CHAPTER VI
THE CONDITIONS OF SELF-REALIZATION
1. Form and Content in Self-Realization.--2. The Incidental and the Essential in Human Nature.--3. Man as a Natural Being.--4. His Native Instincts.--5. Man as a Conscious Self.--6. His Spiritual Capacities.--7. Necessary Stages in Self-Realization.--8. (a) Individual.--9. (b) Social.--10. (c) Universal.
1. Form and Content in Self-Realization.
The Good is now deflned as the full realization of the human self. This conception of self-realization is of supreme importance in the science of Ethics. But its establishment does not mark the complete solution of the ethical problem; it only provides a necessary basis for further inquiry. Highly significant as it is, the conception of self-realization as thus far developed is an abstract principle of little value in solving the practical problems of conduct. To be genuinely helpful and illuminating it must be made concrete. We must know something of the actual nature of the human self whose realization is the summum bonum--of what capacities it is constituted, through what activities it is expressed. Only through such knowledge can the principle of self-realizaticn furnish guidance and direction to human conduct.
Or, to put the matter in other words, our study up to the present point has revealed to us the form of the Good. An analysis of the activity of volition has proved that conduct, in order to satisfy this faculty of will and hence deserve to be called ” good,“ must be completely organized in form, that is, realize the whole self. But
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the student of Ethics cannot be content with a principle that is merely formal. He must know the content of the Good as well as its form. What are the activities that go to make up a completely organized life? What are the qualities and characteristics of the self whose nature is completely realized? If mere organization is the Good, will not every life in which the different acts are all strictly subordinated to a ruling purpose--even though, as in the case of the criminal, this purpose is a cruel and sinister one--be morally approved? Suppose a boy is reared in the belief that it is his chief duty to avenge the death of a murdered father. As he grows to manhood such vengeance becomes his ruling purpose,--perhaps connecting itself with an ideal of personal honor. In finally gaining his revenge he himself meets death. Is not his life completely organized? Does he not--or does he--fully realize himself? Such an example shows the necessity of going beyond the formal principle of organization and discovering what definite characteristics and capacities are displayed by all normal human beings in the course of their development.
2. The Incidental and the Essential in Human Nature.
The task now before us is to ascertain what are the fundamental characteristics of the human self and to see how these are expressed in the process of self-realization. Now while the form of the Good was discovered by an investigation of the faculty of volition, which is the source of all conduct, this, the content, can be determined only by a study of the facts of human nature and human experience. The effects of such a study--especially a first general survey--are discouraging. The facts are many and complicated, and the variations of character between men of different races and ages are apparently endless and certainly bewildering. It seems that all men possess in common only the bare faculties of thought and action, while the many ideas and beliefs which spring from the one, and
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the varied tendencies and dispositions which pertain to the other, are different in each individual case. What characteristics have the Norse Viking, the medieval recluse, and the modern businessman in common? To what extent will the course of self-realization for the Kaffir, the Innuit, and the European be identical? Or even within a modern civilized state, how many activities are shared equally by street-sweeper, stock-broker, and charities-worker?
The activities involved in self-realization must necqssarily differ with the time, race, sex, and occupation of the self. In fact, self-realization is bound to have a differeut meaning for each separate individual; since each possesses certain attributes and abilities peculiar to himself, which enter into his self-realization. Despite this infinite diversity among men there are, nevertheless, certain characteristics which are essential to human nature as such. They are consequently possessed by all normal human individuals, and serve to direct the course of self-realization in each. In fact, these essential characteristics determine the activities which all men must put forth as conditions of their self-realization. They may hence be said to prescribe the laws of self-realization, valid universally within the field of human conduct. Before we proceed to a consideration of those essential characteristics of human nature which constitute the universal and necessary conditions of self-realization in the life of man, a question must be answered which will naturally arise at this point. To what extent can such a process as self-realization which, as we have seen, is the expression of the free agency of volition, an original and spontaneous power, have its course pre-determined by any influence whatever?
The mere idea that it is possible by reflection to discover conditions of moral development which hold for all men, and hence pre-determine the course of self-realization in
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human life, may seem in direct contradiction to the previous assertion that the future must always contain for the voluntary agent an element of uncertainty which reason can never eliminate, and that consequently human conduct must ever remain a venture in which the surprising and unexpected are constantly encountered. If this latter assertion be true,--it will be urged,--it is manifestly impossible that the course of self-realization should be pre-determined or its successive stages prescribed. If the future course of moral development is thus determined, the power of human volition is limited, the will is not truly free. Conversely, if we are to have true freedom in human conduct and real evolution in human life, the possibilities of change and difference must be unlimited. Indeed, the logic of the situation may appear to require from us the admission that not even the goal of moral development is fixed, but that it is subject to indefinite change and variation in response to new and different conditions which may arise in the future. This view--that the logic of development forbids us to attribute to development any definite goal or ultimate end--is repugnant alike to reason and to common-sense; it warns us against the over-emphasis of one aspect of the truth, itself of great importance, to the exclusion of the other aspects which in real experience offset and balance it. Now the indubitable truth which finds expression in the view we are considering is that no genuine development realizes an end set for it by some external agency; it, so to speak, unfolds its result out of its own nature. The moral ideal of self-realization is rooted in the nature of volition itself. For development, to be development, must be the development of something, not of nothing. The thing in this case is will, and we learn from experiencing its activity that it is essentially an agency of adjustment and organization. It is inconceivable, therefore, that the goal of its development should be
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other than the completed organization, perfected adjustment. Further than this, reflection upon the achievements of volition in human life shows that it works under certain fundamental conditions, conditions fixed by the characteristies of human nature, or by the character of the real world. The existence of these conditions, revealed by the results of past action, makes it reasonable to conclude--as we shall presently see--that self-realization in the case of all men must involve an integration of impulses in the individual and an adjustment of interests in society. But in addition to these necessary implications, which are of a very general nature, the process of self-realization holds forth enough uncertainty to test the courage of the most adventuresome soul. The methods whereby self-organization can be achieved in the individual and social spheres can be ascertained only by trial and experiment. Guided of course by the results of previous experience, man must ever advance to meet new situations; in meeting these situations he must have the strength of will, the courage of conviction, sufficient to risk happiness already attained in putting to the test new and more promising solutions. All that ethical reflection can do is to make such generalizations from the moral experience of humanity as will afford us most effective guidance in solving the problems of future conduct.
What, then, are the essential characteristics of human nature which constitute the universal and necessary conditioiis of human self-realization?
3. Man as a Natural Being.
Man is primarily a natural being, a member of the highest of the animal species. He is the outcome of the same natural evolution that has produced the other living forms, and is, therefore, related to them by descent. His genealogy may be traced down through a succession of species to the earliest and simplest forms of life. As a result of this, his natural origin and
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development, man possesses certain qualities which must be reckoned as fundamental to his character. Most important in their influence upon conduct are the instincts which all men thus possess. These instincts are a part of man's natural inheritance, and hence are shared in common with the lower animals. They are modifications of the nervous system originally developed in our animal ancestors by natural selection because giving an advantage in the struggle for existence. Originating in this way they have been transmitted by physical heredity and made a permanent part of man's physical structure.
4. His Native Instincts.
Hence the first of the characteristics fundamental to human nature is the possession by all men of a set of natural instincts. These instincts have an important bearing upon man's conduct, since they cause him at first to react involuntarily to certain kinds of objects and then consciously to desire and voluntarily to seek them. It is difficult, if not impossible, to enumerate and classify the various instincts of man. This is not because their existence is in the least doubtful; but in many cases the objects and movements involved in a group of instinctive reactions are so related that it seems an arbitrary matter whether we attribute the whole group to one instinct or divide it among several. Are the instincts, so-called, of defense, combat, and rivalry three separate instincts, or just varied manifestations of one instinct? Who shall decide? Still it is possible to make a rough catalogue of the more important human instincts 2 which will be sufficient to our needs; since, for ethical purposes, we do not require a complete classification of every variety of instinctive reaction in man. For purposes of the present discussion, then, man's instinctive reactions may be divided into three classes, in accordance with the nature of the object upon which they are directed, whether it be the individual himself, an inanimate object, or another
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living individual. Under the first head comes the instinct of self-preservation, which causes man to seek his own health and pleasure, and equally to avoid conditions of harm and pain. Under the second head we may note the instincts of food, drink, shelter, and acquisition. Thirdly, come the social instincts, among which are those of sex and parenthood, of speech and sympathy, of resentment and emulation. We may add as another to these three classes, certain instincts whose object may be either an inanimate thing or another living individual--that is, the instincts of imitation, curiosity, beauty, and play.
Originating as conditions of survival with the lower forms of life, these instincts serve--through the actions they prompt--to maintain the existence of the human organism in the natural world. Thus they relate man as individual to the objects of nature, giving value to material things according as these minister to human needs. The world of the human individual is consequently not a world of objects that merely exist as facts, but a world of objects which appeal as possible ends of action because supplying food, shelter, clothing, amusement, etc. In the same way man's native instincts relate him to other members of his own species. Other individuals acquire interest for him because furnishing companionship, arousing resentment, or appealing to sexual or parental emotions. Through his various natural instincts, therefore, man is set in certain definite relationships to objects of the material world and to other men as natural individuals.
5. Man as a Conscious Self.
But man is more than a natural individual: he is a conscious self. As a self or person, he is not a material thing with boundaries to separate it from other things in space, he is a spiritual being to whom no such limitations can be assigned. Man's selfhood or personality resides in the conscious unity of his experience. ” To have a conception of one's own self,“
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says Hobhouse, ” one must be aware of a certain identity running through the mass of past experiences, and inferentially prolonged into the future.”1 Now man's consciousness of the unity of his experience, in which his selfhood consists, depends upon his ability to weave together the facts of his experience into a connected system. He must do more than associate experiences in the order of their occurrence; for this the animals do and yet have no selfhood or personality. He must be able to establish permanent relations among the objects of his consciousness “upon the basis of their affinities and the more remote connections that follow therefrom.”2 Now this work of the organization of experience, which is the condition of conscious selfhood, proceeds ultimately from volition, the spiritual force in man which builds out of the materials of animal life a self-conscious personality. We already know how volition in its first and simplest form begins this work. In discovering the means which must be used to attain the end of desire the individual is made aware of relationships among objects that are permanent and necessary. Imitation and language are, as we have noted, also important factors in the development of the self. The social character of selfhood is therefore marked from the first; since self-development in its earliest stages is dependent upon the influence of other selves and the possibility of cornmunicating with them.
With the appearance of volition, then, in the third or fourth year of human life, the growth of the self begins and it continues through childhood. But full self-consciousness does not arise until the power of free thought and imagination is developed in the later period of adolescence. This power enables the individual to deal with his experience in its larger masses and more comprehensive relationships.
1 HOBHOUSE: Mind in Evolution, p. 301.
2 HOBHOUSE: Op. cit., p. 300.
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He may behold himself as a physical being, a denizen of a planet in a great solar system and an insignificant atom in a vast universe of suns and stars, or in his social nature as one among the many millions of souls now existing in the world. He may view his present in its connection with the past which is fading in memory, and with the long future which stretches out before, filled with unknown possibilities. In such consciousness of self the existence of other selves is necessarily implied. The very relationships by which the experience of the self is organized are assumed to hold for other selves as well. The real universe in which the self finds its home is assumed to exist for other selves also. In fact, consciousness of self-existence involves constant appeal to the existence of others. From his nature as such, the self-conscious person must identify himself with, and yet at the same time distinguish himself from, other persons. He must recognize that all have the same world, yet each occupies therein his own point of view.
6. His Spiritual Capacities.
As a conscious self man has certain spiritual capacities the possession of which may rank as the second of the fundamental characteristics of human nature. And as his natural instincts serve to sustain and strengthen his physical existence, so his spiritual capacities maintain and enrich his conscious persona.
These capacities are all expressions of the basal activity of volition which, through its work of organization, builds up the unity of selfhood. But in the discharge of its office volition manifests itself in three highly specialized forms which it is permissible to distinguish as different capacities. These spiritual capacities in man are: first, the Intellectual, the power of thought, the ability to acquire knowledge; second, the Technical, the ability to contrive, to construct, to invent what is serviceable; third, the Esthetic, the ability to perceive and enjoy what is beautiful. Now the effect of the operation of all three of these capacities is to extend and
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to enrich the unity of the self. The intellectual capacity does this by introducing within the unity of self-consciousiiess the objects and fixed connections of the real universe. The scientist, with his telescope or microscope, is continuAlly enriching human experience by bringing into it new facts. In a like manner also does every individual enlarge the content of his own personality, who by serious thought ,discovers a new factor or hidden cause within the ken of his own experience. The technical capacity of man extends the unity of his own selfhood by subjecting the agencies of the environment, natural and social, to the ends of intelligence. This the inventor does when he devises a machine by which the forces of nature are compelled to fulfil the purposes of man; the educator, too, when he devises a new method for communicating knowledge--for teaching spelling or arithmetic or grammar. The same ability is exercised by all individuals who, through skill and contrivance, adapt external surroundings to the uses of their own personal intelligence. The cesthetic capacity in its way also enriches the content of the unitary self; through exercise of the imagation and perceptive faculties such form and arrangement are given to experiences of color and sound as to create in them new suggestions of meaning, and thus to provide the agent with new sources of satisfaction. This ability is of course displayed primarily in the work of the artist; but in a less degree by all those who enjoy beauty in any of its forms.
Since these activities spring from the nature of the self and all contribute to its extension and development, we should expect that the objects which they seek to realize would be ideal or spiritual. Such is indeed the case; the objects of the three spiritual capacities mentioned are ideal in character and possess none of the limitations of material things. Of course any object which becomes an end of action is of necessity ideal. This is just as true
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of the material object which instinct causes us to desire as it is of the best considered purpose or most comprehensive ideal. But the material object which becomes an end of natural desire is particular in character and limited in time and place; hence it cannot be pursued by all men, but only by a few individuals. Through the power of intelligence, generalizing upon experiences of achievement by race and individual, however, objects of much greater range are furnished as ends for volition in its three-fold capacity--objects extending in their scope to all places and all times and being possible of pursuit by all individuals. In this way simple curiosity about a particular object becomes a wish to know about a whole class of objects, then a number of classes of objects, and at last develops into the craving for knowledge of all possible objects--i.e. for Truth. Interest in the steps which must be taken to secure a particular object grows into a desire to discover the best means or methods for attaining all objects of the same sort: agencies and methods are standardized, technique is developed, and finally Power or Efficiency is adopted as an end to be sought by all individuals. Liking for a special object which, when seen or heard, gives a peculiar kind of delight develops into an interest in all objects which produce esthetic pleasure, in their relation to one another, and the conditions of their existence; out of this interest grows the yearning to produce in every sphere the conditions necessary to this species of enjoyment and thus realize Beauty universally.
Truth, Power, and Beauty, the three ideals sought by man as a spiritual being, are therefore ideal in the sense of being Universal, and thus having a scope and compre, hensiveness that natural objects do not possess. In proof of this, compare the ideal of Truth, the object sought in all intellectual activity, with the object of a natural instinct--say, food. Food is material, hence is perishable
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in character and strictly limited in amount, so that what one individual gains the rest must necessarily lose. Truth, on the contrary, being ideal, survives even the limits of man's natural lifetime, enduring and increasing as the successive generations of men are born and die. It is not restricted in quantity; it cannot be ” cornered “ by any individual. Rather does the individual, in the measure of his success in obtaining it, increase the possessions of all the rest; for truth requires for its pursuit and discovery the cooperation of many individuals in a community of intelligence. Nor is it otherwise with Power or Efficiency, the end sought in technical activity. The engineer who designs a new type of bridge, and the agricultural expert who devises an improved method of farming are not seeking material things with their narrow limits--combinations of stone and steel, bushels of grain, or tons of hay. Instead their object is ideal--the control of the forces of nature by the power of intelligence. The same may be said of efforts made in the social and political spheres to devise methods and instruments whereby the aims of intelligence may be attained in commerce and government. The purposes which direct these undertakings, because intelligent are universal, and hence the object of the inventor or engineer, the master of industry or the statesman, when attained, is of benefit to all humanity. Thus the originator of the suspension bridge and steam engine pursued and attained ideal objects which, as such, had permanence and universality; for the inventions survived the natural life of the inventor and became the common possession of humanity. Likewise Beauty, which we in our esthetic capacity seek to create and enjoy, is identical with no block of chiseled marble or piece of painted canvas which can be bought and sold. It is ideal, consisting of the pleasant harmony of imaginative faculties induced by certain aspects of nature and works of art. In seeking it, then, we seek,
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not a particular object which can be possessed by but one individual, we seek an ideal quality which resides in this object for all persons of cultivated imagination, and thus may be seized on and enjoyed by them all.
Each of the three ” spiritual “ activities of man has its distinctive end. These three ends constitute the three ruling ideals of self-conscious personality, Truth, Power, and Beauty. In a sense they are coordinate and independent ideals, each having its own distinctive sphere and rightfully demanding supremacy within it. Sometimes, however, the ideal of Goodness is given equal standing with these three or with the. first and last, Truth and Beauty. Herein a serious mistake is made; for the ideal of Goodness represents the demands of the agency of volition, of which intellectual, esthetic, and technical activities are but subordinate expressions. Ultimately, then, the three ideals we have been discussing must all be measured in terms of goodness, and all are subject to the requirements which the complete satisfaction of the power of will imposes on human conduct. By true ideas we mean, in last analysis, ideas that can be realized as ends of action, by efficient agencies or methods the ones that will produce the desired results, and by beautiful presentations those in which the ends of intelligence are immediately apprehended. Thus do intellectual, technical, and aesthetic activities contribute to the satisfaction of volition in its work of organizing and enriching personal life.
7. Necessary Stages in Self-Realization.
Two characteristies, we find, must be regarded as fundamental to the human self. They are consequences of the fact that man is at once a natural being and a conscious self. The first is the possession by him of a number of natural instincts which relate him to the material objects of his environment and to other individuals of the human species. The second is the development in the human self of certain
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spiritual capacities which serve to relate it both to other selves and to universal reality. These conditions, fundamental to human nature, determine the course of self-realization for all men. They prescribe what activities must have place in the conduct of every human individual who would realize himself. Hence we are now prepared to learn of the content of self-realization, as well as the form, to ask what course self-realization must take in human beings thus characterized.
It will be convenient to recognize in advance three leading aspects of self-realization in man, which are consequent upon the above-noted relations in which he stands, as natural being, and conscious self.
Full Self-realization, or the complete organization of human conduct, requires the realization of:
(1) The Individual Self.--Through such adjustment of the activities in man that all are made means to the promotion of individual interest.
(2) The Social Self.--Through such adjustment of the interest of the human individual to the interests of others that his activity is made a means to the furtherance of social welfare.
(3) The Universal Self--Through the adjustment of human welfare to the Universal Purpose.
Thus an outline is furnished which may be regarded as provisional until it is filled in and verified in subsequent discussion. Let us now ascertain in further detail what activities are essential to self-realization under the conditions set by the nature of man. Or, since self-realization is achieved by voluntary action, through the pursuit of what succession of ends the self is fully realized.
8. (a) The Individual Self.
Self-realization within the individual sphere means that the total interest of the individual shall be realized by all of his acts. Now, as we know, the human individual possesses both natural
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instincts and spiritual Capacities. In virtue of these characteristies of his nature, -certain objects appeal to him and prompt him to act. In order that his conduct shall express himself, it is first necessary that the objects of instinct become the ends of conscious desire. When thing is accomplished, he seeks in each succeeding act for the thing which he at the moment desires-be it food, play, companionship, or what-not. But the total interest of the individual is not attained in this way; for these desires: often conflict, and to satisfy one today may prevent the satisfaction of another tomorrow, or even for days to come. Self-organization, then, requires such adjustment and correlation of these varied and opposing desires that each may receive a measure of fulfilment consistent with the, due and proportionate satisfaction of those remaining. This, adjustment is not merely a compromise, however, in which, all the desires are treated as independent units and thus admitted to have equal rights. Certain desires are given--a preference, but---consistent with the principle of Self-realization--upon one ground only, that is, their greater comprehensiveness. The measure of fulfilment which self-realization permits to one of the particular desires or purposes of the self is determined entirely by the comprehensiveness of the object concerned, the degree to which it includes other objects sought-for, and hence is expressive of the whole self. As illustrative of difference in this regard, compare the objects of two natural instincts; for example those of food and of resentment or anger. The first is, much more comprehensive than the second. Upon the obtainment of a sufficient quantity of the proper food depends the effective exercise of the most of the other activities of the human individual. The other desire has a very narrow range--since the attainment of its object, retaliation, in any but the most restricted form and unusual circumstances, acts as a hindrance to the attainment of other
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objects desired. Of all the objects which man seeks through natural instinct, the most comprehensive is self-preservation. This instinct leads the individual to desire those pleasant conscious states which are indicative of physical well-being, and equally to shun that consciousness of pain which signifies bodily disorder. Generalizing upon particular experiences of pleasure and pain, he is further led to form the purpose to secure in life the greatest enjoyment, or, in other words, gain the maximum of pleasure. Now pleasure, in the sense of agreeable consciousness, is the most comprehensive of the objects which man is led by instinct to pursue, and therefore the purpose to pursue it deserves to be made supreme over all other desires and purposes having a like source. For the greatest amount of pleasure in the case of the human individual is generally an accompanimeint of the highest degree of health, security, and comfort in natural existence. And, since all other instincts which man possesses have been developed to maintain and promote his natural existence, the different objects which they cause him to desire--wealth, amusement, reputation, etc.--fall into subjection as means to the inclusive end of Pleasure, or natural well-being. Thus Pleasure emerges as the first of the ends which, in the process of self-realization, represent the whole self it contrast to any of its parts; and we make due recognition of the truth contained in the Hedonistic conception of the Good.
We have already seen, however, that the ideal objects of man's spiritual capacities--Truth, Power, and Beauty--are larger and more comprehensive, not merely than any particular thing which he naturally desires, but even than his natural existence and well-being itself. Self-organization in the individual life requires, therefore, that the end lately made supreme over all natural desires and purposes now be subordinated as a means to the realization of these spiritual capacities. The individual, that is, must make
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his natural well-being and pleasure a means to the exercise of his intellectual, technical, and Esthetic activities. The ends of these higher activities of the human self taken together may be expressed by the word Culture. Culture thus appears as the ideal which transcends all other ends in the conduct of the individual, because representing his largest interest and embracing all lesser goods. To its attainment, the natural existence and well-being of the individual must be made subordinate, including of course such lesser purposes as those to gain wealth, amusement, fame, etc. These have now to be realigned and made instrumental, not to the gaining of Pleasure, but to the attainment of Culture. In thus making Culture supreme among the ends pursued by the individual we provide for the truth in Rationalism, which finds man's Good in spiritual activity rather than natural pleasure. The ideal of Culture on which we dwell, as representing the highest interest of the self as individual, is practically identical with the Highest Good as conceived by Plato3 and Aristotle.4 According to Plato Justice, the supreme and all-inclusive virtue, consists in a strict division of labor and harmonious cooperation between the three principles in the nature of man--it being understood that it is the function of reason to control. Aristotle, in his doctrine of the Mean, would allow to each desire that measure of gratification consistent with the realization of the Supreme End which is the fulfilment of all man's capacities under the direction of reason.
9. (b) The Social Self.
Man is related as a natural being to other members of the human species, and, as a conscious self, to other selves in a community of intelligence. Self-realization requires that his interest as individual be adjusted to the interests of others in society.
The human individual becomes aware of the existence
3 PLATO: Republic, 443, C.
4 ARISTOTLE: Nicomachean Ethics, 1106, B.
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of others as soon as he becomes conscious of existing himself. One of his leading instincts, moreover,--that of sympathy, --makes him desirous of increasing others' pleasure and lessening their pain. The formation of a general purpose to promote the happiness or well-being of others usually waits upon the development of a definite self-interest in the individual himself. At first the sympathetic impulse is correlated with other natural tendencies of the individual and made a means to the promotion of his own interest. It is only after a comparatively clear consciousness of self, and self-interest arises that there comes also a recognition of the interest of others. This conception of another's interest becomes fuller and more adequate as the development of self-interest proceeds, growing from the idea of another's comfort and happiness merely, to the cultivation of his higher personal capacities. The impulse of sympathy, attaching to such an idea of another's good, makes it attractive as an end of action. Thus a well-defined aim to seek the interests of other individuals appears and exists along with the ideal of self-interest. These varied interests often conflict, so that it seems possible to gain one's own ends as an individual only by thwarting the ambitions of others, and, conversely, others' good can often be realized only at the expense of one's private ambition. Self-organization makes necessary the adjustment of these warring interests. As always, it insists that the less inclusive shall be subordinated to the more inclusive end. Consequently the realization of the self requires the adoption of the ideal of Altruism on the part of the individual--the determination to seek the interests of others with whom he comes into contact as well as his own. This means that he shall surrender his own desire--or partial interest--when it is opposed to the total well-being of another. In cases where ego and alter seem to have equal interests at stake, Self-realization enforces the doctrine of self-sacrifice,
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since allowance must be made for the influence of a strong and persistent tendency to over-estimate the interest of self and under-estimate that of others, due to the fact that one's own interest is keenly felt, while that of others is only thought or imagined. There are limits, to be sure, to the extent of self-sacrifice which self-realization requires. It would not, for instance, require the individual to sacrifice his own well-being to the passing whim of another. For here the interest of the self is the more comprehensive end.
Self-realization in the social sphere is not completed when the individual adjusts his own interest to the interests of others of his acquaintance. For the selfhood of which man is conscious is a universal principle present in all human beings and uniting them in a community of intelligence and personality. For full self-realization, therefore, it is not sufficient that man pursue his own highest interest as an individual, or that of other individuals with whom he comes into contact; he must go further and seek the good of human personality, of conscious selfhood, whenever and wherever found. Thus a new end appears, more comprehensive than Altruism, which may be called Humanitarianism. It means the development of humanity--the full, free, harmonious exercise of all the capacities of human personality. To this ideal, Self-organization requires that the individual subordinate his own interest and the interests of all
other particular individuals. The conflict at this point between culture and humanitarianism--between the interest of the individual or a privileged group or class of individuals and the welfare of humanity--while less obvious--may be as acute and persistent as that between egoism and altruism. It cannot be doubted, however, that the fullest expression of the self is found in pursuit of the more comprehensive end, and the highest culture can mean nothing less than the fullest self-development. The artist or the
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scientist may regard it as a hindrance to be obliged to recognize a social responsibility in, their specialized activities. Yet the very capacities, intellectual and wsthetic, which they are exercising are implicitly universal, involving the union of many persons in a common knowledge and appreciation. Can one of these spiritual capacities of man be exercised most effectively, then, unless it contribute to the highest personal development of humanity?
10. (c) The Universal Self.
Finally, man is related through his spiritual capacities to Universal Reality. His thought discovers the necessary connections of things and shows how all natural objects are part of an inter-related system. Through constructive activity he learns how the objects and forces of nature are adapted as means to the purposes of intelligence. Through his aesthetic faculty he feels the order and harmony of nature. Self-realization in its third and culminating phase requires the adjustment of human interests to this all-comprehensive Reality. Now it is plain that the character of this adjustment will vary in accordance with the degree of development which self-interest has undergone--whether it is still mainly individual or has been broadened to include the welfare of humanity. But since in all cases of incomplete development the adjustment is only provisional we may safely neglect them and consider only the interest of the self when thoroughly socialized. The question is, therefore, that of the adjustment of human welfare to the Real Universe. It must not be thought, however, that here we go outside the boundaries of the self and inquire concerning its relation to an external reality. On the contrary, just because the real universe is a necessary factor in self-consciousness, it must be reckoned with in the process of self-realization. The problem of the relation of man to the universe is of course the problem of religion, and, as such, is an essential aspect of self-realization.
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The difficulty of the adjustment in question is that the ultimate character of the All-encompassing Reality is unknown. It cannot be directly observed or logically demonstrated. Hence man can only speculate, and such adjustment as he is able to effect will rest upon an assumption. But speculation upon this subject need not be without rational grounds. In fact, it is man's own moral development that is most illuminating at this point. For, in the process of self-realization, natural objects are sacrificed to spiritual activities because the latter prove to be more, comprehensive. Is it not reasonable to assume, therefore, that Universal Reality, which is by nature all-comprehensive, is spiritual--that it is the expression of a Universal Self within which all our human interests may be included and harmonized? Of course the existence of such a Universal or Divine self is in last analysis a matter of faith rather than knowledge; but we have seen that faith is called for along the whole course of moral development. The very existence of the self is rooted in an act of will, and each step forward in its realization is a venture, the abandonment of one good which, although restricted, is assured, for the sake of another which, although it promises a larger satisfaction, is uncertain and largely unknown. Religious belief is simply the last of these acts of faith, the final venture, in which man commits his welfare into the hands of the Universe, believing that since Spirit is
Universal no natural agency, in life or in death, can lessen or destroy the reality which has been attained by a conscious self.
Man thus subordinates his interest to the Universal or Divine Purpose, adopting the latter, so far as it can be known, as his own good. To describe in detail the character and conditions of this adjustment is the task of religion rather than of Ethics. It involves, for the ordinary man, not a number of specific activities in addition to those
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prescribed by individual and social duty, but rather, a personal attitude--of resignation to the divine will, and trust in the divine wisdom. The end now pursued is of all the most comprehensive--the realization of the Universal Purpose, the Cause of Universal Progress.
Thus we see that with human nature characterized as it is, the process of self-realization for man is definite in its direction and specific in its requirements. In its three aspects it involves the attainment of a progression of ends, each of which includes and supersedes the one before, until the supreme and all-comprehensive ideal is reached.
In tabulation these ends appear in the following order:
Self-realization
REFERENCESAgency--Organizing Activity of Volition.Material--Natural Instincts and Spiritual Capacities of Man.
Aspects Ends
Individual Pleasure && Culture
Social Altruism && Humanitarianism
Universal Universal Progress
BALDWIN, Social and Ethical Interpretations in Mental Development, Chaps. VI, IX, XII.
JAMES, Psychology, Chap. XXIV.
PILLSBURY, Essentials of Psychology, Chap. X.
GREEN, Prolegomena to Ethics, Book III, Chap. VI.
ALEXANDER, Moral Order and Progress, Book II, Chap. II.
DEWEY AND TUFTS, Ethics, Chap. XX.
MACKENZIE, Manual of Ethics, Book III, Chap. I.
LESLIE STEPHEN, Science of Ethics, Chap. III.
