CHAPTER IV
VOLITION AS AN ORGANIZING AGENCY
2676
1. Volition as an Organizing Agency.--2. Volition as the Synthetic Activity Comprehensive of Feeling and Thought.--3. Developnient of Volition: Involuntary Action,--4. Voluntary Action: (a) From Desire,7-5. (b) From Purpose,--6. (e) From Ideal. -7. Volition as Creative of Self-conscious Personality.--8. Volition Does Not Always Effect Complete Organizationi--9. But to That Extent Is Not Fully Developed.
1. Volition as an Organizing Agency.
The leading ethical theories, Hedonism and Rationalism, have now been reviewed and the problem of the Good is still unsolved. Neither theory when followed out provides for the complete satisfaction of the human will. Only one way is open to us, therefore,--that of approaching our problem directly, seeking first to discover the essential character of volition and then to infer from its character as thus disclosed what is required for its complete satisfaction.1
When we approach the problem in this way our study of Hedonism and Rationalism proves to have been far from fruitless. Both of these theories throw light upon the character of volition, for both reflect essential aspects of this activity. Hedonism expresses its demand for suecess in present attainment, but would secure such success at the cost of limiting strictly the objects which it seeks to attain. Rationalism voices its demand for a larger range of objpcts to pursue, but at the expense of making these objects mere thoughts and leaving them unrealized. How can these two demands be met without the corresponding disadvantages? How can the will be assured of enjoying
1 Compare Part I, Chap. II, § 3.
132
VOLITION AS AN ORGANIZING AGENCY
133
the success of present achievement without restricting itself to objects which present perception or past experience guarantee will furnish such satisfaction? And how can the will overcome this restriction and direct itself upon the larger objects of thought and imagination without abandoning the actual world for the realm of the ideal and merely possible? Clearly, only when it takes a third step and endeavors to convert the ideal into actuality. This is accomplished by making the present act a means to the realization of the principles and conceptions of reason. The realization may be distant and the present act contribute but little toward it, yet the two, actual present and ideal future, are joined in a close and vital connection. This, the third aspect of voluntary activity, is therefore a synthesis of the other two, which transcends and at the same time unites them. Present achievement is rendered more satisfactory because it is no longer restricted in its range as to object, but extends to the most inclusive and far-reaching ends. On the other hand, our knowledge of these larger aims and ideals is increased and made more definite by our experience in progressively realizing them. The two aspects of will which at first appeared to conflict, its demand for present attainment, and its demand for the greatest range of choice among objects, now prove to be complementary and inter-dependent. All this is evidence that we now behold volition with its nature fully expressed. As thus viewed, it reveals itself as an activity of adjustrnent, by which the various activities of the individual are adjusted, or correlated, with one another--or, better, an organizing agency, whereby the successive acts of the self are related as means to deliberately chosen ends.
2. Volition as the Synthetic Activity Comprehensive of Feeling and Thought.
Let us consider a little further this organizing activity of will, with particular reference
THE NATURE OF THE GOOD
134
to the part played in it by feeling and thought. An ordinary instance of volition will illustrate clearly how its organizing work is carried on. Suppose that a young man is intending to devote an evening to amusement in such company as he knows will furnish good-fellowship and pleasure. He happens to think, however, of a leading purpose of life, to prepare himself for a certain profession in which he hopes to win distinction, and, as he thinks, he begins to wonder uneasily if he is making his evenings contribute as they might to the realization of his purpose. In this connection there occurs to his mind the notice he has seen of a lecture to be given this very evening upon a subject relating to his proposed profession. He recognizes that attendance upon this lecture would further his life-purpose, and hence, contrary to inclination, he gives his attention wholly to the idea of it, goes, and remains an interested listener. The consequence of his thus acting in accordance with his larger purpose is that he gains new knowledge which makes this purpose clearer and more effective in his life, besides the encouragement which results from having taken a step in its actual realization. We see, then, that the young man-and the case is of course typical of all volition-through the exercise of will takes his evening's action out of its isolation and makes it a means to the attainment of a larger end which he has chosen to pursue. To adjust actions as means to larger ends, in this way, is to organize conduct. The particular act is given meaning through its subordination to the ruling purpose, while the purpose is made real through the instrumentality of the particular act.
When volition is thus conceived as an organizing agency, it appears as the all-comprehensive activity of intelligent life, including within its unity both feeling and thought, and assigning to each its proper place. Feeling is subjective and expresses the actual state of the self, a state of
VOLITION AS AN ORGANIZING AGENCY
135
pleasure when in possession of sought-for objects.2 Thought is objective and represents the ideal conditions of a larger life in the conception of objects as yet unattained. These two factors come into conflict and opposition. Thought, by representing new and greater possibilities of achievement, destroys the unity and equilibrium signified by pleasant feeling. Then, through action, the new objects thought of are attained and the unity of the self is felt to be restored and increased by the possession of a greater variety of objects. Volition is the synthetic activity which includes within its scope all these lesser activities of feeling, thought, and action. These minor factors exist only in so far as they contribute to the main work of organization. Hence we see that it is absurd to regard volition as subordinate either to feeling or to thought. Volition is not the servant of feeling, limited to seeking those objects whose possession is sure to increase pleasure. For the circle of such objects is small, and, to obtain satisfaction, volition must go beyond it in pursuit of objects whose pleasure-yielding capacity is doubtful and uncertain. Neither is volition the servant of thought, limited to the idea of larger achievement, or to the mechanical reproduction of a program of action previously thought out in every detail. For thought, as thought, does not communicate actuality to its objects, nor can it anticipate with exactness the actual future. But volition demands actual achievement and must therefore advance on its own initiative to grapple with a future uncertain both as to feeling and fact. Volition is essentially a venture--a venture into the unknown. To a degree reason
THE NATURE OF THE GOOD
136
may direct, and feeling impel, but never to the ei of absolutely pre-determining what shall come to pass. The individual must surrender objects which assure satisfaction in order to seek other more remote and reaching ends. It is true that these ends when achi may afford a fuller satisfaction than those sacrifice them, but this can be ascertained only by making the sacrifice--by taking the venture. An element of uncertainty is bound to remain, and from this fact it follows that, pure reason, but rational faith, an effort of will gu by intelligence but transcending the limits of proof or demonstrable certainty, is the primary requisite of intelligent life and action. Every act of will brings an perience that is entirely fresh and unique and yields : results that possess absolute novelty. The occurrene what is absolutely new, and hence cannot be anticipate a distinguishing characteristic of all life. From it springs the necessity for faith in one's self and the courag venture, and upon it rests the possibility of real spir: growth and achievement through such exercise of volition.
3. Development of Volition--Involuntary Action, Instinctive and Impulsive.
If further evidence is ne to prove that volition is essentially an organizing agE it is furnished by a survey of the different forms % this activity takes in the course of human development
The earliest actions of the human individual are voluntary if we understand action to be voluntary w is directed towards a consciously chosen end.3 They have not even a conscious motive. Man is born with ceretain instincts--modifications of his nervous system which csuse him to react in a definite manner to to specific stimuli. Some
VOLITION AS AN ORGANIZING AGENCY
137
object or influence of the outer world is usually the stimulus to which the instinct is keyed, and the action by which the organism responds to such stimulation is called instinctive. When a pencil or the handle of a rattle is laid in the hand of a very young infant, and the tiny fmgers move and close around the object, we have an example of such instinctive action. The infant does not perceive the pencil or rattle, much less act with the intention of grasping it. Instinctive action is then originally without conscious motive. But with its repetition--and as the result of it--comes a growing consciousness of the object. The numerous pressures and strains that accompany the instinctive movement, and the pleasure or pain which is consequent upon it, associate themselves with the group of sensations set up by the original stimulus, cause them to be distinguished from the confused contents of consciousness, and finally to be given meaning as a definite object. Thus the babe comes to perceive the rattle or colored pencil and, when he puts out his hand for it, his movement is prompted by an idea of the object. His action now has a conscious impulse.
Action which is thus initiated by the perception or image of an object may be called impulsive. The number of objects which are thus perceived and may become motives of action rapidly increases in the early period of mental development. Each of the instincts dominant at this time leads to the perception of a class of articles constituting its objective stimuli. Thus the different kinds of food, a variety of playthings, etc., are consciously recognized and induce action. Then besides these instincts which are directed upon objects of a specific nature, there is the instinct of imitation, whose stimulus is any movement of any object, but particularly the movements of other individuals. Through the operation of this instinct the child learns to distinguish different people by their characteristic behavior
THE NATURE OF THE GOOD
138
which he has imitated, and from this imitation comes also to know something of his own strength and capacity. Moreover, in addition to an increasing knowledge of the nature of objects, we find at this period--as Baldwin points out--an increasing sense of their worth. The pleasure or pain which results from seeking an object attaches to the idea of this object and determines its power as an incentive to action. Objects are sought in the degree to which their suggestions are pleasurable, and avoided to the extent in which they have painful associations.
While impulsive action has a conscious motive, it is nevertheless not truly voluntary. It is action in pursuit of a consciously-perceived object. But it is not action in pursuit of a consciously chosen end. In true volition the object is not merely known, but known as the end of action. This is not the case with impulsive action. The impulse is only the instinct raised to clear consciousness, and is still dominated by the object. As Baldwin remarks concerning this type of action in the child,4 “The object before him fills up his consciousness; he thinks nothing about it, he simply thinks it. His action goes out in channels of inherited tendency, directly upon the object.”5 In order that an object be a “chosen end,” as in voluntary action, it must, in contrast to this, first be distinguished as ideal and future from what is actual and present, and, second, be distinguished from other ideal possibilities as the one required to satisfy the self.6 Green says, speaking of desire, to him the typical form of volition, “The common characteristic of every such desire is its direction to an object consciously presented as not yet real and of which the realization would satisfy, i.e. extinguish the desire.”7
4 BALDWIN: Mental Development: Social and Ethical Interpretations, p. 369.
5 Op. cit., p. 366.
6 HOFFDING: Outline of Psychology, Eng. trans., p. 322.
7 GREEN: Prolegomena to Ethics, § 131.
VOLITION AS AN ORGANIZING AGENCY
139
Before volition can arise, therefore, there must be ability to distinguish between the present and actual, on the one hand, and the ideal and merely possible, on the other. In contrast to the world of actual objects present to perception with nature and relations fixed, there must exist an ideal order, a world of free ideas in which the thought of the individual can range at will. This world of ideas, as it develops, represents the experience, abilities, and interests of the individual himself as distinguished from all objective conditions. Its development means the growth of self-consciousness and selfhood. With its appearance comes the possibility of acting to realize an end--an ideal chosen from among other ideal possibilities because the most satisfactory to the self--and thus of rising to the dignity of a voluntary agent.
The distinction between ideal and actual is, like all mental achievements, the result of a gradual process of growth. Ideal elements enter very sogn into the experience of the individual in the form of memory-images. These images may constitute impulses to action just as do perceptions. Thus the clinking of spoon and glass calls up an image of the nursing bottle to the infant consciousness and prompts the same actions that the actual sight of the bottle would. If the prompting of an idea inwardly aroused (in distinction from a perception) sufficed to make an act voluntary, we should have volition very early in mental development. Animals are frequently moved to action by images rather than by perceptions, as when the dog which has been fe(i two mornings from the step behind the house begins to leap and bark when he sees the door opened on the third morning. But it is requisite to volition that the idea be recognized as in its ideality different from the perception, and at first this does not occur; the images simply fuse with the perceptions. As development proceeds, however, this fusion becomes less close
THE NATURE OF THE GOOD
140
and complete--at least in the experience of the human individual.8 The image when revived brings with it numerons associated images which, continuing for an interval of time, serve to interrupt and dislocate the regular order and sequence of perceptions from the outer world. Thus the two series, inner and outer, ideal and actual, each having its own order and relation, tend to break apart and run separately. But, as H6ffding believes, probably the distinction between idea and actuality is first consciously made as the result of the unpleasant experience of finding that an idea, when acted upon as always in the past, does not have the same result in the present, owing to change in actual conditions. Thus the child seeing the whiteness of the snow has an image of sugar called up, and, acting upon it, fills his mouth with the cold substance. Such experiences, with their unpleasantness, teach him effectually the distinction between ideas or memories and actual objects and conditions. Thus “the first basis is laid of the contrast between possibility and actuality. Then only the free ideas enter into a relation of definite contrast to sensation and percept.”9
With this distinction once made the individual becomes capable of voluntary action, i.e. action in pursuit of a consciously chosen end. When the implications of volition are thus drawn out and stated, it may seem to be an involved and complicated activity. Yet in its actual exercise it is direct and simple enough. The three-year-old, who leaves his play out of doors, enters the house, and, disregarding everything else, goes to his mother and says, “I want an apple to eat,” fulfils in his behavior all the requirements of true volition. The object of his action, the apple, he distinguishes as ideal from all actual objects
8 Hoffding gives a full and illuminating account of the growth of the distinction between ideal and actual in his Outline of Psy- chology, Eng. trans., pp. 122-33.
9 HOFFDING: Op. cit., p. 133.
VOLITION AS AN ORGANIZING AGENCY
141
present to his perception, and he disregards them for it. He also distinguishes this idea and prefers it as an end to all other ideal possibilities-it is the apple he desires, not bread, or sweet-meats, or any other eatable. In the formation of this ideal order which the individual, learns to distinguish from the actual world and to identify with himself, two factors deserve especial mention. The first is that of imitation. Through imitating others the individual acquires, in addition to his ideas of objects that give pleasure, conceptions of various activities which yield him satisfaction.10 The second is language. The human individual is able in the manner indicated to construct an ideal order which has permanence and unity largely because of the faculty of language which he possesses. Through the use of words he gives body and definition to ideas which otherwise would be too tenuous to persist in memory and too shifting to enter into any permanent re- lationships.
4. Voluntary Action: (a) From Desire.-The first stage in the development of volition is that of desire. Action from desire has for its end the present attainment of some single object.11 An idea of the object in question has been produced by past experience in the mind of the individual. That idea has acquired interest and value be. cause in the past its object has given satisfaction to some need or capacity. That idea now becomes an end of action which the individual consciously seeks to realize. The object of desire, although single, may vary greatly in its meaning and importance. The apple sought by the child in the simple illustration just used and the rare book or picture sought by the art collector, the flower by the roadside, and the great ma-nsion are, equally, in their way, objects of desire. Action from desire differs from instinctive
10 BALDWIN: Op. Cit., p. 34.
11 BALDWIN: Op. cit., p. 372, and HOFFDING: Op. cit., p. 323.
THE NATURE OF THE GOOD
142
or impulsive action not so much in the:nature of the object as in the relation of the object to the self. Previous to the appearance of desire, the action of the individual is determined by the objects and forces of the environment, as they play upon his different instincts and impulses. Not the individual is acting, but the forces of nature are acting through him.12 But in desire, the first form of voluntary action, all this is changed. The individual seeks an object thought of as an end to be realized, and, consequently set in sharp opposition to the world of objects, actually existing.13 He resists the appeal of externally existent objects to his instincts in order to pursue this end, which, of all the ideal possibilities of the situation, appeals most to himself. Through effort he overcomes the opposition between ideal and actual, by making the ideal actual, by realizing his end.14 Thus actual objects and conditions are determined by the self and not vice versa. The effect of desire is to release the actions of the human individual from their subservience to various external objects and to make them means to ends chosen by himself. Thus the different acts are all made instrumental to self-expression, and the first step is taken in the organization of conduct.
5. (b) Action from Purpose.-With the growth of intelligence single objects are grouped, according to their affinities, into more or less comprehensive classes; general ideas or concepts are formed which include a number of particular pereeptions.15 Volition, in the next-stage of its
12 GREEN: Op. cit., § 91.
13 Ibid., § 131.
14 “Alexander in his account of desire emphasizes the conflict which it involves betnveen ideal and actual, ideal end and actual conditions. He describes desire as consisting in “a feeling of tension which may be described as a sense of disparity between the ideal object and the actual state of the agent.” (ALEXANDER: Moral Order and Progress, Bk. 1, Chap. 1, § 3, p. 22.)
15 As Alexander says, while each desire is a single particular in mental history, in content it includes many qualities which as universals serve to connect it with the content of other desires. (Op. eit., P. 65, also P. 100.)
VOLITION AS AN ORGANIZING AGFNCY 143development, has for its end the attainment of such classes of objects, the realization-that is-of these general ideas. For the sake of clearness in distinction, desire has been defined as action whose end is the attainment of a single object. As a matter of fact, however, no hard and fast distinction can be made between actions whose object is particular and those whose object is general. Since it is a case of development the difference is always one of, degree. The child who desires “something to eat” or “something to play with” is well on his way to the formation of general purposes. Such purposes appear, clearly conceived, as soon as infancy is passed and childhood fairly entered. The resolves of the boy to stand well in school, to gather bird's-eggs or stamps, or to learn to throw curves with a ball, are examples of such purposes. The boy who adopts one, seeks not a particular object to be attained in the present, but a group or series of objects whose attainment is prolonged into the future. Indeed, the object of present desire, in its relation to such a comprehensive group or series, becomes but one of many particulars. Like all particulars it is reduced to a subordinate position within the inclusive whole. Thus the eventual attainment of the larger end may mean the denial or limitation of present desire. This influence of the general over the particulars is soon manifest--for instance, in the case of the purpose to avoid punishment which, when once taken, imposes a strict limit on the gratification of present desire.
The second stage in the development of volition we may thus call purposive action. It is action in pursuit of a group of objects to be realized in the course of future time, rather than in pursuit of a single object to be realized now. The object in purposive action is always general, but may vary greatly in the range of its generality, the extent of its inclusiveness. One purpose, such as to do one's morning's work well, may embrace a comparatively few acts and
THE NATURE OF THE GOOD
144
extend over a little time; another--such as to preserve one's health--may extend over the whole of a lifetime and include thousands of acts. The purpose to secure wealth is representative. Its end is a general idea standing for a large group of objects--money, land, houses, clothing, jewels, etc. Its attainment usually occupies a period of time--often a lifetime. It requires the individual to restrict many of his particular desires for food, drink, clothing, amusement, and the like,--the attainment of the general purpose necessitating the strict subordination of all the particular acts. What, then, is the procedure of volition in purposive action? It is first to check the action of present desire and to turn the attention of the individual from the particular object he now craves to the more general object he purposes in the future to attain. The bearing of this larger purpose upon the present action is next considered, and finally the original desire is allowed just that degree of gratification which is consistent with. the realization of the ruling purpose. Thus, through purpose, the second form of volition, the successive acts of the individual are taken out of their isolation as expressive of a variety of particular desires, and are related as means. to the attainment of several general purposes,--the second step being thereupon taken in the organization of human conduct.
6. (c) Action from Ideal.
But thought can go beyond the ideation that yields the object of desire and the generalization that furnishes the object of purpose. It can. take the material of experience, analyze it into its elements, and then by synthesis construct from it a new and significant conception. It is this constructive activity of thought, more or less freely exercised, that produces the, Ideal, which constitutes the object of the next and highest form of volition. Through free ranging thought and imagination an end is created more comprehensive than the
VOLITION AS AN ORGANIZING AGENCY
145
particular object of desire or the general object of purpose. This end extends in its scope beyond the limits of the individual's life, and involves the effort and cooperation of many individuals. It is a cause to which the individual devotes himself rather than an object which he desires or a purpose which he pursues. It serves to identify him with his fellows and to make his very existence itself a means to the realization of universal ends. The discovery of truth is an example of such a cause or ideal to which many men in modern times have devoted themselves. Naturally these ideals appear later in mental development than do desire and purpose; for while their growth may be encouraged by teaching, they can become effective as ends of action only after the individual is able to interpret them in terms of his own experience and apply them to his own life. Hence they are only anticipated in early years--perhaps in the boy's passing fancy of himself as doing some noble work as President or Premier. The subsequent period of youth and adolescence is the great flowering time of ideals, when the young man sees himself serving humanity as patriot or explorer, artist or inventor, physician, lawyer, or teacher.
Through the adoption of an ideal as the ultimate end of action, volition completes the organization of conduct. Since the ideal is all-comprehensive and includes the individual himself, it also embraces all his life-purposes. These purposes are adjusted as means to the realization of the supreme ideal, just as previously the various desires were made means to the attainment of these larger purposes. Indeed, such a supreme end is needed as the final court of appeal between the conflicting claims of different purposes. In the specific instance the attainment of one ruling purpose might require the denial of a desire, the attainment of another its gratification, and what is to decide between the two unless a still larger end exists to which
THE NATURE OF THE GOOD
146
the purposes themselves are subordinated? When this is done, and the particular act performed with a view not merely to the attainment of a life-purpose of the individual, but also to the realization of his supreme ideal, we have volition in its fullest development. Here choice is preceded by full deliberation in which the consequences of alternative lines of action are carefully traced out and thus their bearing upon leading purposes of the individual is ascertained. The relation of these ruling purposes to the supreme ideal is next considered; and finally, returning from the universal to the particular, that act is chosen which promises to further the purpose most in harmony with the ideal.
7. Volition as Creative of Self-conscious Personality.
Volition proves to be, then, the formative and sustaining activity of conscious selfhood, or personality. Thinkers of today are agreed that the self is not a spiritual substance or entity which has permanent existence apart from the succession of mental states. Rather it is just the unity of these conscious states, the inter-relation of our different experiences, which gives to them unity and coherence as a whole.16 Now it is volition that originates this unity among the contents of consciousness and maintains it through the appropriation and assimilation of new objects. In the initial period of mental development the materials of personality are accumulated in the form of memory-images of objects and activities. But these memories do not constitute a self until they are distinguished as ideal from the actual world, and, through the exercise of will, are made actual possessions of the self; for it is only through the realizing of its different ideas that the self becomes real. Then these various objects of desire are connected and inter-connected as means to ends, being thus subordinated to more comprehensive purposes. Finally
16 BALDWIN: Op. cit., pp. 8, 374.
VOLITION AS AN ORGANIZING AGENCY
147
all the contents of consciousness are woven into one organized system when these purposes are made themselves instrumental to the realization of a supreme and all-inclusive ideal.
Thus the process through which the self develops is that followed by all life in its growth--evolution. Like all genuine evolutions, this organization of personality by volition has two aspects, differentiation and integration. When an object is chosen as an end of action, difference is introduced into the life of the self. Inasmuch as the object is an end for the self it exists within the unity of self-consciousness; but in so far as it is unattained it is at th6 same time external and opposed to the self in actual existence. Hence tension arises in the self and even pain, the pain of unsatisfied desire. This tension is relieved and the pain changed into pleasure when, through action and effort, the object is attained. In integration, the coordinate aspect, the difference is overcome and the object is appropriated by the self. Thus the unity of the self is restored, but with a richer and more varied content. In this way the development of the self proceeds through the agency of volition--ever expanding its boundaries to receive new objects, and by this very process strengthening and perfecting its own unity.
8. Volition Does Not Always Effect Complete Organization.
To the statement that volition is essentially an organizing agency the objection may be made that it does not in all cases actually manifest itself as such. In the conduct of the majority of men, volition fails signally to effect complete organization. The action of many never passes the first stage of unregulated desire, while comparatively few ever reach the fnal stage, where all action is governed by a few controlling purposes which are themselves subordinated to a supreme ideal. If volition does not inevitably and of necessity pass through these successive
THE NATURE OF THE GOOD
148
stages, what right have we to assert that a law inherent in its nature causes it to follow this development, effecting a more and more coanplete organization of conduct? To this objection the reply may be made that there can be no doubt of the fact that in actual life volition often fails to organize action completely. The only question is: How serious a difficulty does this fact constitute for the view that volition is in its essential nature an organizing activity? The difficulty, such as it is, is really but a particular aspect of a more general problem upon which Paulsen17 remarks, as confronting all theories which identify the Highest Good with the full expression of the human will. If the normal human will finds complete and natural expression in the thoughtful and well-regulated action which we usually call good, how does it happen that the actual will of man seems usually to rebel against such action? Can organization and adjustment be regarded as the truest manifestations of will when it appears most flourishing and vigorous in the demand for unlimited power and unrestricted gratification?
9. But to That Extent Is Not Fully Developed.
The difficulty is not great in the present case, however. If we are seeking to discover the essential nature of volition, surely we must base our conclusions upon its fully developed form, and not upon phases of incomplete development. For only in its completed development shall we find the true character of volition revealed. In earlier stages of growth this remains largely latent and concealed. Now such is just the case when, in the lives of men, conduct remains unorganized. In that degree their wills fail of their normal development. To that extent, in fact, volition is absent from their lives. Such individuals, we correctly say, fail to ” exercise their wills.“ And not being exercised their wills fail to display the larger possibilities they
17 Cf. System of Ethics, Bk. 11, Chap. I
VOLITION AS AN ORGANIZING AGENCY
149
possess. Such cases of arrested development are sometimes due to external causes, but oftener to the individuals themselves. Volition is an activity self-initiated and self-controlled. Its exercise and development require effort, the effort of close attention, studious thought, and discriminating selection. Whether or not this effort is made depends for the most part on the self. Of course the individual's capacity for such effort may itself be referred back to his will, his “will-power.” But not in such a way as to make the lack of organization in his life fairly chargeable to the inherent nature of his will and not to himself. For the whole point of the matter is that the individual's capacity for ” effort,“ his ” will-power, “ is not fixed, having its amount pre-determined by his heredity or some other cause outside his control. Rather is his exercise of the power of volition, and the increase in this power which follows upon its exercise, determined by himself alone. It is, in fact, identical with the power-to-be-a-self which, once present in germ, can, like all vital principles, be maintained and strengthened only from within. But upon the actual effort put forth depends the development of volition into the fullness of its capacity as an organizing agency, and upon this bangs the moral destiny of the human individual. As Professor James says in a celebrated passage: ” Thus not only our morality, but our religion, so far as the latter is deliberate, depend upon the effort we can make. 'Will you or won't you have it so?' is the most probing question we are ever asked; we are asked it every hour of the day, and about the largest as well as the smallest, the most theoretical as well as the most practical things. We answer by consewts or non-consents and not by words. What wonder that these dumb responses should seem our deepest organs of communication with the nature of things! What wonder if the, effort demanded by them be the measure of our worth as men! What wonder if the amount we
THE NATURE OF THE GOOD
150
accord of it be the one strictly original contribution which we inake to the world! ”18
REFERENCES
SETH, Ethical Principles, Introduction, Chap. 111.
HOFFDING, Outlines of Psychology (Eng. trans.), Chap. VII.
BALDWIN, Social and Ethical Interpretations in Mental Development, Chap. IX.
JUDD, Psychology, Chap. XIII.
STOUT, Manual of Psychology, Chap. X.
GREEN, Prolegomena to Ethics, Book 11, Chap. 11.
18 JAMES: Psychology, Vol. 11, p. 579.
