CHAPTER II
HEDONISM
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1. Pleasure as the Good.--2. Cyrenaicism.--3. Element of Truth in Cyrenaicism.--4. The Inadequacy of Cyrenaicism.--5. Epicureanism.--6. Value of the Epicurean Theory of the Good.--7. Arguments in Support of Hedonism.--8. Error of Psychological Hedonism.--9. Criticism of Ethical Hedonism.--10. Transition to Rationalism.
1. Pleasure as the Good.
There is reason to believe that all actions whose results are beneficial to animal life are accompanied by pleasure, while harmful actions are attended by pain. As human beings, we know that actions which tend to conserve health and physical well-being are, generally speaking, pleasurable, while actions whose effect is to diminish health and lessen bodily vigor are usually painful.1 Advancing from the biological to the psychological sphere, we find it true that the uninterrupted and successful exercise of our mental faculties is accompanied by a pleasant, affective glow, as in observation, thought, and imagination. Here, too, the reverse condition of frustrated thought and interrupted imagination is essentially unpleasant, as in doubt, perplexity, and confusion. In fact, psychologists tell us that
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success in attaining the end of action always brings pleasure in result, and failure causes pain.2 In view of these facts, it is not surprising that in the sphere of morals the theory of Hedonism,--the view that the Good is Pleasure,--has appealed strongly to men's minds. For is not pleasure the unfailing index of our success in attaining those objects which we as voluntary agents strive after? If we pursue pleasure do we not therefore seek that satisfaction which our natures demand, and, if we obtain the greatest possible pleasure, do we not obtain the maximum of satisfaction for that faculty of will which is the source of all our action?
2. Cyrenaicism.
Early in the history of ethical reflection Hedonism was proposed as a theory of the Good. It was first definitely enunciated by Aristippus, who had been a disciple of Socrates and professed to derive this view from the teachings of his master. Socrates' conception of the Good had, it w@ll be remembered, two sides. According to the one, the Good was happiness, and reason was but a means to the highest human happiness. Aristippus was deeply impressed with this aspect of Socrates' teachings and developed it to an extreme, neglecting the rationalistic element which offset it in his master's conception, and thus destroying the balance and unity of the latter. He taught that the Good is pleasure and, since the past is gone and the future is uncertain, the pleasure of the present moment. Thus man achieves his Good when, with skill and care, lie extracts the greatest possible enjoyment from each passing moment. This theory, that the Good consist@ in the enjoyment of present pleasure,--Called Cyrenaicism3--is, of course, not merely a feature of the history of Ethics. It is the view of all those in every age who consciously prefer the enjoyment of present pleasure because they regard the future as at best incalculable
2 STOUT: Manual of Psychology, Bk. 111, Div. 1, Chap. 111, § 3.
3 From Cyrene, the birthplace and home of Aristippus.
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and uncertain--believing it wise to ” eat, drink, and be merry, for--tomorrow--we die.”
3. Element of Truth in Cyrenaicism.
Cyrenaicism is so obviously impossible as a final solution of the ethical problem that it is easy to overlook the element of indubitable truth which it contains. Even the animals go beyond this standpoint, it may be said; since they forgo present pleasure to provide for future need--as when food is hoarded for the coming winter. It must not be forgotten, however, that animals are prompted to such action by instinct--an inherited nervous modification that makes it pleasanter for the individual so to act in the present as to conserve future welfare. Man himself possesses an instinct of self-preservation which causes him to take present precautions to avoid future pain,--and the possession of this instinct renders it easy and natural for him to resist the pressure of momentary feeling. But, it may be asked, has not man an overwhelming advantage in the possession of his reason, which enables him to foresee the future clearly, and plan for it? This is of course true, yet it is also true that this very faculty reveals to man a fact of which the animals are not cognizant--that the future of any living being is essentially uncertain and incalculable. Or, to express the same truth in other words, reason has decided limitations in its ability to foresee the future. In an important sense reason is limited to the familiar, is compelled to interpret the future in the light of past experience. Life, on the contrary, presents what is essentially new, is ever revealing novel and unexpected aspects. In comparison, therefore, with a future which must remain to a large degree uncertain, the present has actuality, and this actuality gives it a genuine importance and rightful claim for consideration. It is in this emphasis upon the rights of the present moment as alone actual that the truth of Cyrenaicism consists. After all, life is constituted of
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a succession of present moments, and always to sacrifice the now present to the future is to rob it of attainment and satisfaction all along its course.4 American life has been justly criticized because, intent upon the pursuit of wealth or the fulfillment of ambition, it fails to find any true joy or satisfaction along the way, and hence becomes hard and barren and mechanical.
4. The Inadequacy of Cyrenaicism.
While we thus do justice to the truth in Cyrenaicism, its inadequacy as a theory of the Good can be made clear in a very few words. To assert that the human will finds satisfaction in the enjoyment of present pleasure only, is to admit that it has no scope beyond the confines of the present, no extension beyond the limits of the single moment, and is, in effect, to deny that human life has any real unity or is more than a succession of unrelated moments. It is, to be sure, a fact--a deplorable fact--that many human lives fail to attain any unitary meaning or significance; they remain but a succession of impulses which yield pleasure or pain, according as they succeed or fail of gratification. We think however that such lives miss the dignity of the truly human, and resemble in character the animal existence. In many cases this enslavement to present desire is due to mental deficiency--the individual being unable to imagine the future or think of its connection with the present with sufficient clearness and coherence to make it a determining factor in present action. An extreme instance of such deficiency is seen in the case of those constant offenders who fall repeatedly into the clutches of the law because they seem unable to represent to themselves the consequences of their actions. Yet, as we have seen, knowledge of the future does not insure adequate provision for it in the present. Moreover, reason, although
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it may forecast the future cannot guarantee it. To adjust present action to the needs of the future requires, therefore, the exercise of a faculty which transcends even reason--that is, faith--faith in one's future and faith in one's self. It calls for the exercise of will, the will to be a self, which includes many present moments and joins them in a significant unity. That the will has this power to transcend the limits of the present can only be learned by the exercise of it: yet its exercise is absolutely necessary if the will is to find adequate expression in human life and conduct.
5. Epicureanism.
When it is thus seen that in order to derive the greatest pleasure from life we must take into account the future as well as the present we adopt a second form of Hedonism, Epicureanism. Of this version of Hedonism the author is Epicurus, a Greek philosopher, who lived and taught in Athens a century after the time of Aristippus. He gathered about him a company of devoted disciples who perpetuated his teachings after his death in a school which continued for six centuries, and always held the name and writings of its founder in greatest reverence. Epicurus remained true to the fundamental tenet of Hedonism, that pleasure is the only absolute good in human life. Differing from the Cyrenaics, however, he held that it was not present enjoyment, but the happiness of a life-time which is the summum bonum. Now if man is to gain the greatest pleasure from his life as a whole it is clear that he must often forgo a present pleasure in order to secure a greater pleasure in the future or to avoid a pain which will more than outweigh the present enjoyment. Epicurus saw the necessity for this and urged his followers to exercise strict self-control in all their enjoyments. He preached temperance particularly in the case of the bodily pleasures and, always, a prudent regard for the future. He even went so far as
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to recommend that intellectual pleasures be preferred to those arising from the gratification of physical appetites--and did so, on the strictly hedonistic ground, that the intellectual enjoyments, although less intense, were more permanent and less exhausting. Epicurus also dwelt upon the pleasures of friendship, and of friendly intercourse with a circle of congenial acquaintances. In his own practice he sought a life of quiet contentment, having few desires, and satisfying these with strict temperance, and finding solace chiefly in the intellectual enjoyment of philosophic contemplation and friendly intercourse.
6. Value of the Epicurean Theory of the Good.
As a theory of the Good, Epicureanism cannot be dismissed as easily as was Cyrenaicism.5 No justification can be found in its doctrine for a debauched or licentious life, for an idle dallying with present pleasure at the cost of future well-being. He who would obtain the maximum of pleasure in life must vigilantly guard his health, and this alone, the careful conservation of health and bodily vigor, requires the strictest temperance. Nor does Epicureanism excuse such absorption in the pleasures of sense as will exclude the higher satisfactions which come from the exercise of our spiritual capacities. Rather it enjoins us not to look solely at the present intensity of a pleasure, but also at the length of its endurance and its possibilities as a source of future enjoyment. Such reckoning, if honestly made, will usually lead the consistent Epicurean to seek such ” intellectual “ pleasures as those given by reading, music, or conversation, rather than the ” physical “ enjoyments of eating, drinking, etc. Nor, again, does Epicureanism recommend that the individual pursue his own selfish pleasure with a ruthless disregard of others' rights
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and happiness. On the contrary, a survey of human life and the conditions of its maintenance teaches the individual how largely his own happiness is dependent upon his relations to his fellows and their good-will towards him. Moreover, one of the purest and most lasting pleasures of human existence is that arising from friendly intercourse and companionship. Hence the true follower of Epicurus will sedulously cultivate a circle of congenial friends, and take pains to preserve a good reputation among a larger number of pleasant acquaintances. When consistently carried out, therefore, Epicureanism as a theory of the Good is by no means to be despised. It produces an orderly life and one yielding much genuine satisfaction. It develops a type of character dignified by many virtues. The true Epicurean will be temperate and law-abiding, industrious, saving, and prudent, a man quite content With simple pleasures, the enjoyment of which is enhanced by being shared with congenial friends.
7. Arguments in Support of Hedonism.
When we come to criticize Epicureanism the larger question of the truth in Hedonism is naturally suggested; for Epicureanism may be taken as the standard form of Hedonism.6 Considering the matter in this more general way we find that arguments advanced in support of Hedonism fall into two main classes. The first is psychological and consists in the assertion that all men do pursue pleasure always, whether aware of it or not. The nature of the human will
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is such that man can seek but one object and this his own pleasure. In fact, to ” desire “ and to seek pleasure are identical. In the words of J. S. Mill we have a classic statement of this view:
“It results from the preceding considerations that there is in reality nothing desired except happiness. Whatever is desired otherwise than as a means to some end beyond itself and ultimately to happiness, is desired as itself a part of happiness, and is not desired for itself until it has become so. Those who desire virtue for its own sake desire it either because the consciousness of it is a pleasure or because the consciousness of being without it is a pain or for both reasons united: as in truth the pleasure and pain seldom exist separately, but almost always together, the same person feeling pleasure in the degree of virtue attained and pain in not having attained more. If one of these gave him no pleasure and the other no pain, he would not love or desire virtue, or would desire it only for the other benefits which it might produce to himself or to persons whom he cared for. We have now, then, an answer to the question of what sort of proof the principle of utility is susceptible. If the opinion which I have now stated is psychologically true--if human nature is so constituted as to desire nothing which is not either a part of happiness or a means to happiness--we can have no other proof, and we require no other, that these are the only things desirable. If so, happiness is the sole end of human action, and the promotion of it the test by which to judge of all human conduct; from whence it necessarily follows that it must be the criterion of morality, since a part is included in the whole.”7
If it is true that all men do pursue pleasure, and if, moreover, they do so because they must from a compulsion of their nature, why of course the whole question is settled and further debate concerning the summum bonum is unnecessary and futile. The Good is pleasure; for, since the human will can seek nothing else, in this it must find satisfaction. There remains for Ethics only the task of
7 MILL: Utilitarianism, Chap. VI
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determining what forms of conduct yield the most pleasure. The second type of argument in support of Hedonism while not claiming that the psychology of volition proves Hedonism by making all other theories impossible, maintains its position on strictly ethical grounds. Without holding that all men do pursue pleasure he may assert for given reasons that all men ought to pursue pleasure. Various reasons are given why happiness is the only end whose attainment completely satisfies human nature. Perhaps the most convincing are those suggested in the opening paragraph of this chapter. Since pleasure results from all successful endeavor, it signifies the satisfaction of the will which initiated the action. The ultimate end of human conduct cannot be objective in the sense of being external to the conscious life of man. It must rather be subjective, a state of human consciousness. Now the only state of consciousness desirable for its own sake is that which is pleasant, or pleasure. Therefore pleasure is the highest human good.
8. Error of Psychological Hedonism.
Whether or not pleasure is the sole and necessary end of all intelligent action is a question of fact which psychology must decide. Psychology has given its decision and this is adverse to the claims of Hedonism. Pleasure, the psychologist tells us, is by no means the sole and only aim of voluntary action.8 To be sure, we frequently seek pleasure--the idea of the pleasure to be enjoyed being unmistakably the end of our action. But we do not always do so. In fact, it is not usual for us to act with any subjective state, pleasurable or painful, in mind as the end we seek to attain. Rather do we ordinarily pursue objects. Of course, in any case, the end of an action is an idea, but--the point is-not usually the idea of a subjective state which we wish to produce, but of an object which we seek to attain,
8 JAMES: Psychology, Vol. 11, Chap. XXVI, pp. 556-57.
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Intelligent action normally has this objective references-- a reference beyond subjective states and individual feelings.9 Thus the hungry man desires, not the pleasure of satiety, but a beefsteak or some other article of food. Even the man having a holiday is not intent upon producing the feeling of zest or invigoration which comes from this or that exercise or sport, but upon catching fish, or shooting ducks, or playing golf. Indeed, so obvious do the facts appear that one wonders why a view that contravenes them could gain so wide an acceptance. This question may be answered by a brief reference to one most important consideration which explains why psychological Hedonism has won the assent of so many minds.
The plausibility of the doctrine that pleasure is always the end of action depending-upon an ambiguity in the terms which are usually employed in discussing the subject. Is it true or false that man always seeks that which most pleases him? It depends entirely upon what is meant by these words. If one means that man always chooses and pursues the object or action whose idea is pleasantest to him--most strongly suffused or colored by pleasant feeling--it is true. In this sense, the person about to have a tooth extracted, the mother going to nurse a child sick with some very dangerous and communicable disease, the martyr going to the stake, are all of them doing what pleases them most. But this tells nothing about the end, the motive, of their action. To say that man in his conduct always follows the pleasantest course is merely to recognize that the end chosen and pursued is the end most interesting, most attractive, to the agent who chooses and acts. In this first sense, therefore, the statement that man
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always seeks the object which most pleases him is true, but is entirely irrelevant to the question at issue, which concerns only the end of action. If, in the second place, this statement is understood to mean that man always seeks the object which promises to yield him the most pleasure, it is quite false. The mother does not undertake to nurse .the sick child because she expects to derive pleasure from it, but because the idea of the child in pain and danger fills her mind, and then the further idea of relieving his pain and preserving his life appeals to her with overwhelming force. The martyr does not go to the stake moved by the thought of the pleasure he expects to enjoy during the experience or, later, in Heaven, but in order to uphold the principles to which he has devoted himself, to defend the cause to which he has consecrated his life. To maintain in these cases that men act, not in order to realize objects to save a stricken child or to defend an honored cause, but to produce certain subjective states in themselves--is to do violence to the plainest facts of human experience. Thus we see that the dictum on which the Hedonist relies to prove his case is capable of two interpretations. According to the one, it is true, but irrelevant to the question; according to the other, it is relevant, but untrue. Undoubtedly many have been convinced by the arguments of Hedonism because they thought that such a statement in the same sense in. which it was true was also relevant.
9. Criticism of Ethical Hedonism.
The argument that all men ought to pursue pleasure is not as easy to disprove. Many objections have been brought against it in the long controversy over Hedonism; but not all of these objections have weight. For instance, the fact alluded to that the will normally directs itself upon objects and objective conditions rather than subjective states may be urged as an objection to making any state of feeling the Good. While it is true that single acts of will have normally this
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objective reference it must be remembered, however, that the Good is an end sought in no single act, but in all the voluntary activity of the individual. In order that the summum bonum may be thus universal and include all particular goods, it may be helpful to conceive of it--in contradistinction to them--as a subjective state. Thus we secure a common denominator to which to reduce them all; measuring their value and importance by the amount of pleasure they yield. Again Hedonism is charged with being impracticable because it involves the idea of a sum-total of pleasure. Pleasures cannot be thus added, it is said, nor the effect of doing or refraining from a certain act, in increasing or lessening the sum-total of pleasure, be calculated with strict mathematical precision. This is true, but the Hedonist may answer that he is compelled to make no such exact mathematical calculation. No theory of the Good can furnish a standard whereby the worth of each particular object or act may be determined with absolute quantitative exactitude. On the other hand, to endeavor to increase the sum-total of pleasure in life is as practicable as a guiding principle in our conduct as to endeavor to increase the amount of intellectual activity or aesthetic appreciation.
i,@or does the fault of Hedonism lie in anything positive which it leads the individual to do or accomplish. We have seen that, so far from recommending a life of excess or profligacy, it enforces th,,, very opposite. The man who obtains the most pleasure from life must maintain himself in health, comfort, and security. To do this he must accumulate property, win reputation, and provide exercise for his natural impulses in family and social life. Thus Hedonism secures for man many objects that are required to satisfy his will and are thus good. But the fatal objection to the theory is that it is limited to just these objects and hence prevents the complete, satisfaction of
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human volition through the attainment of larger ends. The consistent Hedonist is limited in his choice to those objects which his experience, past or present, assures him will add to his life's enjoyment. Hence Hedonism can furnish no justification for real heroism or true self-sacrifice; since heroism and self-sacrifice consist essentially in surrendering objects known by the individual to promote his happiness for the sake of other larger objects which promise to make no equal return to him in comfoi@t or pleasure. But the moral experience of man demonstrates that such sacrifice and heroism are necessary if those more comprehensive objects, ideal and social, are to be attained which are required to satisfy completely intelligent volition. The fatal defect of Hedonism lies, therefore, in the limitation which it imposes on man's will-limiting him to a circle of objects which his experience proves will add to his comfort and happiness, and shutting him away forever from those larger ends and loftier ideals whose pleasure yielding capacity must remain uncertain until the individual by effort and sacrifice has achieved them.10 The Hedonist may be industrious and frugal, saving his pennies for a rainy day, but he can never sell all his goods and feed the poor, even in order to save his soul. The Hedonist may be honest and good-tempered, checking his ambition and bridling his tongue, in order to preserve a good reputation among his fellows, yet he could never invite death by entering a plague-stricken locality, even to relieve suffering or perchance discover some saving remedy. The Hedonist may be obliging and companionable, going to much trouble to retain a friendship, yet he could never lay down his life, even for the sake of a friend.
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10. Transition to Rationalism.
If the human will is to obtain complete satisfaction, therefore, man must transcend the standpoint of Hedonism, subordinating the life of sense and feeling to the ideals of reason and the imagination. It may seem inconsistent with statements already made thus to base the distinction between Hedonism and the more adequate theory upon an opposition of feeling to thought, For, on the one hand, have we not seen that thought plays an important part in all Hedonistic theories that go beyond momentary feeling and consider the happiness of a lifetime? And, on the other hand, was it not shown that reason alone is incapable of justifying absolutely the surrender of present pleasure for the sake of future happiness, not to mention the greater sacrifice of individual well-being to ideal or social purposes? Certain it is, most assuredly, that the man who seeks as his good the greatest pleasure in life must exercise his reason in considering the exigencies of the future and in forming those general purposes whose realization in the course of a lifetime produces the maximum of agreeable feeling. Yet such an exercise of thought is limited in range and need not extend far beyond the field of sense perception. The Cyrenaic, of course, considers only the objects of present perception and seeks to find in them gratification for the impulse momentarily uppermost. He seeks now an article of food, now a form of exercise, now a mode of companionship, etc., etc. The Epicurean is not limited thus to particular objects and actions. He generalizes upon his experiences, substituting for particular wishes and impulses general desires and purposes. He seeks, not specific objects, like an article of food or clothing, but more general and comprehensive ones, such as food, better health, or more property. Now these general purposes are the work of thought, and as such are not limited to the present, but extend into the future, and their successful realization in
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the course of time requires the denial of present desire. But while such ideas as health, wealth, etc., standing for the natural goods of man, are concepts of thought they nevertheless represent only classes of sense-objects. Hence they do not rise far above the sphere of sense-perception and leave as the distinguishing feature of Hedonism its emphasis upon the natural feelings of the individual. Now turning to the second difficulty, it is admittedly true that in cases where individual happiness is sacrificed to larger ends reason cannot demonstrate in advance of the act of sacrifice that the result will be a larger and fuller satisfaction. Such satisfaction can come only after the character of the individual has been transformed by the voluntary sacrifice, and cannot be imagined previously, just because the transformation has not taken place. If reason could assure the individual of a larger satisfaction, of course there would be no real sacrifice, no genuine heroism. The fact that the human will has capacity for a fuller satisfaction than that found in individual comfort and happiness can only be proved by exercising this will in resisting the claims of present desire and the appeal of purposes whose realization past experience shows to be productive of pleasure, and turning to larger objects whose significance extends beyond the natural pleasure and well-being of any individual. But--and this is the point to be noticed--such objects, objects which promise fuller and more adequate expression to man's capacity of volition, are products of thought and imagination. They result, not from a mere generalizing upon the facts of experience, but from the exercise of free-ranging thought and constructive imagination, which take the materials of past experience and combine them in new and highly significant forms. Thus ideals of spiritual achievement and social betterment come into existence. Think of the case of a man who sacrifices his reputation and standing in the community in order to prepare the
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way for some social reform which he sees coming in the distant future. The objects which he sacrifices are such as appeal to his senses and arouse his feelings--the smiles and compliments of acquaintances, social opportunities and diversions, increase of wealth, etc. The object which he seeks to further is, on the contrary, nowhere visible and tangible--it is a social arrangement which as yet exists only in the imagination of its advocates, and can be brought to pass only in the far future. When we thus come to see the necessity for sacrificing the demands of sense and feeling to the principles and conceptions of reason and the imagination, we advance to the position of Rationalism.
REFERENCES
SETH, Ethical Principles, Part I, Chap. I.
HICKS, Stoic and Epicurean, Chaps. V, VI, VII.
ZELLER, Stoics, Epicureans and Sceptics (Eng. trans.), Part III.
WARNER FITE, Introductory Study of Ethics, Part I.
THILLY, Introduction to Ethics, Chaps. VI, VIII.
MACKENZIE, Manual of Ethics, Book II, Chap. IV.
SPENCER, Data of Ethics, Chap. III.
SIDGWICK, Methods of Ethics, Book II.
HYDE, Five Great Philosophies of Life, Chap. 1.
