful efforts his life is being preserved.4. Happiness Thus the Feeling That Accompanies the Organization of Conduct.
It is clear that such a harmony of pleasures as we have been describing can arise only through the adjustment of the various activities of life--through the organization of conduct. Hence happiness may be defined not only as a harmony of pleasures but also as the pleasure of a harmonized or unified life. With this idea in mind, Mr. Rashdall says that it represents “satisfaction with one's existence as a whole-with the past and future as well as with the immediate present.”1 Now, as we are already aware, such a unity can be achieved in human life only through the continued activity of volition in subordinating particular objects of desire to more general aims and purposes and including these aims and purposes within a single comprehensive ideal. When this is done--or to the degree in which it is done-all the action of the individual has one object and his life possesses unity. The progressive realization of this ideal is of course
1 RASHDALL: Theories of Good and Evil, Vol. II, p. 57.
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accompanied by pleasure. This pleasure may be continuous and permanent; for, as every act contributes to the realization of the Supreme Ideal, its attainment occupies the whole of the individual's life. Unlike the narrower objects of natural desire and individual ambition, its possibilities are not easily exhausted nor is its attainment dependent upon fortune and circumstance to the degree of these lesser goods. It provides, therefore, a permanent source of joy which gives tone and buoyancy to the whole of life, tending to crowd out the pain of temporary misfortune and even to relieve the sorrows of deprivation and bereavement. The complete organization of life through a supreme and all-inclusive ideal with the consistent pursuit of this ideal is thus the source of true happiness and of that ” peace which the world cannot give.“ History records many instances of men who have identified themselves with ideal causes and have found in their devotion a happiness which not the pain of increasing illnes`and infirmity or even the prospect of torture and death itself could destroy; biography tells of individuals who, restless and discontented while seeking their own comfort and amusement, discovered joy and peace in the assumption of arduous responsibility. Of course the question may be asked, “What if the Ideal prove impossible of fulfillment, what if the Cause fail?” Whence shall come the happiness of the widowed mother who devotes herself to the education of her only son and sees him turn out a weakling or a scoundrel, or of the patriot who strives all his life for the freedom of his people and at last when the opportunity of achieving it arises sees the chance lost through the cowardice or treachery of his compatriots! The only answer which can be made in such cases is that the particular cause must fail in order that a still larger good shall be realized and that the individual shall find in the eventual attainment of this larger end a source of renewedSELF-REALIZATION AND HAPPINESS
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happiness. To believe this--and still more to practice it--requires moral faith, faith that ultimately the force which makes for righteousness will prevail. Fortunately human experience justifies this faith--although it does not convert it into a certainty. The yearning to identify his life with an object that could not fail, to adopt as his own a purpose that was sure to be realized, led the ancient Stoic to seek peace and happiness in unity with Nature; it was the same motive which caused Spinoza to recommend to men the “intellectual love of God,” a joy which arises when the finite identifies itself with the Infinite and the human individual finds his own good in the Universal Order. There is a possible danger, however, in seeking to obtain happiness or peace through “conformity to Nature” or “union with God.” It is that the ideal attained will be one of thought merely, the discovery that Reality is one inter-related system, and that along with this intellectual insight will come a quietism in practice, and an acceptance of whatever occurs as right because necessitated by the universal system. The realization of such an ideal satisfies man's intellectual faculty alone and fails to fulfill his practical needs which demand that the world shall be capable of mastery by intelligence, of being adapted to the requirements of conscious personality. When the attempt is made in practice to assist in the adjustment of the world to the needs of intelligent personality--when, in other words, the individual endeavors in his small way to promote the cause of universal progress--his ideal proves far more difficult to achieve and his prospect of securing happiness through its successful attainment much less than if he were content with a purely theoretical adjustment. The objective order seems to be in some points antagonistic to the purposes of intelligence, and evil to be inherent in the nature of things. The same objection does not necessarily apply to belief and trust in an over-ruling ProvidenceTHE GOOD AS SELF-REALIZATION
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in the Christian sense, as a source of happiness and contentment, however; for the distinguishing feature of the Christian revelation is the conception of God as the power striving for righteousness in the world, whose efforts involve suffering and self-sacrifice but whose leadership in the battle against the forces of evil gives man the assistance which he sorely needs and the practical assurance of ultimate victory.5. Happiness Not to Be Accepted as the Good, Because It Is Unduly Subjective in Its Reference.
Happiness, as it has been lately defined, is evidently an essential part of Self-realization, if not actually identical with it. In fact, the two words when properly understood may seem to have the same meaning. Might it not be better then to speak of the Good as Happiness rather than Self-realization? Certainly if the word has no implications which stand in the way of its use it is preferable on grounds of being better understood and hence appealing more directly to the majority of minds. But the truth is that happiness does possess implications, does have a distinctive emphasis, which constitutes sufficient reason for rejecting it as the summum bonum. Its emphasis is always upon the inner, the subjective, aspect of all activity and experience; it calls attention to the effect upon the subjective consciousness of every action and achievement; it directs the thought of the self upon those inner states which may be expected to accompany the pursuit and attainment of objects. Because of these implications happiness is not well-suited to serve as the supreme end of conduct. Led to think of his own states of feeling primarily, the agent is biased in favor of those objects which have proved themselves to be reliable sources of enjoyment. But the full satisfaction of his own will--as well as the attainment of happiness itself-requires that the agent forget himself and his own conscious states entirely
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in his devotion to the object. For it is only through such free outgoing activity, unimpeded by subjective concern, that the powers of intelligence and volition in man can reach their complete fulfillment. The “paradox of Hedonism” that to secure pleasure one must forget it because, if he aims at it, he will miss it, retains force as an objection to making any form or system of feeling the supreme good. Indeed the most serious objection to Self-realization itself as the Good is that it directs the attention of the agent upon himself rather than upon the objects through which his will can gain satisfaction. This disadvantage seems to be more than counterbalanced, however, by the merit of Self-realization in emphasizing the fact that the Good is based upon the powers and capacities of the conscious self and not upon the demands of any external authority.6. And It Implies a State of Passive Enjoyment.
Closely connected with the first is a second objection to accepting happiness as the summum bonum. In laying stress upon the subjective effects at the expense of the objective conditions of activity, such a conception of the Highest Good encourages a tendency to conceive of the Good in terms of passive affection instead of active attainment; it invites the agent to fall into a state of receptive enjoyment whenever possible and to seek to prolong and repeat such enjoyment. Certainly this is an erroneous conception of happiness and the course which it prompts the individual to pursue is mistaken; for, as the ancient moralists clearly saw, if a man thinks of his happiness as an effect produced in him by external causes he is then made dependent upon the objects without him, is rendered the slave of fortune and circumstance. True happiness, on the contrary, arises when the consciousness of the agent, absorbed in the pursuit and attainment of a chosen end which he recognizes as an integral part of
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his life's purpose, is suffused by a glow of pleasant feeling which adds light and life to his thought and action. Happiness is thus inseparable from activity. This fact has caused great moralists like Aristotle to define it as a ” species of activity.“ Not, of course, that happiness is not a condition of feeling, but that this feeling is one that arises when objects are chosen and pursued, and is present in a degree proportionate to the adjustment and organization of these various activities. Thus it is relieved from entire subservience to external conditions and made dependent upon the choice and action of the individual; it also gains from his life purpose a steadiness and permanency which raises it above the changing play of natural events. Aristotle held this view of happiness, as is evident from the following statement:
“We have formed a conception of happiness as something that is permanent and exempt from the possibility of change and because the same persons are liable to many revolutions of fortune. For it is clear that, if we follow the changes of fortune, we shall often call the same person happy at one time and miserable at another, representing the happy man as la sort of chameleon without any stability of position. It cannot be right to follow the changes of fortune. It is not upon these that good or evil depends; they are necessary accessories of human Me as we said, but it is man's activities in accordance with virtue that constitute his happiness and the opposite activities that constitute his misery.”27. Is the Pursuit of Goodness Certain to Result in the Greatest Happiness?
Another problem related to happiness may be touched upon briefly before leaving the subject; although in this case only suggestions and not a final solution can be presented. Happiness has been described as a feeling of harmony which results from the organization of our activities. Such organization frequently requires
2 ARISTOTLE: Nicomachean Ethics, Bk. I, Chap. IX (Welldon's trans., p. 24).
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that our desires be denied the pleasure of immediate fulfillment in order that some larger end may be realized in the future. The larger end-ultimately the summum bonum itself-may be expected in attainment to furnish a satisfaction so great as to outweigh, or, better, so comprehensive as to include, the gratification of the desire in question with its attendant pleasure. All very true, provided that the larger end is attained. But suppose that death intervenes and prevents this. Has not the individual really lost in happiness through his self-control and devotion to his ideal? Moreover is it not the common lot of those who sacrifice their immediate inclinations to the pursuit of extensive and far-reaching purposes, to die before seeing these purposes realized? The complete organization of conduct requires the adoption of an ideal too comprehensive to be realized in the natural lifetime of the human individual. Hence the good man seems destined to miss the pleasure of achieving his highest aim. How then is it possible to maintain that happiness always accompanies self-organization? Or that goodness and happiness coincide? Immanuel Kant was impressed with the importance of this problem and was led, by the necessity which he felt of finding a solution for it to introduce two of his famous ” postulates of practical reason. “ The demand of the moral law that happiness shall be proportioned to goodness justifies us in postulating, he believed, the existence of a God able to bring about such an apportionment, and of an immortality for man in which he shall have time enough to bring his will into perfect accord with the moral law.8. It Is, on the Assumption that Moral Purpose Is Supreme in the Universe.
Kant's introduction of God at just this point in his ethical system has been much criticized and certainly this criticism is deserved if it means that God intervenes in a mechanical fashion to
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square accounts and set things right, giving the good the amount of pleasure which they have missed in life. But the question of the relation of happiness to goodness is not necessarily that of the sanctions of goodness in the way of reward conferred upon the good man by an external power. It is a question of the ultimate ground of moral value. Is goodness real in the sense that the man who achieves it enters upon a larger and more permanent life whose satisfactions are uninterrupted by physical death or is it simply a belief produced in the human mind by certain physical and biological forces which work upon it, with the consequence that while it may bring about useful adjustments it can furnish no satisfaction which extends beyond the period of natural existence? The whole matter goes back finally to the nature of the universe--is moral purpose inherent in it, so that the person who attains moral development at whatever cost of physical health or existence acquires more reality, or is it the product of mechanical forces solely, so that reality must be measured altogether by the amount of physical energy and the length of natural existence? The alternatives remain the same as they appeared to Marcus Aurelius: ” Either a Providence or Democritus and his Atoms; and with it whatsoever we brought to prove, that the whole world is as it were one City? “ But, it may be said, we have already based moral value upon the human will. This is true; for all empirical study of conduct must proceed from a consideration of the demands of volition as these are revealed in human experience. Our study of the demands of intelligent volition has brought to light this significant fact, however,--that its ultimate satisfaction requires objects whose attainment extends beyond the term of man's natural existence. The possibility of full satisfaction to the human will--of complete Self-realization for man--evidently depends, therefore, upon the standing of intelligent will, of self-consciousSELF-REALIZATION AND HAPPINESS
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personality, in the universe. Is it the ultimate reality to which all physical forces are subordinate? Is it not the source of the natural universe itself? We can have no certain knowledge on this point and of course the conclusions of other sciences besides Ethics should influence our belief. Perhaps the best justification for the belief or assumption that the ground of the universe is spiritual, is the fact that in our moral lives we do assume it. Or, more precisely, we act upon it. For what other belief than that of the superior reality of spirit or personality can be reconciled with the system of moral values which we uphold, with the deliberate sacrifice of natural well-being, to ideal ends and purposes? It is a significant fact, furthermore, that those individuals who do, through such sacrifice of natural well-being, enter upon the larger spiritual life, are most firmly convinced of its reality and permanence. The supremacy of a Power that makes for righteousness in the world,-in other words, the existence of God,--seems requisite, therefore, to explain fully the facts of morality, and particularly to give a final solution of the problem of happiness in its relation to goodness. Not that God is required to reward the good and punish the wicked after death, but that the superior reality of purpose and personality over matter and mechanism is necessary to validate the assumption on which the whole of moral development is based-that the human will gains fuller satisfaction through the pursuit of ideal ends and purposes which cannot be completely realized in the present life than in the attainment of those natural goods whose possession may be enjoyed during the period of physical existence.9. And that Man May Complete His Moral Development in a Future Life.-The question of immortality is also involved in the subject under discussion. And the considerations advanced as a warrant for belief in God have
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equal weight in the case of immortality. The strongest argument in favor of belief in a future existence, that is, is furnished by the fact that in moral development we do surrender satisfactions which we are reasonably sure of enjoying in the present existence for the sake of ideals whose scope and extension are too great to permit of their being realized during the term of our natural lifetime. Now if death cut off all further attainment and made the complete realization of these ideals absolutely impossible, they must necessarily lose much, a great part, perhaps, of their value. Immortality has its deepest meaning and highest worth in removing from man's will the limitations imposed by the conditions of physical existence and in opening before it the prospect of a far-reaching development in a larger life. Mr. Lowes Dickinson gives beautiful expression to this idea in his recent Ingersoll Lecture: ” The whole strength of the case for immortality as a thing to be desired, lies in the fact that no one in life attains his ideal. The soul, even of the best and most fortunate of us, does not attain the Good of which she feels herself to be capable, and in which alone she can rest. The potentiality is not wholly realized. I do not infer from this that life has no value if the Beyond is cut off. That, I think, is contrary to most men's experience. The Goods we have here are real Goods, and we may find the Evil more than compensated by them. But what I do maintain is that life here would have indefinitely more value if we knew that beyond death we should pursue, and ultimately to a successful issue, the chosen ideal of which we are always in quest. The conception that death ends all does not empty life of its worth, but it destroys in my judgment its most precious element, that which transfigures all the rest; it obliterates the gleam on the snow, the planet in the east; it shuts off the great adventure, the adventure beyond death.” The objection may be offered that thusSELF-REALIZATION AND HAPPINESS
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to regard, immortality as implied by the facts of moral development is to introduce a factor into morality for which experience gives no warrant and of which we can have no certain knowledge. That we can have no certain knowledge concerning this matter of future existence is assuredly true. But it must not be forgotten that, as we have already seen, moral development is conditioned primarily not by intellect but by volition-it is a venture of will rather than an expression of knowledge. To take the first step in this development man must sacrifice a present inclination which he actually experiences for the sake of a future which is uncertain and whose existence and character no knowledge can fully reveal to him. Then in social adjustment he must surrender interests which have proved satisfying to him as an individual in order to seek social ends whose nature and ability to satisfy cannot be known before the sacrifice is made. Is it unreasonable then to suppose that moral development requires one more act of will--this time of the will to be a self whose life extends beyond the limits of physical existence--in which man's natural life itself with all its interests is made subordinate to the fuller and more lasting satisfactions of a future life! Of the character of this future life we know nothing and possibly should expect to know nothing-whether it will be eternal and without the bounds of time or will have its duration indefinitely extended, whether we shall possess individuality and enter into social relations as we now do. But the same considerations which lead us to believe in any future existence at all suggest that the form and mode of that existence will be such as to enable us to participate in the realization of those ends for which we have striven and suffered here.THE GOOD AS SELF-REALIZATION
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REFERENCES
SIDGWICK, Method of Ethics, Book III, Chap. XIV.
ALEXANDER, Moral Order and Progress, Book II, Chap. V, § 2.
MACKENZIE, Manual of Ethics, Book II, Chap. IV.
SETH, Ethical Principles, Part I, Chap. III, § II.
DEWEY AND TUFTS, Ethics, Chap. XV.
PAULSEN, System of Ethics, Book II, Chap. VII.
KANT, Practical Reason, Part I, Book II, Chap. II (Abbott's trans.)
LESLIE STEPHEN, Science of Ethics, Chap. X, § 2.
