CHAPTER I
THE CONCEPTION OF SELF-REALIZATION
1. The Relation of the Good to the Existing Human Individual.--2. The Good as External to the Individual.--3. The Good as Identical with the Interest of the Individual.--4. These Two Aspects of Goodness Explained by the Principle of Self-Realization.--5. Arnold's Contrast of Hebraism with Hellenism.--6. Hebraism.--7. Hellenism.--8. Relation of Christianity to Hebraism and Hellenism.
1. The Relation of the Good to the Existing Human Individual.
In the preceding part the nature of the Good was considered and the conclusion reached that the summum bonum is Self-realization. Concerning the Good another question may be asked which, although closely related to that of its nature, is nevertheless distinct from it. This question refers to the relation of the Good to the human individual in actual life. How does the Good stand related to the normal. m/an-is it connected intimately and essentially with himself, expressing his own deepest desires and highest hopes, or is it only partially an expression of his nature, representing his social impulses only and at variance with other tendencies, or does it present itself altogether as an authority from without, a command of God or a law of the universe to which he must conform or perish?, Upon this question two conflicting views have arisen in the course of ethical reflection. The one holds that the Good is identical with the interest of the individual and stands for the complete fulfillment of all his desires. The other regards the Good as external to the individual
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and usually opposed to his actual inclinations.1 The line of division between these two views does not correspond to, or even parallel, that between Hedonism and Rationalism. Rather it cuts across this, although obliquely. Thus one may hold the view first-named, that the Good is identical with man's actual interest, and be either a Hedonist or Rationalist, according as he finds this interest in the enjoyment of pleasure or the exercise of reason. Doubtless, this first view has closer relationship logically with Hedonism: feeling is the subjective factor, expressing in its warmth and immediacy the present state of the self. Yet as a matter of historic fact it has frequently appeared in union with Rationalism, as in the case of Greek Ethics, which at once identifies the Good with the nature of the individual and believes it to consist in the supremacy of reason in his life. On the other hand, the second view, that the Good is external to the individual, may be maintained by one who is either a Rationalist or a Hedonist. But here the leaning is still more marked toward one of these rival theories, in this me that of Rationalism; since reason is the objective factor in human nature and its requirements, possessing universal validity, seem frequently to have the force of external authority. If the Good is pleasure and still external to the individual it must be the pleasure of other men or of God. But we already know that Hedonism as a historic doctrine has relied chiefly on the psychological argument that every man must, from a compulsion of his
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nature, seek his own pleasure. Hence a view which finds the good of the individual in the pleasure of some other person or persons does not appear as a true or consistent Hedonism.
2. The Good as External to the Individual.
Both of these views of the relation of the Good to the human individual are supported by facts whose importance cannot be gainsaid. The view, second-named, of the externality of the Good, is in accord with the apparent facts of moral experience. In the experience of the majority of persons the requirements of goodness are opposed, more frequently than not, to natural inclination and present desire. Conformity to these requirements is possible, therefore, only when inclination is thwarted and desire is repressed. The moral life is correctly described as a struggles struggle with rebellious tendencies and a recalcitrant nature. We must be ever watchful, always on our guard, not against the principalities and powers of the outer world, but against our own wayward impulses, the frowardness of our own hearts.' Moral development is not the unconscious maturing, the spontaneous blossoming forth, of our nature. Rather is moral progress a slow and painful ascent in which each step upward is hard-won and costs pain and privation.
We develop morally by subjecting ourselves to a law which our natures resist because of its apparent rigor and severity. Hence even when we have come to recognize fully the authority of the Good over us and to acquiesce in its dictates, we never regard it with the affection and familiarity that we do our private plans and ambitions. Fear and dislike of the Good may turn to admiration and reverence, but our attitude towards it never loses something of that awe which we feel in the presence of a power greatly superior to ourselves. In spite, then, of moral development and an increasing conformity to the demands of the Ideal, duty always retains a suggestion of
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that stern and inflexible authority expressed in the lines of Wordsworth:
Stern Daughter of the Voice of God,
0 Duty, if that name thou love
Who art a light to guide, a rod
To check the erring and reprove;
Thou, who art victory and law
When empty terrors overawe;
From vain temptations dost set free;
And calm'st the weary strife of frail humanity!
3. The Good as Identical with the Interest of the Individual.
When the facts of the moral life are made the subject of conscious reflection, the identity of Goodness with the nature and interest of the individual assumes greater prominence than any semblance of opposition between them. It is true that the voice of duty never loses the note of authority when it demands the subjection of present desire or natural impulse. Yet it is not an authority external to the human individual constraining him against his will. So far from this, the distinguishing characteristic of duty or moral obligation is its utter difference from such external compulsion. When the individual recognizes a moral obligation, he feels that he owes the act in question, not to any person or power outside him, but to himself. To his conscience, he may say it is, but his conscience is an integral part of his own nature. The authority of conscience is therefore an authority self-constituted, and the law of duty is a law which we impose on ourselves. Neither can be understood except as an expression of the will of the agent-a different will from that which flames out in momentary desire, but as the very .contrast suggests, a steadier and larger will. There is no disputing that the demands of goodness express the nature of the individual and are identical with his true interest. This identity of the Good with the highest interests of
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man cannot be doubted even in the most extreme cases of opposition between the requirements of duty and the apparent interest, of the individual. Duty may demand that he give up comfort and possessions, health, and even life, in the discharge of some service to the state whose importance is not recognized or appreciated. Is not the Good opposed to the interest of the individual in this case? No, the fact that he felt this political or social obligation shows that there was a side of his nature which could not be satisfied with wealth, comfort, or pleasure, but which required for its expression some positive contribution to social welfare. Even though the action is one which a fuller understanding of the matter will show to be actually at variance with the true interest of the individual or his fellow-men, the simple fact that the agent feels an obligation to perform it proves that for him in ignorance, for him with his limitations and prejudices,-it is a genuine expression of himself and hence represents at the time his highest interest. It has been truly said in the case often cited of the zealous Puritan, who was willing to be damned if it would increase God's glory, that for this particular man as he was, possessed of the peculiar theological conceptions and intense religious convictions of his sect, such a fate for himself, with the resulting augmentation of the divine glory, might represent the fullest satisfaction of his nature. Such discrepancies between the form and the content of goodness are fortunately rare and destined to become rarer as moral enlightenment proceeds. One of the greatest services of ethical reflection has been to make perfectly clear this dependence of the Good, or the Moral Ideal, upon the nature of man. A better understanding of this fact by people at large will make it less easy in the future than it has been in the past for politicians and ecclesiastics to work upon the consciences of men through the agencies of school and church, arousing
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in them a reverence for laws and institutions actually opposed to the highest human welfare, on the plea that they express the commands of Deity for mankind.
4. These Two Aspects of Goodness Explained by the Principle of Self-Realization.
These two aspects of the relation of the Good to the human individual, neither of which can be denied, yet which seem to contradict one another absolutely, are explained and adjusted when we view the Good as Self-realization. From this standpoint the Good is interpreted as the realization of the whole self. But the whole self, it must be remembered, is actual only at the end of the process. This, the goal of moral evolution, is seldom if ever reached in the present world, and exists--it must be confessed--rather as an ideal limit than as an actual state. In all stages of incomplete moral development, which is the condition of all human individuals, only a part and not the whole of the self is actual. Hence the Good, which is always identical with the demands of the larger total self, is partially external to, and may be sharply at variance with, the desires of the actual self. The existence of the larger self, as yet latent and unrealized, is demonstrated, however, by the obligation felt to transcend the narrow boundaries of the actual nature and enter a larger life. Thus a solution is reached of the chief antimony of the moral life--that the Good is identical with the interest of human nature and at the same time opposed to it. The Good is identical with the interest of the whole self, which exists during the course of moral evolution only in potential and opposed to the interest of the part self, which is alone actual.
Of course, the character of the self is continually changing as moral development proceeds, and consequently the battle-ground between its actual nature and latent possibilities is constantly shifting. There are, however, certain points in the pathway of moral progress where the conflict
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between the actual and the ideal seems especially severe. These assume the proportions of crises in moral experience; for upon the issue of the battle here waged depends the further progress of the individual. Perhaps the most important of these conflicts are those between the sentient or “natural” self and the personal or “spiritual” self, and between the individual or egoistic and the social or altruistic self. In the first case we find that the regulation and adjustment of animal impulse, which is the first step in self-realization, has apparently increased rather than diminished the desire for sentient satisfaction. For such regulation is productive of fuller health and a higher degree of physical energy. Hence the craving for pleasure to be obtained from the due gratification of all sensuous desires becomes stronger and it is accompanied by an increasing consciousness of power to gain such gratification. To the demands for a larger spiritual attainment the nature of individuals, thus domire for sentient satisfaction, interpose the most stubborn resistance. A striking instance of such conflict is afforded in the case of young men who, in the full tide of youthful vitality, are confronted by the necessity of submitting to a long period of preparatory discipline as the condition of successful achievement in some professional sphere. To oppose the insistent clamor of fully awakened senses for their appropriate satisfaction is indeed to battle against nature. Yet such a conquest of nature is the sine qua non of all further attainment and many a promising career has been ruined through failure to achieve it. In an analogous way, the second conflict arises when as the result of the organization of all the' desires and capacities of the individual into a unitary system, a well-defined self-interest appears. This self-interest, when it first emerges from the confusion of opposing tendencies, stands for the individual in his individuality as a single
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unit among many, and thus is of a markedly exclusive character. The individual is sharply conscious of himself as possessing plans and purposes--in short, an interest--which is entirely his own and quite different from the interest of every other human being. Hence one prominent part of his true good is external to the nature of the individual at this stage. The welfare of others, which constitutes an important element in the Good when completely realized, is largely absent from the interest of the self when this is first defined in moral evolution. The cost of increasing coherence is at first increasing narrowness of character; the immediate result of concentration may be accentuated selfishness. When a man, by the ordering of his various impulses, first awakens to the existence of his own individuality his attention is naturally centered upon himself and upon his hopes and plans as a separate individual. He finds that his ambition often conflicts with the purposes of others. The whole tendency of his awakened self-consciousness is to fulfill this ambition of his, to satisfy his own desire at any cost, regardless of the welfare of others and the suffering he may cause among his fellow-men. If, notwithstanding his natural inclinations, he feels obliged to promote another's interest at the expense of his own, he regards the Good which he realizes as entirely external to himself. Duty appears to him as a foreign authority coercing him against his will and compelling him to give up his own Good. Yet here also it is necessary for the individual to surrender his private plans and his actual ambitions if he is to participate in the fuller life of social interchange and community. It must not be forgotten, when we dwell thus upon the conflict of the ideal with the actual nature of the individual, that the feeling of obligation, the recognition of a duty, to overcome the limitations of this narrow, actual self, provesTHE CONCEPTION OF SELF-REALIZATION
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clearly that a larger nature exists latent and undeveloped. No matter how reluctant the admission, no matter how grudging the assent, still the fact that the duty is admitted, the obligation assented to, shows that the larger self is there waiting to be developed. And the development follows, by the necessity of psychological law, when the obligation is met and the duty performed. Led by a sense of duty, and with great unwillingness, a man may engage in the politics of his own city. He may not at first feel the slightest interest in the matter-in fact, may have a strong repugnance for the associations and activities which it involves. But after repeatedly acting as civic duty demands in caucus and election, he begins to form new habits which make these activities easier and more natural. Direct participation in political affairs gives him first-hand knowledge and more intimate acquaintance with them. This in turn arouses interest, and before many years the newly-formed habits pass into a permanent disposition or trait of character which seeks expression and finds pleasure in the discharge of those offices which formerly were performed with dread and disgust. Thus the actual nature of an individual is extended and enlarged, with its boundaries approaching ever more nearly those of his. total self,-the universal self, that is,-present implicitly in all human individuals. This larger self which is developed through effort and struggle is often called the “second nature” to contrast it with the first nature Which is partially the result of heredity and early training. Speaking in the same fashion, Hegel says: “The harmoniousness of childhood is a gift from the hand of nature: the second harmony must spring from the labor and culture of the Spirit.”2 When the Good thus becomes a second nature it is no longer in any sense external to the self, but becomes the spontaneous expression of a character which has been so
2 HEGEL: Logic (Wallace trans., p. 55).
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broadened as to include the interests of others and so organized as to realize all of the capacities of intelligent personality.5. Arnold's Contrast of Hebraism with Hellenism.
These two aspects of the Good which we have been considering are connected by Matthew Arnold, in his famous essay, Hebraism and Hellenism, with two great historic forces at work in human society. The final aim of these two spiritual forces, he asserts, is the same,-man's perfection or salvation; but they pursue their aim by very different courses. The one emphasizes action. Its leading idea is conduct and obedience-obedience to the divine law, in strict conformity to the demands of conscience. Only thus can man conquer the sinful tendency in his own nature and realize in himself the perfection of the divine. The emphasis of the other is upon intelligence. It seeks to know human life and the world of human experience as they are. And to such insight the Good appears as a reasonable and beautiful thing-the condition of human happiness, to be pursued spontaneously and joyously. “And these two forces we regard as in some sense rivals-rivals not by a necessity of their own nature, but as exhibited in man and his history. And to give these forces names from the two races of men who have supplied the most signal and splendid manifestations of them, we may call them, respectively, the forces of Hebraism and Hellenism. Hebraism and Hellenism-b6tween these two points of influence moves our world. At one time it feels more powerfully the attraction of one of them, at another time of the other; and it ought to be, though it never is, evenly and happily balanced between them.” Christianity, according to Arnold, is but a modification of Hebraism. “Christianity changed nothing in the essential bent of Hebraism to set doing above knowing. Self-conquest, self-devotion, the following, not our own individual will, but the will of God,
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obedience, is the fundamental idea of this form, also, of the discipline to which we have attached the general name of Hebraism.” Hellenism was re-born at the beginning of the modern era, in the Renaissance with its desire for knowledge of the material world and its appreciation of the beauty in nature and human art. It persists in the ideal of culture which aims at a perfection of man's natural qualities. It was met, however, by a new form of Hebraism, the product of the Reformation. Protestantism called upon men to find their chief good in obedience to the divine will as revealed in the Scriptures. This, the Puritan ideal, which makes duty or conscience supreme in human life, is still the strongest moral force in the world.-Neither of these two great spiritual disciplines which have for so long opposed one another and still offer to humanity sharply conflicting ideals is to be looked upon as furnishing the law of human development. “They are, each of them, contributions to human development, aug`âcontributions, invaluable contributions; and each showing itself to us more august, more invaluable, more preponderant over the other, according to the moment in which we take them and the relation in which we stand to them.” 6. Hebraism. It will be illuminating to dwell a little longer upon these two tendencies in the spiritual development of humanity which Arnold contrasts so effectively; for here, as in many other cases, history gives vitality and concreteness to a distinction which of itself might seem abstract and theoretical. Let us therefore compare the two conflicting doctrines upon important points, and then inquire if there has not arisen in history a third view which may be taken as a synthesis of the other two. We derive our knowledge of Hebraism chiefly from the literature of the Old Testament. There man's good is represented as existing, entirely outside his own nature, in theTHE GOOD AS SELF-REALIZATION
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will of God.3 Man is, in fact, believed to be entirely sinful and incapable of knowing his own good. The primary and essential condition of goodness for him is obedience to the divine will. The commands of God are not discovered by the exercise of human reason: they are revealed, in the form of a divine law, by inspired law-givers and prophets. The revelation of this divine law to a particular people is based upon a covenant in which God as Law-giver agrees, in reward of their obedience to this law, to make of them a favored race and to continue them under His protection and guidance. The result of obedience, if given, will not be goodness or perfection in mart like to that of God. But man will attain, through obedience unto righteousness, a state of conformity to the divine will. The sphere in which this righteousness is exercised is to be not a political state, but a theocratic kingdom, a divinely established order to be set up in Israel. The people of God's choice may live righteously, ruled by God Himself. This ethico-religious system under which the Hebrew people lived had the great merit of holding before men a lofty ideal raised above the level of individual interest because believed to proceed from the Creator and Sovereign Power of all the world. Thus the requirements of morality were given the dignity and majesty of a law with a superhuman source and supernatural sanctions. But this very separation of the Good from the nature and interest of man had evil consequences which in time seemed to outweigh the merits of the system. Since the Good found expression in a law imposed upon men from without, it was inevitable that they should pay more and more attention to outward conformity and less and less to inward motive and disposition. Great care was expended in learning with literal exactness the requirements of the law and in practicing with formal
3 Cf. BRUCE: Ethics of the Old Testament, Chap. 1, (2) “Fundamental Principles of Old Testament Ethics.”
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precision the observances which it required. Thus Hebraism degenerated into that and legalism and barren formalism which permitted an exact outward compliance with the law--a mere husk of righteousness--to exist along with injustice and cruelty and avarice,--a condition denounced by the later prophets and still more strongly reprobated by Jesus himself.7. Hellenism.
In all essential points the Ethics of Hellenism is the antithesis of the Hebrew doctrine. For the Greek thinker it was a truth self-evident that the Good was based upon the nature of man and identical with his true happiness.4 Not that all the Greek moralists were Hedonists, but, it was an assumption common to all their theories that, whatever the Good was it would be such, as to bring man that happiness which results from the fulfillment of his nature. Even the Cynics, who recommended the renunciation of all natural pleasure, did so because they believed that only through such asceticism could the human soul gain peace and the opportunity to exercise freely and uninterruptedly its own capacities. With regard to the primary and essential factor in goodness, practically all the Greek moralists agree that this is the exercise of reason. Wisdom, the distinctively human capacity, is the one sterling coin for which all the virtues may be exchanged,5 and constitutes the foundation of every good life. Reason when exercised gives man an insight into his own nature and into his relations with his fellow-men: it enables him to foresee the consequences of his conduct and to act with a view to his future happiness. The effect of thus applying reason to the conduct of human life is to produce order and harmony. The several activities of man's nature are so regulated and adjusted that their expression is harmonious and proportionate. Such balance
4 ARISTOTLE: Nicomachean Ethics, Bk. 1, Chap. V.
5 PLATO: Phaedo, 69. 1
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and proportion in the play of its different activities are equivalent to the health of the soul, which is identical with virtue or goodness.” The sphere in which this rationally ordered life is attained is the body-politic, the city-state; since man is a social animal, and complete satisfaction is possible to his nature only when, through the discharge of his duties as citizen, he is brought into varied and intimate associations with his fellows. ]For its effort thus to connect the Good with man's nature Greek Ethics is deserving of highest praise. Represented as the perfection of human nature, the Ideal is made to appear in its demands both reasonable and beautiful. Morality, instead of being an unwilling obedience to a law exacting and inflexible, is the spontaneous expression of a soul enlightened by reason. But this identification of the Good with the culture and perfection of man's faculties had unfortunate results in Greek thought. For an imperfect understanding of human nature led to an inadequate conception of the Good. Reason was made supreme, and thus the Good limited to what could be reasonably expected to increase the satisfaction of the human individual. Hence no sufficient basis was provided, after all, for social obligation. It was possible to show that the citizens of a Greek city had mutual interests, and, for that reason, were bound in duty to assist and serve one another. But that such a community of interest extended to barbarians and slaves could not be demonstrated, and consequently no social obligation was admitted which extended beyond the limits of the Greek nation to humanity in general. And when the Greek states lost their independence and their citizens were brought into more direct contact with other nationalities and classes, this individualism in their ethical thought wag further accentuated until, in the later theories, the chief function of reason in human conduct was to give the individual a 6 PLATO: Republic, 443.THE CONCEPTION OF SELF-REALIZATION
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means of satisfaction within himself which should free him from the need of all social activities and relationships.8. Relation of Christianity to Hebraism and Hellenism.
In the opinion of Arnold, as we have seen, Christianity is only a modification of Hebraism, sharing its one-sidedness and inadequacy. Such criticism may be justly applied to the interpretation of Christianity which regards it as a continuation of the Hebrew cult, in which an intellectual assent to the divinity of the Founder is offered as a substitute for that perfect conformity to the divine law which God demands and man is unable to achieve. But we find in the teachings of Jesus another and a higher view--in all important respects identical with that of “self-realization”--which raises Christianity far above the limitations of both Hebraism and Hellenism and makes of it a comprehensive synthesis of the profound and enduring truths contained in these two historic doctrines. Jesus based the Good neither upon a divine will external to man, nor upon the actual nature of the human individual. He always taught that goodness consisted in inward disposition and not in outward conformity: it must be rooted deep ihe soul of man and develop as a true expression of his nature. “Have salt in yourselves” (Mark 9: 50), he admonishes his disciples, and always sought to arouse and strengthen the better part of their natures. Of all the laws of the old Hebrew dispensation, none was more distinctive or held in greater reverence than that concerning Sabbath observance. Yet Jesus did not hesitate to break this law when human welfare could be benefited thereby, and to his critics he replied, “The Sabbath was made for man, and not man for the Sabbath.” (Mark 2: 27.) Nor, on the other hand, did he identify the Good with the actual interest of man. Rather did he insist that its attainment was an arduous task, involving struggle and submission.
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The individual must prepare to see his own nature thwarted and his own desires suppressed if he proposes to pursue the Ideal. The sacrifice of private aim and ambition was said to be the condition of achieving the higher good. He who would find his life must be willing first to lose it. As the death of the seed is the condition of the growth of the plant, so the death of the old self is the condition of the development of the new life of virtue and goodness. Not, then, in a law imposed upon man from without, nor in desires existing within him, does Jesus find the ground and source of goodness, but in a larger self latent in human nature. This larger self pertains neither to God nor man exclusively, but is common to both and testifies to the union of the human and the divine. It is, in fact, the divine principle in man, and in its realization man shares the divine life, while God is expressed in human nature. Through the submission of his actual nature that individual realizes his larger self, and this perfecting of his own nature brings him into harmony with his fellow men and with God. In further evidence of its synthetic character Christianity finds the prime condition of goodness neither in wisdom nor obedience, but in a union of thought and action--i.e. faith. It does not exalt as the essence of righteousness in man an unquestioning obedience to a will external to him and, a law arbitrarily imposed upon his conduct. Instead Jesus, based his injunctions upon a well-defined and consistent view of man and the universe. According to this, the Christian view of the world, man is not what he seems, a merely natural being whose Good lies in the satisfaction of his material wants. He is in his deepest nature spiritual and the child of the Divine Spirit, who is the source of all reality. Hence the larger life for man, the more real existence, is a spiritual life in which those ends are sought which have universal value. But in the teachings of JesusTHE CONCEPTION OF SELF-REALIZATION
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no attempt is made to prove or demonstrate the truth of these views. Since they concern the possibilities of human development they lie beyond the region of direct proof or demonstration. The only proof which the individual can have of their truth comes from acting upon them. He must be willing to make the venture before he can experience the satisfaction of the larger life. This venture involves the surrender of objects known to have value for the sake of others which are untried ' in actual experience unknown. Faith in the Christian conception is therefore an act of will-enlightened by reason, but not prescribed or pre-determined by reason. The will in this action only expresses the larger self, voicing the latent possibilities in the human individual of a more comprehensive and completely organized life. The larger self, which is the basis of Christian Ethics, furnishes also a new social bond among human beings. Since all men possess this divine principle latent in their natures they are all united by ties of spiritual kinship. A recognition of this kinship awakens in the individual a love for his fellow-men. This love is. different from a natural sympathy for a limited number of friends and acquaintances; it is an enthusiastic devotion to the ideal possibilities which are present in every human individual and give to each an infinite value. This love, when it is awakened, constitutes the only motive sufficient to impel men to unlimited social service. To such motive Christianity appeals, and arouses the individual to effort in behalf of all mankind. Its sphere is therefore not that of the political state, or an ecclesiastical organization, but of the whole human race, and its social ideal, that of the Kingdom of God, is a universal society in which the divine spirit of justice and benevolence prevails and each individual is given an opportunity for the fullest personal development.THE GOOD AS SELF-REALIZATION
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REFERENCES
SETH, Ethical Principles, Part I, Chap. III, § § I-a.
JAMES, Psychology, Chap. X.
DEWEY AND TUFTS, Ethics, Chap. XVIII, § 4.
MACKENZIE, Manual of Ethics, Book II, Chap. V.
ALEXANDER, Moral Order and Progress, Book II, Chap. I.
GREEN, Prolegomena to Ethics, Book III, Chaps. I, II.
ARNOLD, Culture and Anarchy, Chaps. IV, V.
CAIRD, Evolution of Religion, Vol. II, Lecture VI.
