PART TWO
THE NATURE OF THE GOOD
CHAPTER I
1. The Supreme Importance of the Subject.--2. The Good as Determined by Custom.--3. The Good as Discovered by Reflection.--4. Socrates' View of the Good.--5. Merits of the Socratic Conception of the Good.--6. Defects of the Socratic Conception of the Good.--7. The Good as Action or the End of Action.--8. The Good as Conduct or Character.--9. The Good as Duty or Virtue.
1. The Supreme Importance of the Subject.
What is the Good? This is the question which must now engage our attention; for we have seen that all other questions of Ethics lead up to this one, and upon its successful solution depends the possibility of a rational morality. By the Good is meant that form of life which is required to satisfy completely the human will. When the Good is thus understood it is easy to see why the question of its nature--fundamental to all ethical inquiry--is the supremely important problem of human thought. Placed beside it, all questions of business profit and loss, of social order and adjustment sink into insignificance. Such questions as these latter may in themselves be important enough, touching thousands of lives in a vital and essential manner. But, after all, they concern only single departments of human life, while the problem of the Good concerns the whole nature of man as an active being. Hence a question of economics or politics, of education or of art, interests only a comparatively small number of persons, while the moral problem has interest for all human beings in virtue of their common humanity. And for this reason
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--because fundamental in character and universal in interest--the question of the Good is, of greatest practical moment, and its solution of highest practical value. Before an individual can practice an art or profession he must learn its principles and be drilled in its methods. If he is properly to determine his conduct as a free agent, must he not then learn the principles of human nature and the methods of obtaining satisfaction for it? And if it is worth while to spend four years in studying the principles and methods of a profession, is it not more worth while to spend a little time in studying the nature and requirements of human life itself ? Ethics is the science of human life and human conduct, and, as such, underlies all the practical sciences. Compared with that of the highest human good, all other concerns have small value indeed. ” For what shall it profit a man, “ said our greatest moral and religious teacher, ” if he shall gain the whole world and lose his own soul?”1
2. The Good as Determined by Custom.
So important a problem is this of the highest good that in the earlier stages of moral development its solution is not left to the reason of the individual. Instead it is settled for him by the customs of his race.2 These customs are rules of conduct which prescribe what a man must do if his conduct is to meet with approval among his fellows. In general they serve to impose such restraint upon the instincts and appetites of the individual as is required to make group-life possible and, as conditions of social
1 Mark viii, 36 (A. V.).
2 The superiority of custom to reason as an agency for securing actions demanded by social welfare is remarked upon by Lafeadio Hearn in his letters bearing on Japanese life. He alludes to practices required for hygienic purposes or necessary to an orderly community life which have been easily enforced by tradition and superstition, but which would be very difficult to enforce on grounds of reason except among the most highly civilized peoples. (” Japanese Letters of Lafeadio Hearn,“ I, Atlantic Monthly, December, 1909, p. 727.)
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existence, are handed down from generation to generation in the form of a race tradition. All custom in the field of morality has two aspects; a subjective, in the belief that actions of a certain kind are good, and, an objective, in the practices which flow from this belief. Thus the customs of a people lay down the conditions which the individual must fulfill if he is to deserve the title of ” good man “--that, for instance, he must be a brave warrior, a successful hunter, the father of several sons, a worshiper of the tribal deities, etc.
The system of customs which constitutes the morality of primitive man is not the result of his reflection upon the question of the highest human good; these customs owe their origin and perpetuation largely to resXX an agencies purely natural. No doubt chance or ” luck plays a large part in the origin of custom. Some action happens to precede or accompany a piece of great good fortune to the tribe, such as unparalleled success in the hunt or complete victory in warfare. This action is therefore regarded as lucky and is perpetuated as a custom long after the original circumstances have been forgotten.3 With the continued existence of customs the law of natural selection, acting between societies, has much to do. Those tribes whose customs are such as to make them more efficient in hunting and warfare, survive in the struggle for life and their customs are continued, while tribes whose customs tend in the opposite direction--towards disintegration and inefficiency--are exterminated.
But while primitive morality owes its existence so largely to causes that are non-rational, its customs are by no means on a level with the set of instincts by which life is organized in an animal society, such as a community of ants or of
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bees. The, operation of custom in the most primitive human society calls for the exercise of intelligence and volition on the part of the individuals concerned.4 A man must possess the power of thinking in general terms--of conceptual thought--before he can understand the requirements of a custom. He must be able to conceive of general modes of acting--of marrying within or without the clan, for instance--if the custom concerns marriage. Then the obligation that is felt to obey the custom implies the power of choice and selection. The individual must be able to represent to himself a certain form of conduct say, marrying without the clan--as a possibility of action, and to contrast it with other modes of action. Thus only can he feel an obligation to pursue one alternative in action, an obligation which is neither the desire of a particular object on the one hand, nor the sense of external compulsion on the other. Nor can we doubt that the intelligence and volition required for the understanding and obeying of customs have in an increasing degree influenced their origination and continuance. The necessity of teaching the traditional customs of the race to the rising generation would set men to thinking of their meaning and value. Thus thoughts of possible changes and innovations would naturally arise. In result a new feature would be occasionally introduced into the tribal customs through the influence of some powerful individual. These changes, though slight enough in any one generation, would have cumulative effect and, as moral evolution proceeded, serve more and more to rationalize the existing morality.
3. The Good as Discovered by Reflection.
But the time comes in the history of the race, as of the individual, when man is no longer willing to have the nature
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of his good determined for him by the customs of his race. He insists upon applying his own reason to the solution of the problem. The resulting reflection may seem at first productive of evil rather than good; for while general enlightenment follows upon the exercise of thought by individuals, it is generally accompanied also by skepticism or doubt of the existence of any universal standards of truth or goodness, and individualism or the further conclusion that the good for every individual is identical with his own advantage.
The most notable instance in history of such an overthrow of customary morality occurred in Greece in the fifth century B.C. This revolt against the morality of custom and tradition among the Greeks is especially important because, in the systematic reflection which grew out of it, we have the beginnings of ethical science among European peoples.--Victory in the Persian wars had increased the wealth and the commerce of the Greek states. Thus their citizens were given more leisure for study and reflection, and an increasing acquaintance with the beliefs and customs of other peoples. The rise of democracy gave greater importance and scope to action and initiative on the part of the individual, and the frequent changes in government tended to weaken his respect for established law and institution. When we add to these influences the fact that philosophic speculation during the century previous had practically destroyed the old mythology and undermined the foundations of the national religion, it is not surprising to find the moral customs and traditions of the Greek people losing their authority and falling into disrespect.5 This spirit of revolt against authority in all departments of life finds expression in the teachings of
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the Sophists. The Sophists came into prominence at this time as itinerant teachers, first of rhetoric and public speaking, and then, extending the scope of their instruction, of the whole conduct of life.6 The effect of their teaching was to encourage the individual to disregard all accepted standards and established authority in the pursuit of his own interest. They denied that there were any absolute standards of truth and goodness which could claim authority over all men. Hence they maintained that the individual's opinion was truth for him, and that his advantage was his good. The Sophists were therefore skeptics--in the field of thought defenders of subjectivism, and in the sphere of conduct advocates of individualism.
4. Socrates' View of the Good.
The general acceptance of this individualistic doctrine meant the dissolution of all moral standards among the Greek people and the reduction of their social order to a chaos of contending desires and ambitions. To prevent this disastrous result there was need for a man to appear with a mind keen enough to see more deeply into the problem than did the Sophists, and a personality sufficiently vigorous to impress his views upon the thought of his age. Such a man was Socrates, who is justly esteemed as one of the great ethical teachers and moral heroes of history.7 Socrates sought to reestablish the authority of the old standards of justice and courage and temperance,--not
6 First and most prominent among the Sophists was Protagoras of Abdera, born about 480 B.C. He taught for forty years throughout Greece, and with great success. He is the leading figure in the celebrated dialogue of Plato's bearing his name. Other Sophists were Gorgias, Prodicus, and Hippins.
7 Socrates was born in 470 B.C. His father was Sophroniscus, a sculptor. He was trained in his father's profession. This he abandoned in response to what he regarded as a divine call to his peculiar mission. His mission he understood as the moral instruction of the Greek people. As a moral teacher he followed the indirect method of question and answer. By skillful questioning he
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by appealing to the authority of tradition and the past, however, but by carrying still further that reflection on ethical subjects begun by the Sophists. He maintained that if men would not be content with mere feeling and opinion, but would take the trouble to think systematically on the subject of human conduct, they would discover what is man's true good and see that its attainment imposes on all men certain fundamental obligations. He declared, in fact, that virtue or goodness is knowledge. For by a necessity. of his nature every man seeks his own interest. If he does wrong, this shows that he is ignorant of what his true interest is. Conversely, if he gains knowledge of his true interest he cannot help pursuing it, and hence must do right. This knowledge, which for man is identical with virtue, is primarily a knowledge of himself, of the needs and capacities of his human nature. It is also a knowledge of the conditions under which the individual can find self-satisfaction in human life and society. Such knowledge, leading the individual to consider the future as well as the present, and revealing the community of interest among fellow-citizens, will convince him of the necessity of discharging the commonly recognized duties as conditions of his own happiness. Thus that true knowledge which is identical with virtue is shown to be a means to happiness. Socrates is able, therefore, by a change of emphasis to define virtue as happiness--the true happiness attained through the control of action by reason.
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5. Merits of the Socratic Conception of the Good.
The value of Socrates' contribution to the science of Ethics can scarcely be over-estimated. He was the first to offer a positive solution for the ethical problem; since he was the first to find ground in human nature for a Good which was the same for all men and would consequently unite them in the bonds of a common moral obligation. Although designed to refute the individualism of the Sophists, Socrates' view has not the one-sidedness which usually condemns a doctrine developed in the heat of controversy. While it upholds the authority of duty it pro- vides for the satisfaction of the individual. In fact, Socrates' conception of the Good is a synthesis of two elements which often appear in open conflict. It contains, first, the rationalistic principle that sense-impulse and present desire should be subjected to the conceptions and purposes of reason. But we find, in the second place, the hedonistic doctrine that the exercise of reason should in its turn be a means to the satisfaction and happiness of the individual. Virtue is knowledge, but knowledge is happiness.
6. Defects of the Socratic Conception of the Good.
Just this synthetic character, which is the strength of Socrates' view of the Good, is also the source of its weakness. For it is a synthesis too easily achieved. If knowledge of one's true interest necessarily involved action in accordance with it, we should have here a final solution of the moral problem. But such is not the case. ” For the good that I would, I do not; but the evil which I would not, that I do, ” says Paul,8 and the facts of our moral experience are in accord with the statement of the Christian apostle rather than the view of the Athenian sage. Socrates' error seems to have arisen from an imperfect understanding of the working of the human will. In the
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process of volition the idea which reason connects with one's true interest does not automatically and inevitably translate itself into action and accomplishment. I may be thoroughly convinced that two hours' exercise in the open air every afternoon is required for my own best welfare, yet sit quiet in my office or study during every afternoon of the week. Besides the thought of the object and the feeling of satisfaction in its attainment, a third factor enters into volition whose significance Socrates did not appreciate. This is the effort, the activity, with which volition proper is often identified. This effort is mental--that activity of attention required to keep an idea steadily in mind despite distracting influences, while the steps necessary to its realization are duly taken. Now the amount of attention which any idea is able to command is not determined by rational considerations solely. (The most reasonable alternative is not always the most attractive one.) Rather is it in a large measure the result of the individual's tendencies and habits--tendencies which are innate and habits which have been developed through past action and experience.
In the development of such habits the ” training “ of the will consists. And in order that an individual shall pursue his true interest it is necessary, not only that his intellect be enlightened as to its character, but also that his will be trained in its performance. Not only moral instruction, therefore, but also moral training is required if a man is to act for his own good. For the habituation in a course of action, which results from training in its performance, makes the idea of it attractive, and powerful over the attention. These considerations lead to a position the very opposite of that taken by Socrates--and one that sounds paradoxical enough when first stated--that one can know an idea fully only after he has acted upon it. Without attempting at this point to clear up the perplexities involved, we may acknowledge that this
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last statement contains sufficient truth to disprove the Socratic doctrine that virtue is knowledge. It is undoubtedly true that in many cases one can learn that an object is a part of his own good only by seeking and attaining it. He must have sufficient courage to make the trial, and then he will be convinced by the results of his action that the object which he sought is part of his own good. Thus it is only by pursuing another's good at the expense of our own that we learn the extent of our own interest--that it includes the welfare of others.
7. The Good as Action or the End of Action.
The difficulties in the Socratic conception show clearly that no theory of the Good can be accepted as final which neglects the conditions under which it is realized in action. The reason for this is plain. By definition the Good is that which completely satisfies intelligent volition. Volition is action in pursuit of a chosen end. Thus whatever else it may or may not be the Good must certainly be some form, or end, of action. Mr. Alexander states this fact with emphasis in his Moral Order and Progress: ” Hence the object of morality cannot be a passive state like pleasure or the possession of knowledge. When these are the objects of will, what is willed is not the feeling or the state by themselves, but their production. It would be infinitely tedious to be obliged always to say so, but the condition is always implied.”9 To admit the truth of this is not by any means to decide the question of the Good in favor of some form of voluntarism.10 The Good may still be a passive state—a condition of agreeable feeling or of complete knowledge. Or it may be the extinction of all individual activity--as in the Buddhist Nirvana. But these conditions of being or non-being will nevertheless be objects which are
9 Moral Order and Progress, ed. of 1889, p. 165.
10 The theory, that is, that the Good is found in the process or activity of willing itself rather than in any object or end attained by Will.
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actively pursued. The happiness must be sought after, the knowledge must be obtained, and even the Nirvana of the Buddhist must be achieved by long and persistent effort. In short the Good must be some form of conduct; for only in conduct can the will find expression.
8. The Good as Conduct or Character.
To conceive of the Good as a form of conduct is to not identify it with outward and visible action in contrast with inner and essential nature. Such an antithesis of conduct and character is possible only on a false view of the human self. According to this view--held by a Psychology now antiquated--the self or soul is an entity or ” thing “ which possesses a nature permanent and in a large degree independent of outward act and condition. This view permitted of a sharp distinction being made between character as pertaining to this inner and unchanging principle of human selfhood and conduct as belonging, to the outward world of visible and changing events. Modern Psychology, however, is dynamic, not static; it understands the self as a sum total, or better, an organized unity of conscious activities. From this standpoint it is impossible to make any hard and, fast distinction between conduct and character. For conduct does not consist of a series of unrelated acts; these acts are acts of will, and represent so many choices. A series of such choices tends to produce a habit, and out of these habits are formed those dispositions and capacities which constitute the character of a person. Character in its turn does not consist of passive qualities which exist apart from the sphere of action. Rather it is made up of the dispositions and attitudes of the individual--dispositions to act and attitudes towards objects of action. But it is in just these modes of activity that the individual's conduct consists. Thus conduct and character resolve themselves into two sides, outer and inner, of a unitary subject, the active self or
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personality.11 What a man is is manifest in what he does, and what he does is an expression of what he is. If it is legitimate to define the Good as a form of conduct, it is equally legitimate to describe it as a species of character.
9. The Good as Duty or Virtue.
The relation is identical when we consider whether the Good consists in the performance of duty or the acquisition of virtue. By duty we understand a mode of action which is morally approved. A virtue, on the other hand, is an attribute or disposition of character which is judged good. Now the moral ideal may be formulated in terms of either of these two conceptions. The Greeks preferred the latter--explaining goodness as the acquisition of certain virtues. Thus the greatest Greek moralists, Plato and Aristotle, discuss at length those virtues which are requisite to goodness, the so-called cardinal virtues of temperance, courage, justice, etc. Christian Ethics has in the main adopted the former conception, understanding right living to consist in the performance of certain duties. Hence Christian moralists have laid greatest stress upon a code of duties which are conceived as laws prescribing the conduct of the good man. The Ten Commandments are often cited by these moralists as constituting the fundamental code of duty, proceeding directly from God, the source of the moral law. These two conceptions of goodness as duty and as virtue have been frequently contrasted as if they were in essential opposition and exclusive of one another.12 The Greek view of the Good as virtue has been charged with making morality self-centered, while the Christian conception of goodness as duty has been accused of making it external and formal. Such a contrast is made possible only by that abstract and false
11 This point is briefly but clearly put by SETH, Ethical Principles, ed, of 1908, p. 5.
12 Sidgwick emphasizes this point of difference between Greek and Christian Ethics in his Outline of the History of Ethics, Chap. III.
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separation of conduct and character which has just been condemned. As conduct and character are two sides, outer and inner, of one unitary personality, so duty and Virtue are two aspects, outer and inner, of the expression of this personality. Whether we conceive of goodness in terms of one or of the other is altogether a matter of emphasis; for one cannot exist without the other. A man can acquire or possess no quality of soul which does not manifest itself in action, nor can he perform any intelligent action without affecting and modifying his essential nature. The Good may therefore be conceived, equally well, as the performance of duty or as the acquisition of virtue.
REFERENCES
ALEXANDER, Moral Order and Progress, Book I, Chap. II, §§ 4,5.
DEWEY AND TUFTS, Ethics, Chaps. IV and XIII, §§ 3,4.
MACKENZIE, Manual of Ethics, Book I, Chap. III, and Book II, Chap. I.
WUNDT, Ethics, Vol. I, Chap. III.
WINDE:LBAND, History of Philosophy (Eng. trans.), Part I, Chap. II, §7.
BAKEWELL, Source-book in Ancient Philosophy, Chaps. VIII, IX, X.
