CHAPTER V
THE GOOD AS SELF-REALIZATION
1. The Good as Self-Realization.--2. Self-Realization Through the Instrumentality of Volition: (a) The Present Self.--3. (b) The Natural Self.--4. (c) The Personal Self.--5. The Possibilities of Selfhood as Actualized by Volition.--6. Self-Realization Identical with Self-Determination.-7. Libertarianism.--8. Determinism.--9. Freedom as Self-Determination.--10. Objections to This View.
1. The Good as Self-Realization.-The nature of volition has been investigated with the hope that knowledge of this subject would furnish a key to the fundamental ethical problem of the Good; for insight into the true character of volition should enable us to answer the further question as to the form of conduct required for its complete satisfaction. Volition has upon investigation proved itself to be in essential nature an organizing agency. Can we not infer from this fact what is man's highest Good? This query receives at once an affirmative reply; for the truth lies open before us, as a moment's examination of what is implied in the idea of organization, will show.
What is the work of an organizing agency? What is meant by organization? Clearly, to organize is to establish a relation of inter-dependence and cooperation among the parts within any whole. This inter-dependence is the most thorough, this cooperation is the closest, that is possible. So thorough is the inter-dependence that every part has its nature altogether constituted by its connection with the other parts of the system, and ceases to exist in independence of it. So close is the cooperation that every part has
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its life altogether determined by the office it discharges within the system, and ceases to act independently. Organization means, therefore, such a relation within a system that the whole finds expression in every part, and to organize is to establish this relation. Thus it is with the living body which, because such a relation obtains among its parts, is called an organism. The members are so related that each has its nature wholly determined by its function within the whole. This is what social organization means, too,--such cooperation among the different individuals that each finds expression for his own individuality in the discharge of his specific office in society. To organize a business or industry involves such a distribution and adjustment of its various activities that each department shall work with maximum efficiency in the interest of the whole. Nor is it otherwise in the organization of human conduct through the instrumentality of volition,--to organize is to relate the different activities of the individual so that each may promote most effectively the exercise of all--and organization means that the sum-total of the individual's tendencies and capacities shall find conscious expression in each single act. Now the sum-total of the individual's active tendencies and capacities, expressed in their conscious unity, constitute, as we have seen, his selfhood or personality. Consequently, the complete organization of conduct, the goal which volition strives to attain, and which is required to satisfy it fully, is identical with complete self-expression--or, in the more familiar phrase, self-realization. Self-realization is therefore the summum bonum, the highest human good, which we have been seeking to discover. It is that form of conduct wherein each single act is made contributory to the welfare of the whole self and, conversely, the whole self is given expression in every act.
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2. Self-Realization Through the Instrumentality of Volition:
(a) The Present Self.The Good is Self-realization, because volition is an organizing agency, and complete self-organization is identical with complete self-realization. This is the conclusion to which the argument as thus far pursued has led us. Volition, whose demands for satisfaction are expressed in the Moral Ideal, now appears as the faculty through whose instrumentality the self is realized. How this result is accomplished through the exercise of will becomes clearer if we glance back at the successive stages in the development of volition and see what is the effect of each upon the existence and nature of the self.
A person or a self is, as Royce remarks, a life lived according to a plan.1 Now such purposiveness or aim is introduced into human consciousness through the work of volition in its earliest and simplest form--that of desire. In action from desire a number of experiences are united as means to an end, the attainment of an object. The consciousness of the child who desires a toy, and hence goes in search of it, acquires a unity which it did not possess when he acted from instinct or impulse. In instinctive or impulsive action his successive experiences might be united by the fact that they were all adapted to produce a single result, but he would not be conscious of this unity, and it is in a consciousness of the unity of different experiences that selfhood or personality consists. Since through desire unity is first brought to the individual's consciousness from within, this first form of volition may be said to establish the existence of the self. Of course the unity introduced is not extensive or thorough-going. A desire does not embrace a class of objects and hence unite the experiences of the individual over any considerable span of time. Instead it is directed upon a single object and the measures which must be taken for its present
1 ROYCE: Philosophy of Loyalty, p. 168.
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attainment. Hence the self that is realized in desire is not the whole self, nor even a large part of the self--it is the self in form most limited and circumscribed, the self of the present moment. This present self is realized, then, through the pursuit and attainment of the object of momentary desire. Its character, even at the moment of its inception, is, to be sure, largely the outcome of past experience. The idea of the object, now the end of conscious desire, has been produced by past experience, when the same object prompted to instinctive and impulsive action. Even when the desire is for an object of present perception it is not for the object merely as perceived, but for the perceived object thought of as an end of action, i.e. a means of self-satisfaction, and the perceived object could be thus regarded only as the result of previous experience with it. Thus it might be said that in desire, not the self of the present simply, but that of the past as well, is realized. While this is to an extent true, desire does not allow of any conscious reflecting or generalizing upon past experience with a view to determining present conduct. For such use of the past involves the subordination to it of the present as of a particular instance to a general class, and this is action from purpose and not from desire.
3. (b) The Natural Self.
Through action from purpose a more inclusive unity is established within the individual consciousness. Objects of like nature, desired and sought in many different moments, are now grouped together and pursued as a class. Such purposes show by their generality that they are not confined in their scope to the present. Including many particulars, they arise only out of the accumulated experiences of the past when these particular objects have been singly desired, and can be fulfilled only in the course of future time, when these same specific objects are serially attained as parts of an inclusive
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end. Thus purposive action unites experiences past, present, and future, relating a succession of acts as means to the attainment of an end embracing them all. By its instrumentality the boundaries of the self are therefore extended beyond the limits of the present moment to include past and future. A larger self is realized--how large depending upon the scope of the purpose. Some purposes are restricted to a particular period, or place, or undertaking,--as the purposes of youth or of old age, or the purpose of a man starting upon a journey. But the typical purpose extends in its scope over the natural lifetime of the individual--the period of his physical existence. An instance would be the purpose to win favorable recognition from, to be “liked by,” one's fellows. Formed as the result of many agreeable experiences of pleasing others, this purpose is pursued throughout the remainder of life and runs like a binding thread to the very end, tying together diverse actions which would otherwise appear isolated and discrepant. Since the typical purpose extends over the natural lifetime, we may call the self which is realized through purposive action the natural self. It is the self as natural individual whose existence covers a definite period of years and is cut short by death.
4. (c) The Personal Self, Individual and Social.
By the third and highest form of volition, action from ideal, a unity is produced which transcends even the limits of natural individuality and physical existence. . The ends sought, the ideals of Truth and Honor, of Justice and Beauty, are such as involve the cooperation of many persons in a community of intelligence and endeavor. Hence they include the natural self with its purposes, reduced now to the rank of means to a more comprehensive end. The self which is realized through the attainment of these ideals is therefore not the natural self, the particular individual external to, and exclusive of, others, but rather
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the self in its universal aspect, the human person as such. In this the culminating stage of self-realization the existence and action of the natural individual are made instrumental to the expression of the powers and capacities of human personality. This largest self may, therefore, be called the personal self. The development of the personal self through voluntary action follows two lines, which may be clearly distinguished, although they are in close and constant connection. It may be achieved through the pursuit of such ideals as the discovery of truth or the conquest of some department of nature--ideals which, while they implicate and refer to other persons, still concern primarily the individual person and his relation to objective reality. Or it may be achieved through the pursuit of such ideals as those of patriotism and humanitarianism, in which the welfare of other selves is sought directly and explicitly. In this way the social person is developed. The two modes of personal expression, individual and social, although distinguishable in direction, are really two aspects of a unitary development, and hence are complementary and inter-dependent.
5. The Possibilities of Selfhood as Actualized by Volition.
Through the exercise of volition in its successive stages, therefore, the self is created, developed, and brought to full realization. The effect of the organizing activity of will is to extend the limits of the self over a larger and larger field. In action from desire the unity of selfhood is manifested only in a grasp of the possibilities of the present situation. Through purposive action this unity is expanded to include events past and future and finally to include within its scope the whole of a natural lifetime. Action from ideal pushes the boundaries of personality out still farther until the lives of others and the whole of the real universe are brought within its unity. Thus voluntary action, when continued, discloses the
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possibilities of that selfhood which we all possess. Our selfhood or personality is an ideal unity, capable of infinite expansion, from a mere point in the present back into the past and out into the future until the period of natural existence is covered, and then in a wider sweep embracing the lives of fellow-men, the epochs of human history, and finally comprehending the vast process of universal evolution. Each self is capable of becoming an epitome of the universe--in truth, a microcosm. That these potencies shall be made actual, that the possibilities of selfhood shall be fulfilled, requires only that volition be exercised in the fullness of its powers. Absolutely correct, then, was the statement that the goal of volition as an organizing agency is full self-realization. Equally true is it, also, that only in such complete self-realization can volition find complete satisfaction, and that herein, consequently, lies the highest good for man.
6. Self-Realization Identical with Self-Determination.
The process of self-realization, which now becomes a subject of especial study, is equivalent to an increasing, control by the self of its own action--in other words, to growing power of self-determination. The power of self-determination, the, ability of the individual to direct and control his own conduct in accordance with his own wishes, is a faculty peculiar to man. It is not possessed in any degree by the lower animals, whose action results from the interplay of forces of the environment, with certain fixed instincts present in the individual as part of his race inheritance--for example, the actions of birds in nest-building are due to the influence of external conditions connected with season, locality, etc., which stimulate a highly developed and powerful instinct. The action of the animal cannot then be said to be in any true sense self-determining or spontaneous; the individual remains a part of the great system of nature, acting out its laws and expressing its
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forces. With man, the first actions are, like those of the animals, instinctive; the actions of the individual are not directed by himself but, instead, only register the effect of external objects upon his nervous mechanism. With the entrance of volition all this is changed, however, and self-determination begins. Action from desire is not elicited by an external object which stimulates a fixed instinct; it is prompted by an ideal object which the individual takes for his own good. Such action may be properly regarded as an expression of the individual himself. But while the act expresses what the individual now desires--his present self, that is--its performance may serve to prevent the gratification of a desire equally strong in the future. In this case, the act does not express the future self, but goes counter to it. It is not determined by the entire self, therefore; it is not wholly self-controlled. How can the control of the self over such acts of desire be increased? Clearly not by the absolute denial of desire or cessation from action. Rather by relating the different objects of desire and comprehending them within more extensive ends which represent the good of the self in the future as well as the present. This work of relating single actions to larger aims and more general purposes is carried forward by volition in its higher stages until, finally, present conduct is made instrumental to the attainment of that ideal end expressing the good of the whole self, present and future, natural and personal, individual and social. Then, and then only, action becomes entirely self-determined--expressing the self, the whole nature of the self, and nothing else. Now this process of self-determination is of course the identical process of self-organization or self-realization that we have been discussing. But it is important to notice their identity; for self-determination is in its turn identical with true freedom. The correctness of this last statement will appear if we compare this
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conception of freedom with the opposing views which have long and vainly contended for supremacy in the field. We shall see that the progressive self-realization, which we have agreed is man's highest good, is equally the attainment of absolute freedom.
7. Libertarianism.
As one extreme among possible views of human freedom is Libertarianism. According to the Libertarian view man's will is free in the sense that it is undetermined, that it acts without a cause. Of course the Libertarian does not deny that our: will is, in a way, influenced by our motives and tendencies. The field of choice is limited by the knowledge and experience of the individual and the possibilities of action that they suggest to him. But when it comes to actually choosing between courses of action open, the Libertarian believes that the human will is uncontrolled by any influence whatsoever. In this crisis no one motive is stronger in its influence upon the will than any other. All motives are reduced to a common level, in fact, since all are equally powerless to control the will. Hence, as far as the ability to choose is concerned, it is a matter of absolute indifference to the will which of the possible courses shall be taken. Any possibility may with equal readiness be chosen or rejected.
In the course of the long controversy upon the subject, many considerations have been advanced in favor of this and the opposing view. The leading arguments on both sides may perhaps be summarized under three heads. The Libertarian, with whose argument we are now concerned, claims that his view is supported by facts of the following classes. (1) Psychological. Men are generally conscious of freedom in the sense just explained. They are conscious before acting of the ability to choose with equal ease any one of the alternatives offered, and, after acting, of the fact that they might have chosen otherwise than they did. (2) Ethical. Only if men's wills are undetermined can
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we justly hold them responsible for their actions. For if the human will is strictly determined no man can prevent his conduct's being what it is. He should not be punished for what he cannot help. (3) Metaphysical. Only if man's will is thus uncaused is he freed from the chain of natural causation and given power and dignity as a spiritual being.
8. Determinism.
The other extreme in the free-will controversy is occupied by the Determinists. They hold that volition is strictly determined in its activity. Every choice is the result of a conflict of motives or tendencies in which the strongest always wins. Being thus the necessary resultant of certain fixed forces no choice could be other than it is. Hence the act of will-so far from being arbitrary or uncertain-is, like all other events, the inevitable effect of definite causes. In defense of his position the Determinist has on his side many arguments. The most important are the following, grouped under the three heads used above. (1) Psychological. Study of the psychology of choice shows us that the strongest motive does win. The idea is acted upon which succeeds better than all others in holding the attention. Now, in this struggle of ideas for command of the attention, the victory is bound to go to the one which is inherently most attractive, i.e. most pleasant to the individual with his character and disposition such as they are. (2) Ethical. Only if action is the necessary outcome of the character of the agent can we hold him responsible for it. If, in the final choice, the will acts in entire independence of all the motives and tendencies of the agent, the act cannot fairly be regarded as his, nor can he with justice be punished for it. (3) Metaphysical. Nowhere in the world of our experience do we find action without a cause. Science has proved that the uniformity of law and the necessary sequence of cause and effect, prevail throughout nature. To suppose that the human will acts without a cause is to introduce an arbitrary
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and lawless factor into the system of nature and thus to contradict the fundamental principle of science.
9. Freedom as Self-Determination.
The conception of freedom as self-determination goes to neither of these extremes, but in a sense stands between them, and thus includes the truth in each. This conception makes freedom, as Paulsen says, a “real, positive property of human nature.”2 It is the ability to seek an object chosen by one's self; hence the power to direct one's own conduct. So understood, the animals do not possess freedom; for they act as they are compelled to act by instinct or impulse. Freedom is exhibited, however, by all men who act voluntarily, i.e. in pursuit of a consciously chosen end. In this sense, it is sometimes called psychological freedom, since it is a property of developed intelligence and is possessed by all men of normal mental faculties. It is sufficient for responsibility, moreover; because, even though the act proceed from momentary desire, it is nevertheless an expression of the self. But in action from momentary desire we have not an expression of the whole self, but only a part, a fractional part, the self of the present moment. Hence the act is not wholly self-determined. Neither is it entirely free. This fact is recognized when, for instance, we condemn a man for being a “slave to his desire,” as in the case of the drunkard or the glutton. The drunkard is free, when he returns to the drink, inasmuch as his act expresses himself. But since he acts from momentary desire and in spite of good resolutions to the contrary, he is not free inasmuch as the strength of present appetite thwarts and prevents the expression of his permanent self. Action is entirely free, therefore, only when it is determined by the whole self. This requires such a complete organization of conduct that each single act shall be an expression of the total self. Freedom in this meaning, often termed moral
2 PAULSEN: System of Ethics, p. 476.
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freedom, is not a natural possession of man, but is a condition to be attained. Its attainment is equivalent to reaching the goal of moral development, full self-realization. For only he who realizes in his conduct all the possibilities of his nature is entirely free.
If we understand I that the true meaning of freedom is self-determination we are able to perceive how far both Libertarianism and Determinism are right, and, at the same time, to detect the errors in each. Our consciousness of freedom, emphasized by the Libertarian, is no illusion. Man is free in the sense that he is subject to no external compulsion in his conduct, but can direct his own action. Moreover, since. it is the individual himself who decides in any instance of choice, it may with truth be said that all the alternatives remain open until he himself makes up his mind. But this does not imply that in the final choice the will acts in equal independence of all the tendencies and characteristics of the individual that have been in play, or that, with the aspect of the self that was upper-most at the culminating moment, the decision could have been other than it was. Determinism is, therefore, right in maintaining that the strongest motive always wins. But it is wrong in treating the motives as if they were forces separate from the self and acting upon it from without. Instead they are all expressions of the self, and to say that the strongest wins is simply to say that the dominant aspect of the self determines the action. Again the Libertarian is right in asserting that the individual cannot be held responsible if his act is the necessary resultant of forces within him which he cannot control. But he is wrong in his further conclusion that responsibility attaches only to those choices in which the will acts in independence of disposition and character. Rather is the view of the Determinist correct--that a man is responsible only for those actions which are an expression of his character.
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Only we must not think of character in this connection as a factor given, fixed, or ready-made, but rather as subject to constant direction and development at the initiative of the self. Finally, we agree with the Libertarian that man can claim the dignity of independent personality only in so far as he is relieved from the constraint of mechanical necessity and left to be master of his own destiny. But this does not require us to exalt to the supreme place in his nature a perfectly arbitrary and lawless will. It only requires that the laws by which this will acts should be grounded deep in the nature of the self.3
10. Objections to This View.
It is not supposed that the foregoing paragraphs remove every difficulty connected with the vexed problem of free-will; but only that they indicate the general direction in which present thought is moving toward a solution of this problem. Many difficulties remain. For instance, the Libertarian may object that the view just advanced provides for no genuine freedom. Action is said to be always the necessary expression of character, while character is admitted to be, at the time of action, fixed, itself the necessary result of past actions and influences. Why speak as if the individual had any real freedom of choice when, in every case, the very bent of his will--i.e. its power and direction--is fixed and determinate as a part of his character? In answer to this objection two things should be said. In the first place, it is a mistake to think of a map's character as something distinct from himself which acts upon him from without, and, as an external force, constrains him to behave thus and so. This is a false abstraction. Rather is his character just himself, and, when it determines his action, he is determining it. In the second place, it is wrong to conceive of the character of the individual as if it were once for all fixed and defined by agencies quite beyond
3 GREEN: Op. cit., §§ 98, 105.
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his control. The fact is that his character, and particularly his tendencies and dispositions of will, are subject to constant modification and development. And this modification and development is largely under the control of the individual himself, so that he is responsible for the present state of his character. The amount of “will-power” which he possesses in the present emergency is in a great measure the result of efforts which he has made to exercise his will in the past. Man may thus, if he chooses, train and form his own will, building up such habits as he judges will be beneficial, taking thought to avoid I situations that will serve to awaken a desire that is excessive, or reducing the strength of such a desire by more drastic measures of repression and denial.
But, it may be urged, this is merely to push the difficulty a little further back and not to remove it. For is not the individual's ability thus to develop his own character, to train his own will, the necessary resultant of causes which lie altogether beyond his own choice or control--of his heredity, that is, and the influences of his environment? Race, sex, and family stock all combine to produce in the individual through heredity certain definite characteristics and capacities. Age, country, and local habitation have an inevitable effect upon his nature. One man inherits a taste for liquor, another is endowed with marked inventive ability. The spirit of one age leads men in great numbers to enter upon religious crusades, that of another makes. the pursuit of art equally popular. Is not, then, the individual's ability to form and develop that character, which in any particular case determines his action, itself the result of forces outside his own will? In the last analysis, therefore, is not the human will determined by external influences?
At this point it will be necessary to inquire how these influences, particularly heredity and environment, operate
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in determining the will. Obviously, what they do is to determine the comparative attractiveness of different objects to different individuals. Thus from hereditary tendency one man is attracted to wealth, pursues it, and becomes a millionaire; another man is attracted to machinery, studies it, and becomes a great engineer. But in what lies the attractiveness given to these objects by heredity and surroundings? Is it that in consequence of hereditary constitution more pleasure results from the pursuit and attainment of these objects than any others? In this case human freedom is not destroyed; for we have seen that the will is not determined by a necessity of its nature always to seek the greatest pleasure. Does not the influence of heredity and environment consist rather in determining for the individual how pleasant, how interesting certain objects shall be when they are represented as ends of action? Now there is no doubt that these factors do wield a momentous influence over the will in just this way; since the pleasantness of-any object is the measure of its command over the attention, and hence its power over the will. The fact that a certain desire is by heredity especially strong in a man means that its object is much pleasanter to him than to most other men, and that, consequently, an unusually strong purpose will be required to overrule it and reduce it to proper submission. The idea of being a prosperous and useful citizen must be especially attractive and appealing if it is to hold the attention and be pursued as a purpose by a man with an inherited craving for liquor. We must admit, therefore, that heredity, and environment too, do influence the will in its expression and development, by determining the natural or inherent a attractiveness of different objects for it. And if the will were merely a faculty whereby particular objects are sought and obtained, its acts would simply reflect the varying attractiveness of these different
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objects and thus be determined exclusively by the two factors above mentioned. But will is more than this: it has a positive nature of its own.4 In essential character will is an organizing agency, and this fact means that whenever it is exercised and to the extent in which it is exercised, the pleasantness of the larger and more inclusive object is increased. Hence it is always possible for man by an effort of will to overcome the strength of hereditary tendency and environmental influence and act in accordance with his own larger good. And this exertion of the will is dependent on nothing but the will itself. In the exercise of its own peculiar power, therefore, it is an independent and original source of spiritual energy. Thus while heredity and environment often influence the action of the will, in some cases setting practical limits to its expression by making some desire so strong that its subjection requires a disproportionate and exhausting effort, it is inconceivable that the will should be completely controlled by these external factors.
The Determinist may now, in his turn, accuse us of reinstating the idea of will as an “uncaused cause,”5 as the
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one faculty of man which acts in absolute independence of other tendencies in human nature and of the forces in the outer world. This conception of will, he may say, hag been already discarded, as false to the facts of psychology, and without any ethical value. In answering this charge it is perhaps sufficient to say that the phrase, “uncaused cause,” does not in the least apply to the self-determining will as it has been described in the previous paragraphs. This will is not conceived as the one member of a group of forces that is out of relation to all the rest, the single event in a causal series that is itself undetermined. We have seen that it is volition as an organizing agency which establishes the unity of human experience and assigns place to every object and interest therein. It is therefore the source of the self and all its acts--or, better, it is the self acting in its unity. Every act and every tendency of the self is an expression of will, for will is just the power of the self in all its acts. How is it possible, then, to suppose that will is determined and limited by one of these dispositions or tendencies which are but minor expressions of itself ? As easily suppose that the power and potency of life is limited and defined by the various species which it has already produced. And the independence and initiative which we thus ascribe to will is only a fuller manifestation of that power to originate new forms and initiate new activities which is admitted to belong to all life and which is the condition of all development and evolution. The explanation of freedom is self-determination, the explanation of self-determination is development-the realization of the latent and often unknown possibilities of human nature.
REFERENCES
STOUT, Manual of Psychology, Book IV, Chap. VII.
BALDWIN, Social and Ethical Interpretations in Mental Development, Chap. VII.
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GREEN, Prolegomena to Ethics, Book II, Chap. I.
PAULSEN, System of Ethics, Book II, Chap. IX.
SETH, Ethical Principles, Part III, Chap. I.
LESLIE STEPHEN, Science of Ethics, Chap. VII, § 2.
ROGERS, The Religious Conception of the World, “ The Problem of Freedom.“
JAMES, Psychology, Chap. XXVI.
MACKENZIE, Manual of Ethics, Book II, Chap. V.
SIDGWICK, Methods of Ethics, Book I, Chap. V.
