CHAPTER II
SELF-REALIZATION AND THE STANDARD OF GOODNESS
1. The Idea of the Good as Furnishing a Standard of Moral Judgment.-2. Self-Realization Criticized as Failing to Supply Such a Standard.--3. The Ideal of Self-Realization as the Standard of Moral Judgment.-4. This Standard When Applied to Human Life Yields Further Principles of Moral Distinction.-5. The Principle of Individual Interest.-6. The Principle of Social Welfare.--7. Maxims of Individual Interest: (a) Maxim of Prudence.--8. (b) Maxim of Idealism.--9. Maxims of Social Welfare: (a) Maxim of Altruism.--10. (b) Maxim of Humanitarianism.
1. The Idea of the Good as Furnishing a Standard of Moral Judgment.
One of the reasons why it is worth our while to inquire at length into the nature of the summum bonum is that the conception of the Good when attained should provide us with a satisfactory standard of moral judgment. Indeed it seems that this is the chief reason for such a study as we have undertaken; since the leading aim of Ethics is to rationalize human conduct, and this is accomplished only by substituting a rational basis for the authority of custom and tradition, in all judgments of moral value. Now, as previous discussion has shown, the idea of the Good ought to furnish just this rational basis for the deciding of all questions of good and evil, and hence for the practical guidance of life. We have a right to expect, therefore, that Self-realization, if a true view of the Good, will fully meet this requirement. To the question of whether the theory of Self-realization actually furnishes such a standard of moral judgment we now address ourselves.
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2. Self-Realization Criticized as Failing to Furnish Such a Standard.
Unfortunately, difficulties are encountered at the very beginning in the form of charges recently made that Self-realization fails in just this matter of supplying an adequate criterion of right and wrong. It is asserted, in the first place, that Self-realization gives no ground for discriminating between different acts of the individual, since all are equally expressions of the self and hence good. Professor W. R. Sorley has thus criticized “self-realization” because it affords no standard for estimating the moral value of the different actions of the individual. “In every action whatever of a conscious being,” he says, “self-realization may be said to be the end: some capacity is being developed, satisfaction is being sought for some desire. A man may develop his capacities, seek, and to some extent attain self-satisfaction,-in a manner realize himself-not only in devotion to a scientific or artistic ideal or in labors for a common good, but also in the selfish pursuit of power or even in senusal enjoyment. So far as the word “self-realization” can be made to cover such different activities, it is void of moral content and cannot express the nature of the moral ideal.“1 In the second place, it is charged that Self-realization does riot permit us to make distinctions of moral worth, as between the conduct of different individuals. For are not all individuals equally selves, and in so far as the activities of each express his own nature, are not all upon the same plane of goodness? In this connection, Professor Boodin, for instance, criticizes Self-realization and charges it with failure to furnish a standard for the evaluation of conduct. “There are many types of selves, and each type desires its own fulfillment. If self-realization is to be the criterion of life, what self is to be realized, the baboon self, the pig self, or what sort of self? If all but human
1 W. R. SORLEY: Recent Tendencies in Ethics, p. 90.
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selves are to be excluded, what sort of human self? Not the criminal or the insane self, surely? Only a normal self could be the standard. As Plato says, it must be a very wise man who is to be the measure. But what is normal?”2These critics strike at a vital point in the Self-realization theory. The defect dwelt upon is not an unimportant or external feature which can be easily removed. Instead it appears to be inseparably connected with the fundamental principle of Self-realization. For it, is the peculiar merit as well as the distinguishing characteristic of this view that it finds the Good not in the exercise of any one part or faculty of human nature, but in the harmonious development of the whole self. But does not this fact, which is the boast of the Self-realizationist-that his theory recognizes as equally legitimate and worthy all the tendencies and powers of conscious personality-prove a stumbling-block when the attempt is made to use the, theory as a basis of moral judgment? For how discriminate between acts, approving some as good and condemning others as bad, when all are equally necessary expressions of the self ? And how impose the same standard upon different selves, when they vary in character and ability, and the ideal demands that each should realize his own capacities?
Because they exalt one side of human nature at the expense of the rest, the time-honored doctrines of Hedonism and Rationalism have been discarded. But by virtue of this very quality-one-sidedness, we consider it-they succeed, where Self-realization seems to fail, in furnishing a definite standard of moral judgment. Take Hedonism, for instance; pleasant feeling is declared to be the Good. Hence all acts that bring pleasure now or in the future are morally good; all acts that bring pain are morally
2 “The Ought and Reality,” International Journal of Ethics, July, 1907, p. 457.
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bad; all other acts are morally indifferent. The case is the same with Rationalism, if the exercise of reason be substituted for the feeling of pleasure. If we take either of these two doctrines as the rule of life, we can contrast acts which satisfy the chosen part of the self with acts that satisfy other parts, draw a sharp line of distinction between them, and judge the former actions to be good and the latter to be bad. Thus we gain a serviceable principle for the ordering of our lives, which is certainly better than no principle at all, and perhaps better than a principle which presents an attractive ideal but supplies no guidance for the conduct of daily life. 3. The Ideal of Self-Realization as the Standard of Moral judgment. Self-realization need rest under no such condemnation, however; since such criticisms as those just mentioned result from a misunderstanding of the theory. It is a mistake to think that because Self-realization identifies the Good with the expression of no one part of the self to the exclusion of the remainder, it therefore approves of all activities of the self as good. True it is, that our view finds the Good in the exercise of no one faculty of human nature, but this does not mean that it is consequently deprived of any criterion by which right action can be distinguished from wrong. On the contrary, it furnishes a very definite criterion. For, according to Self-realization, the Good lies in the realization of the whole self in distinction from any part or division of the self. From this ideal we secure a clear and decisive standard of moral judgment. The line of distinction is drawn between actions which contribute to the satisfaction of all the capacities of the human self and those which serve to gratify only single ones. The former are judged good: the latter are pronounced bad. So far from making only vague and ambiguous recommendation, Self-realization issues the most definite and peremptory commands. AllSELF-REALIZATION AND STANDARD OF GOODNESS
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acts which hinder or frustrate the fulfillment of man's entire self it condemns as utterly wrong, and it demands their absolute suppression. Thus we gain a secure and adequate basis for all judgments of moral value. The Ideal of Self-realization furnishes no infallible touchstone of good and evil, to be sure, deciding off-hand the moral value of every particular act. It is an ideal of a very general character. Its application to specific questions of right and wrong is often not apparent, and can be made out only by protracted and careful thought. This does not lessen the value of Self-realization as the Ideal, however; for, in order to fulfill this office, a conception must be sufficiently general to comprehend within its scope all practical considerations whatsoever, and to be universally applicable throughout the entire field of conduct. Hence while in the regulation of daily life we may find that principles, more definite in meaning and limited in range, are usually of greater assistance, still on critical occasions when these principles themselves are called into question sue an ideal is indispensable as a final court of appeal. The Ideal may be likened to the polar star which, far removed from the affairs of our planet, gives to the surveyor of the earth's surface his ultimate direction of reference. He does not take it into consideration every time he measures a distance or computes an area. Yet since it furnishes the direction upon which all other directions are based, there is a tacit reference to it in every calculation of the surveyor, and, in all cases of serious doubt, it is the final court of appeal. Whenever we are driven back to first premises we have need of such a standard as the Ideal of Self-realization supplies. This may occur in the case of acts that are comparatively unimportant. An action which in itself is trivial, like playing a game of cards or calling upon an acquaintance, may take on the significance of a test caseTHE GOOD AS SELF-REALIZATION
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and involve all the issues of morality. Ordinarily, however, we have recourse to an ultimate standard only when ,considering such broad and fundamental problems of human life and relationships as call in question otherwise accepted principles of conduct. This is the case when we are required to pass judgment upon existing political and social institutions. Then the value of such a standard as Self-realization is most clearly manifest. Suppose that it is a form of government which we are critically considering; for instance, democracy or aristocracy. Then it is illuminating and even necessary to know that the final aim of government is neither to promote the interest of a special ,class nor to register the will of a majority, but to further the development of human personality in all individuals, to express the “general will.” Or if it is a social institution, like monogamous marriage, of which we are seeking to ascertain the value-then we must recognize that the worth of such an institution depends, not u the extent to which it fulfills a supposed divine command or continues ,a historic development, but rather upon the degree to which it contributes to the self-realization of the persons involved. Or, better stated perhaps, the pretensions of any social ,or political arrangement to be of divine origin or in the line of moral development may be rejected as false when this arrangement does not minister to the personal welfare of humanity.4. This Standard When Applied to Human Life Yields Further Principles of Moral Distinction.
Still it must be admitted that if Self-realization were limited to enjoining every individual to realize his entire self, there would be sufficient justification for the second criticism .noted above, that the theory provides no definite principles of conduct which are binding upon 0 individuals. For since individuals differ in character and in capacities the expression of the entire nature will involve quite different
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forms of conduct for each one. Self-realization, as thus far considered, an ideal which recommends the realization of the whole as distinct from the part self, leaves undecided the question of what kind of a self is to be fully realized, normal or abnormal, primitive or civilized, masculine or feminine, intellectual, emotional, or practical. But this objection also disappears after further. reflection. When the Ideal of Self-realization, which we have accepted as the standard of moral judgment, is applied to actual human nature, it yields certain definite principles of action which hold for all men equally and constitute in themselves an adequate answer to the objection. For while human nature varies almost without limit there are, as has been shown, fundamental characteristics which all men possess in common. In the first place, all men have the same natural instincts, which relate them to a world of objects and to other members of the human species. Secondly, men are all alike in the possession of certain spiritual capacities, which relate them to fellow-men in a community of intelligence and to the real universe as an orderly system. In consequence of this essential identity of human nature, the realization of the whole self requires from all of us the same modes of action. It is possible, therefore, to derive from the Ideal of Self-realization, when applied to the actual nature of man, a set of principles and maxims which enable us to distinguish between good and evil in our daily experience. Of course, the whole self is not realized in a single act or all at once. Rather is it gradually unfolded or developed in a number of spheres and through a succession of stages. What we wish to know is what form of conduct expresses the whole self and hence deserves to be called good in each important sphere and at every necessary stage. The two most important spheres or aspects of the life of the self are the individual and the social. In the sphereTHE GOOD AS SELF-REALIZATION
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first-named, the self is manifest as an individual, gaining expression through a system of objects. In the second, the self appears as united with other individuals in a social community. In the first sphere the whole self is represented by the total interest of the individual or the satisfaction of all his desires and capacities in their organized unity, in contrast to his partial interest or the satisfaction of one or more desires at the expense of the rest. In the second sphere the whole self is represented by the welfare of society or the social self, in contrast to the interest of any individual or limited number of individuals. 'When applied to both of these spheres the Ideal of Self-realization thus yields two principles of moral judgment, each of which may be briefly considered. 5. The Principle of Individual Interest.-The principle which Self-realization furnishes to guide moral judgment in the individual sphere is that the total interest of the individual is to be preferred to any partial interest whatsoever. And since this total interest is the result of the adjustment of various activities and tendencies of the individual into an organized system, its attainment will involve the proportionate expression of all these activities--and that in contrast to the gratification of any single desire or group of desires. Some moralists do not admit the existence of such an adjustment within the life of the individual in distinction from the adjustment of the individual to society. For example, Mr. Alexander, in his Moral Order and Progress,3 tells us that Goodness may be understood either as (1) an adjustment of activities in the individual or as (2) an adjustment of individuals in society. These adjustments are identical in process and result. Hence the individual who gives harmonious expression to all his impulses at the same time discharges in full his obligation to society. The same writer endeavors
3 ALEXANDER: Moral Order and Progress, Book II, Chap. II.
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to show how all the virtues usually regarded as solely individual have also a social reference. Now it is assuredly true that the individual and the social spheres cannot be separated, and that they imply one another at every point. Such a virtue as temperance, ordinarily thought of as individual, has a decided social bearing. But nevertheless to deny the existence of a sphere at least relatively distinct from the social, in which the individual is concerned only with his own interest, is to overlook certain of the most salient features of morality. It is to neglect the importance of the development of individuality in the moral life, both in itself and as a condition of the further adjustment of the individual to society. The need for recognizing a distinctly individual sphere of action is apparent when we think of the principles which should determine the individual's choice of a profession or occupation. While it is important for the individual to take account of social conditions and demands, it is still more important for him to consider his own abilities and limitations, and select that line of work in which the one shall receive the fullest expression and the other offer the least hindrance. For genuine ability in a man when honestly exercised may always be socially useful, while a work undertaken for social benefit will fail of its purpose if the individual is unfitted to perform it. When social influences or economic pressure interfere, therefore, to prevent the individual from consulting his own aptitudes and preferences in this matter of a life-work, the result is morally injurious. In European countries young men have been drawn in large numbers into the clergy and the army, not because of any particular fitness for these professions, but because social convention has set an artificial premium upon activity in these lines and thus put at a comparative disadvantage other professions. In America accepted social standards tend, in like manner, to infringe upon theTHE GOOD AS SELF-REALIZATION
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liberty of the individual by setting a premium upon business and political success, and reflecting corresponding discredit upon scholarly and artistic achievement. As Professor Munsterberg says: “If we are sincere we ought not to overlook the fact that the scholar, as such, has no position in public opinion which corresponds to the true value of his achievement. The foreigner feels at once this difference between the Americans and the Europeans... . The finest men go into business and industry, into law and medicine; and those who turn to the graduate schools of the country are, in the majority, men without initiative and ambition, and without promise for the highest kind of work.”4 And what is here said applies, not merely to professions and “darlings,” but to every trade and occupation which men pursue. The establishment of vocation bureaus in some of our large cities, through which individuals are relieved of economic pressure for a short time, during which they are assisted in findion for which their natures have fitted them, shows how far the rights of individuality in this respect have been violated under present social conditions. The man, who as carpenter or brick-layer leads a dissatisfied and unregulated life, may as sign-painter become a happy and useful citizen, because, in the latter case, his native ability is finding free expression and not being thwarted and stifled. After the life-work is once chosen the individual may rightfully claim a large liberty in methods of preparation and accomplishment. He should follow the principle which governs action in the individual sphere---selecting those means which promise, in his case and with his nature, the most effectually to further his supreme aim. Of course human experience has discovered, in the case of the leading occupations, what is in general the best preparatory
4 HUGO MUNSTERBERG: “The Standing of Scholarship in America,” Atlantic Monthly, October, 1900, p. 455.
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training, and the individual greatly economizes his own time and strength who submits willingly to such preparation and appropriates as much as possible of its benefit. But when accepted methods of preparation and practice in any trade or profession become so rigid and exacting as to cramp his originality and destroy his initiative, they lessen the individual's power of achievement, and he is justified in rebelling against them and asserting the right of his individuality to seek its own methods of accomplishment. In other details of his conduct not related to his specific life-work, but intimately connected with himself, such as dress, amusements, and daily routine, the individual should have in a large measure the freedom to determine his action in accordance with what he believes to be his highest interest. These are not matters of great moment, but they are ways in which individuality naturally seeks expression. Hence they may assume a critical importance when an unwarranted interference in them is attempted by society, and such interference, if successful, reacts most unfavorably upon the character of the individual. In this way sumptuary and “blue” laws, such as those enacted by our Puritan ancestors, do great harm. Unfortunately, some traces of this aspect of Puritanism are still seen among us, especially in our smaller communities, where a person's attitude towards “worldly amusements” is deemed more significant of his character than his acts of justice or of mercy. The right which many Protestaarrogate to themselves of censoring their minister's conduct, even in the minutia of clothing and amusements and domestic economy, has undoubtedly lessened the efficiency of many members of the Protestant ministry, thwarting their individuality and destroying their independence, thus causing them to appear negative and colorless in their virtue.THE GOOD AS SELF-REALIZATION
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6. The Principle of Social Welfare.-In the social sphere Self-realization requires that the welfare of society be preferred to the interest of any individual. The human individual is thus forbidden in all his relations with his fellows to utilize other individuals as means or instruments to the attainment of his own interest, but is rather enjoined to seek the interests of others as his own. This subordination of individual interest to social welfare is not in any sense a violation of the true welfare of the self. Instead it signifies the realization of the social self, and this social self is larger and more complete than the individual for the very reason that it does not center around a single individual interest, but comprehends in an organized system a vast number of interests each one of which is an end in itself. The social self is a kingdom of ends the content and value of each of which is increased by its relation to all the rest; human society is an organic system in which all the members stand in functional relation to the whole. The principle of social welfare applies to all human action that concerns more than one individual. Of course every action of a normal human being has its reference to other individuals, but, as we have just recognized, this reference is often only indirect and implied. On the other hand, there are actions of the individual that are primarily social in their character. Such are, for instance, the activities of citizenship. In a democracy the most important of these activities is the exercise of the franchise. In his voting the individual citizen should be governed altogether by the principle just enunciated. Not the promotion of individual interest in any of its forms, but the furtherance of public welfare should be the aim of every ballot cast. This moral issue which is involved in every election is frequently confused where popular government is secured through the party system. In that case the individualSELF-REALIZATION AND STANDARD OF GOODNESS
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cannot vote directly upon measures and policies, but only for party candidates who are pledged to enact certain laws and follow certain policies. Now it is unlikely that a man who thinks seriously about public welfare will agree entirely with the platform of any party. Yet, if his vote and influence are not to be entirely ineffective, he must join one of the leading parties and support it loyally. Hence election time finds the good citizen aiming directly at party success rather than public welfare. This necessity for choosing some party as best on the whole, and then of loyally supporting it, despite objectionable features in policies or personnel, does not mean, however, that the citizen shall cease to think for himself on all matters of public concern or shall hesitate to abandon his party on the instant that he is convinced that the policies of another party are more in accord with the general welfare. Unfortunately, this is just what it does mean with many citizens who substitute a blind loyalty to party for an intelligent devotion to social welfare, thus seeking the good of a group within the state rather than that of the state itself. The same situation is reproduced on a larger scale when we think of the relation of the human individual to other individuals of different nationality-to human beings over all the world. The citizen of a modern state can exert very little direct influence for good or for ill upon the citizens of other states. The rise of the nationalistic idea in modern times seems in many ways to have increased the barriers between civilized states. But the rise of the nationalistic idea has been accompanied by the inception and growth of internationalism-the belief that the single state has an office to discharge in the family of nations. Hence while the individual citizen can do little directly to affect the destinies of the millions of human beings living outside his own state, he can have a share in determining the policies of his own nation, which, acting in its nationality,THE GOOD AS SELF-REALIZATION
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capacity may affect profoundly the welfare of humanity over all the world. The principle of social welfare, applied here, shows it to be the duty of the citizen to favor those measures which promise to further, not the well-being of his own nation merely, but of all the nations, of mankind universally. There is no reason to doubt that such internationalism will be as effective in benefiting humanity as would a humanitarianism which leveled all national barriers. For, in acting at a distance and in a large way, the organized agencies of government are more adequate and efficient than the effort of single individuals or associations of individuals. At the time of the earthquake of 1908, in Italy, much valuable assistance was rendered through individual initiative and cooperative enterprise; but none so prompt and effective as that of the government, which diverted a loaded naval supply-ship to the relief of the starving sufferers. 7. Maxim's of Individual Interest: (a) Maxim of Prudence.-But the idea of Self-realization when interpreted in the light of human experience is capable of supplying more explicit and detailed criteria of right and wrong 7 whose bearing upon the questions of daily conduct is direct and obvious. Let the two principles just explained, those of individual interest and social welfare, be applied within their respective spheres, and the result is in each case two corollaries or maxims. These maxims express the requirements of Self-realization in successive stages, and each constitutes within its own province the determining principle of moral judgment. In the individual life Self-realization calls first for the regulation and adjustment of those sentient impulses which are the common heritage of mankind. Now of all the natural instincts of man that which, when raised to the level of conscious aim, is most comprehensive in its scope, is the instinct of self-preservation. At first merely a desire forSELF-REALIZATION AND STANDARD OF GOODNESS
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present security and well-being, it develops, with the growth of intelligence, into the purpose to have comfort and pleasure throughout the natural lifetime. Its object, the individual in his physical existence, endures throughout a period of years, and is permanent compared with multitudinous objects of natural desire which are varying and transitory. Within this inclusive purpose, then, fall the objects of the other natural instincts which have been developed as means to individual survival, like those of food, acquisition, resentment, etc. Being thus inclusive of all such objects in the degree to which they contribute to man's comfort and well-being, this purpose represents the system of natural goods, and, within its own province, the Ideal of Self-realization. Hence the first maxim in the individual sphere is that survival and future pleasure should be preferred to the gratification of any desire or desires. There is slight reason, it may appear, to enjoin human beings to seek their own comfort and pleasure. Prudence is easily learned, and the burden of ethical teaching must be to recommend the subordination of prudential considerations to the larger personal and social ends. Yet as limited and circumscribed as is its cause prudence constitutes an end much larger and more significant than many of the ends to which it is often subordinated. Such objects are, for example, wealth and reputation, when these are sought for themselves, and not as part of some far-reaching plan. To be sure, a certain amount of property and a good reputation are important aids in the attainment of comfort and security, and, in so far as they are thus sought, their pursuit is justified. But from being at first sought as means they become, in many cases, ends in themselves sought for their own sake and to which the comfort and pleasure of living are ruthlessly sacrificed. This is particularly true in a country like our own, where the individual's sphere of activity and social standing areTHE GOOD AS SELF-REALIZATION
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not pre-determined by his birth and early surroundings. The appearance of unlimited opportunity begets a spirit of restlessness and dissatisfaction with present conditions which leads the individual to seek wealth and reputation, not from any appreciation of the larger possibilities of life which they may open, but simply from a desire to “get on.” To this desire, eager and consuming, all the simpler joys of living are sacrificed-the comfort of the fireside on winters' evenings in company with interesting books or truly congenial friends, the enjoyment of the summer's holiday out-of-doors, the pleasures of unimpaired digestion, and the solace of refreshing sleep. Spencer remarks upon the folly of the husband and father who, in order to increase the income of his family, applies himself so unremittingly to his business that his health is broken down or his life shortened.5 How much more foolish is the individual who brings these results upon himself not because of devotion to his family but merely from asire to surpass his acquaintances in wealth or rise above his parents in social position! 8. (b) Maxim of Idealism. In addition to his natural instincts the human individual possesses, as we well know, certain spiritual capacities which require for their satisfaction the attainment of ideal objects, such as Truth and Power and Beauty. To realize himself fully it follows, then, that the individual must seek and attain not only material well-being but also personal culture. Now these ideal ends which man in his spiritual capacity pursues are, as has been previously shown, more comprehensive and far-reaching than any of the objects of natural instinct, even that of the instinct of self-preservation itself ; because such ideals as Truth and Beauty are not limited in their scope to the period of the individual's natural lifetime but include the existence and activity of many generations
5 SPENCER: Data of Ethics, § 72.
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of men. Hence the individual who devotes himself to a realization of these ideals identifies himself with the cause of spiritual progress which unites men of all ages as loyal adherents and fellow-workers. We may therefore set down as the second maxim of Self-realization in the individual sphere that the attainment of the ideal objects of intelligence and personality should be preferred to the promotion of material well-being and the gratification of natural desires. The grounds for this maxim should be made perfectly clear. The one and only reason why from the standpoint of Self-realization the exercise of man's spiritual capacities is better than the gratification, of his natural desires is that such spiritual activity results in a larger and more comprehensive life. Thus the attainment of ideal ends, intellectual, practical, and Aesthetic, represents the realization of the whole self, in contrast to which the material comfort and pleasure stand for the interest of the partial self. The life of spiritual attainment and personal culture is to be preferred morally because it is a larger and a fuller life than that of physical gratification and well-being. This is easy to see when we contrast the life of the cultivated man of affairs with his broad outlook and lasting achievements to that of the unlettered peasant with his narrow horizon and rude pleasures. But it is not so easy to see when the life of the successful man of the world and that of the struggling artist or obscure scholar are compared. Particularly is this true at present when improved facilities of transportation and communication, and the development of the arts of printing and photographic reproduction, have made it possible for a man possessed of good health and riches to travel over the entire world and to possess what books and works of art he pleases. It is difficult indeed to believe that the .career of such a man, widely traveled and surrounded by all the fruits of culture, is not largerTHE GOOD AS SELF-REALIZATION
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and fuller than that of the artist or investigator who has never been able, to travel outside his own country and can scarcely supply himself with the books and appliances which his work necessitates. Now the advantages of travel and the possession of books and pictures in stimulating even a belated growth of intelligence and taste are not to be overlooked on the one hand, nor is the limitation which the lack of these things imposes upon the most fruitful and promising spiritual activity to be neglected on the other. Yet the law inexorably holds that the breadth and fullness of human life is directly proportionate to the amount of spiritual activity exercised in it. The uncultivated man may travel to every quarter of the globe and all that his travel will yield him is a succession of unrelated impressions which soon become vague memories or are forgotten altogether. He cannot make the objects he sees his own because his mind furnishes him with no background of historic associations or value judgments with which to connect them. His varied and interesting experiences do not become a permanent addition to his life, for he has built up by his own thought and study no system of ideas within which the now experiences can be given a fixed and definite place. Such a person may buy books by the ton and pictures by the gross, but these will remain simply material objects without a trace of profound meaning or subtle suggestion. The scholar, artist, or investigator, on the contrary, although he possess few or comparatively none of these advantages, has through the exercise of his intellectual powers, creative ability, or artistic skill, so correlated his ideas and organized his experience that his life is extended in space and time far beyond the limits of his geographical location or natural existence, understanding the past in its relation to the present, viewing other worlds than his own, and penetrating to the deeper and essential meanings of things which do not appear onSELF-REALIZATION AND STANDARD OF GOODNESS
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the surface but reveal themselves to rational insight and aesthetic intuition. The career of the philosopher Immanuel Kant is instructive in proving that the breadth and fullness of a human life is determined rather by cultivation of spirit than by any external advantages or possessions whatsoever. During the whole period of his maturity Kant was occupied with the methodical discharge of the routine duties of a university professor. He seldom left the university town of Koenigsberg and never went outside his native province in Germany. Yet he possessed such an inquiring mind and so comprehensive an intelligence that his reading and thought extended far beyond the subject of his special interest, philosophy, to all questions pertaining to the earth and its inhabitants. Hence in addition to his epoch-making work in philosophy he wrote treatises on the history of the earth, upon the origin of the different living forms, and upon the relations of the various races of men. These latter rank among the most important contributions of the eighteenth century to our knowledge of the natural world and anticipate in a remarkable way the evolutionary conception of the succeeding century. Thus Kant, secluded throughout life in an insignificant German town, and hampered by the exactions of an academic routine, attained a fuller knowledge of the natural world, its facts and its forces, than many a contemporary who, blessed with rank and fortune, was able to travel over Europe at will, viewing its most interesting localities and interviewing its most illustrious personages. 9. Maxims of Social Welfare: (a) Maxim of Altruism. In the social sphere the primary adjustment is between single individuals or persons. The individual comes into contact with other persons like himself before he enters into conscious relations with the larger social groups such as the community, the “public,” the nation, orTHE GOOD AS SELF-REALIZATION
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humanity. In all the stages of individual development the self is of course associated with others. Material comfort and pleasure are obtained by the individual only by association with other individuals in procuring the means of subsistence and maintaining the conditions necessary for human existence. In this case 7 however, the social relationship enters as a means to the survival and material well-being of the individual. To a still greater degree does the achievement of the aims of intelligence and personality involve the cooperation of many individuals in the fields of art and science and invention. But here the individual is brought into contact not with the lives of ,others in their entirety, but only with such parts as are connected by the bond of a common interest with his own. Thus a man can achieve professional success only through cooperation with his professional colleagues: but he is interested in them not as men, but as physicians or lawyers or engineers. It is this fact to which Mr. Chesterton refers in his picturesque and forcible way when he asserts that the social life of the large community like our modern city is much narrower and more limited than that of a small community. For in the large city we come into association only with those who have aims and interests identical with our own, while in the small community we are forced to come to terms with individuals in the totalities of their natures, which are always different from and, at some points, antagonistic to our own.
“We make our friends, we make our enemies; but God makes our next-door neighbor. Hence he comes to us clad in all the careless terrors of nature; he is as strange as the stars, as reckless and indifferent as the rain. He is Man, the most terrible of beasts. That is why the old religions and the old scriptural language showed so sharp a wisdom when they spoke, not of one's duty towards humanity but of one's duty towards one's neighbor. The duty towards humanity may often take the form of a choice which isSELF-REALIZATION AND STANDARD OF GOODNESS
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personal and even pleasurable. That duty may be a hobby; it may even be a dissipation. . . . The most monstrous martyrdom, the most repulsive experience may be the result of a choice or a kind of taste. . . . But we have to love our neighbor because he is there-a much more alarming reason for a much more serious operation. He is the sample of humanity which is actually given us. Precisely because he may be anybody he is everybody. He is a symbol because he is an accident.”6 The maxim which the principle of social welfare (and ultimately the Ideal of Self-realization) supplies for the directing of conduct in this adjustment of differing individualities is that the individual should prefer the interest of another to his own interest. Now it has been previously made clear that for a man possessed of the instinct of sympathy and of an intelligence to which his own personality is revealed as a universal principle present equally in the lives of all other self-conscious persons, the interest of every other human individual is an end of equal value with his own. Hence the individual does wrong when he treats another individual as a means to his own ends, subordinating the interest of another to his own. The reason for this is apparent when in case of conflict the interest of the alter is greater than that of the ego; for when, in such emergency, we prefer another's interest to our own we are attaining a greater good, realizing our own larger selves. Perplexity may arise, however, when the conflicting interests of ego and alter are, as far as honest thought can decide, equal in amount and importance. Why, it may be asked, when ego and alter have equal interests at stake, is it attaining a larger good to sacrifice my interest to that of another than to sacrifice his int6rest to mine? Only one interest can be attained: the other must be thwarted. It is asserted that both have equal value, and
6 CHESTERTON: Heretics, “On the Institution of the Family,” p. 185.
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the same right to attainment. Let this be granted, and readily-why then should not mine be the one that is attained and the other's the one that is thwarted? There is genuine difficulty in such cases, but it is not insuperable. From the standpoint of Self-realization a form of conduct is preferred as better only as through it the self attains a larger and more inclusive end. When in the circumstances above described the individual subordinates his interest to that of another, his own interest is not entirely thwarted. It may be in so far as the attainment originally sought for is concerned. But when voluntarily sacrificed to another's good the interest of the ego is converted into a means to the promotion of the alter's interest and lives again in its complete and successful attainment. The same is not true in the contrary case where another's interest is made subordinate to one's own. The interest of the alter may be forcibly subordinated to the interest of the ego, but it not voluntarily sacrificed to it. No individual has the power to cause the aims and interests of others to sacrifice themselves voluntarily to his own interests and ambitions. Hence in the first case the conflicting interests merge, the one entering into and completing the other; in the second the one is attained at the expense, and to the exclusion, of the other. Manifestly it is in the former alternative that the self attains the larger and more inclusive end, and it is this course only which it is right for the individual to take. Instances in which the opposing interests are exactly equal are extremely rare, however; and the difficulty just considered is more one of theory, perhaps, than of practice. Usually it is amply sufficient if the individual recognize that the interests of others have equal value with his own and then, in particular cases where the interests of ego and alter come into conflict, try earnestly to discover which is the larger good. If study of the situation shows that he has himself much more at stake than his fellow, theSELF-REALIZATION AND STANDARD OF GOODNESS
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individual is justified in preferring his own interest. In all other circumstances he is morally bound to seek the other's good. But this obligation of the individual to interest himself in desires and ambitious which are frequently unattractive or even distasteful does not, as would at first appear, act as a check to his own development, thwarting his aims and impoverishing his life. It has just the opposite effect, by opening to the individual new sources of interest and capacities for action. When we seek the interests of others they, by virtue of being different from and antagonistic to our own, communicate to our lives a fuller and more varied content. The fullness or variety of any individual's life is measured largely by the degree to which he has, in domestic and social life, interested himself in the hopes and plans of others, participating in their efforts and sharing their successes. To seek the interests of others, therefore, so far from hampering or impoverishing the life of the self, is the most effective means to broaden and deepen it.7 10. (b) Maxim of Humanitarianism. The social relationship is not limited to the association of individuals who come into direct contact with one another. For to the human individual as an intelligent person all conscious personality has the same absolute worth. Hence the welfare of humanity in the larger social groups of the community and the state and the world becomes an object to be sought for, although here a personal contact of all the individuals involved is manifestly impossible. And since
7 Theodore Roosevelt brings out most forcibly the interest and value which attaches to each individual among the mass of our fellow-citizens if we take the trouble to investigate it. In his article, “The Coal Miner at Home,” he says: “I think that those who preach to the educated man-to the graduate of a particular school or college--about his duty to the country often tend to lay the emphasis on the wrong side. If he remains aloof from his fellow citizens, the damage done is really not as much to them as to him, and he is the man who suffers most.”--Cf. Outlook, December 24, 1910, pp. 900-904.
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all persons are alike ends whose interest is to-be pursued, the most inclusive object is that which embraces in its realization the welfare of the largest number of persons. Most comprehensive of all objects in the social sphere is, therefore, humanity, the welfare of human personality universally. It follows then that the second maxim in the social sphere is that the welfare of humanity should be preferred to the interest of any lesser number of individuals. The first duty of the individual in the social sphere is to seek the good of other individuals with whom he is acquainted. This means that he shall strive incessantly to extend that personal development and cultivation which he seeks for himself to the members of his family, his circle of friends, and those with whom he is professionally associated. Such effort has frequently been successful in human history, and small groups or classes have arisen which, through cooperative activity and mutual encouragement, have attained a high level of personal culture in the various fields of spiritual achievement such as art, science, literature, etc. But the culture of these small groups has usually been at the expense, rather than for the benefit, of existing humanity. A much larger number of their fellow-men have been condemned to lives of ceaseless and spirit-killing toil in order that a selected few should have the needed leisure and appropriate surroundings for the exercise of the higher psychic powers of human nature. It was thus in ancient Greece where the labor of thousands of slaves provided a small number of citizens with the means of subsistence and thus made possible their incomparable intellectual and artistic achievement. The same condition has existed, though to a less extent, in many modern states in which the presence of a hereditary aristocracy has led to a restriction of culture, as a privilege of the select few born into this class. Up to the time ofSELF-REALIZATION AND STANDARD OF GOODNESS
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the French Revolution the great mass of toilers with few exceptions bore this arrangement uncomplainingly, being led by social tradition and religious superstition to believe that the lot to which God had ordained them was to labor unremittingly that a few of their fellows might enjoy the better things of life. But during the past century the proletariat has been awakening, its attitude has entirely changed, and it will no longer submit willingly to a regime that restricts the benefits of culture to a chosen few. As Eucken says: “Hitherto spiritual conflict has usually been confined to the limited arena of cultivated society, and the general mass of mankind has not been much affected. Now, however, the people are pressing forward; they not only demand a voice in the settlement of ultimate questions, but require that the whole structure of society shall be regulated with reference to their opinions and interests. They are very liable moreover to that harsh intolerance which always characterizes big mass movements.”8 It is plain then that the work of extending to all humanity the opportunity for real cultivation of spirit--to each man according to his capacity--must be undertaken more vigorously and on a larger scale than ever heretofore. For the days of privilege are numbered, and the sort of spiritual expansion which is possible in a few only at the cost of a corresponding limitation in the many, will not be permitted to exist much longer on the earth. Culture must now, if ever, be justified of her children, and those of her exponents do her indeed a poor service who assert that she is essentially selective and opposed to the spirit of democracy. For if culture is identified with privilege she is destined to be swept away by that movement for human brotherhood and social equality which is slowly beginning and gathering momentum, but which when it gains its full force shall sweep all else before it. Far
8 EUCKEN: The Problem of Human Life, Eng. trans., p. 566.
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truer and more consistent with ethical principles is it to identify culture with that united effort on the part of all mankind to develop the highest powers of human personality, which is itself identical with human brotherhood. REFERENCES
ALEXANDER, Moral Order and Progress, Book II, Chap. II.
GREEN, Prolegomena to Ethics, Book III, Chaps. III, IV.
MACKENZIE, Manual of Ethics, Book III, Chaps. I, II, III.
SETH, Ethical Principals, Part I, Chap. III, § § 6-9.
DEWEY AND TUFTS, Ethics, Chap. XX.
KANT, Metaphysic of Morals, Second Section (Abbott's trans.).
THILLY, Introduction to Ethics, Chap. IX.
