CHAPTER VI
THE MOTIVE OF GOOD CONDUCT
1. The Appeal of the Summum Bonum as the Motive of Good Conduct.--2. Possible Discrepancy Between the Intention and the Consequences of Conduct.--3. Good Intentions When Accompanied by Adequate Knowledge Are Usually Productive of Good Consequences.--4. Good Consequences in Most Cases Indicate Corresponding Degree of Goodness in Intention.--5. But Good Motive Does Not Absolutely Insure Good Consequences Because of Inability of Reason to Foresee Future Developments.
1. The Appeal of the Summum Bonum as the Motive of Good Conduct.
Motive, psychologically speaking, is the conscious condition of action. The motive of voluntary action-with which alone Ethics is directly concerned-is the desire of an object as end. We may now go a step further and return answer to the question: What is the motive of good conduct? The motive of good conduct is the idea of the Highest Good in its appeal to the will of an intelligent being. In this motive we have distinguished and considered separately two aspects, an intellectual and an emotional. On the one hand there is the conception of the object to be sought, the inducement of action; on the other are the feelings of interest or obligation aroused by thought of this object, the incentive to act. Both of these factors are necessary as constituents of the motive; only through their cooperation is it able to discharge its office in the determination of conduct. The motive of good conduct is then composed of thought and feeling joined in an effective unity-it is the idea of the Good become dynamic, converted into a living force for the creating of conduct, the constructing of character.
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The statement that all good conduct has for its motive the attainment, of the summum bonum does not imply that every act which is truly good, results from conscious thought of, and has explicit reference to, the summum bonum. This need only from time to time be so attentively studied and clearly understood by the agent that he is constantly aware of the general principles which its progressive attainment imposes on his daily conduct, and that its appeal to him shall be so strong that a feeling of compelling obligation is communicated to these principles of conduct. When this is the case and such principles determine human conduct, either operating consciously as motives, or having done so in the past and now governing through habit, the conception of the summum bonum is in verity discharging its proper function as the motive of good conduct.
2. Possible Discrepancy Between Intention and Consequences of Conduct.-Thus far we have assumed that an action which aims at the Highest Good will, within the limits of its own field, result in its attainment. No account has been taken of a possible discrepancy between intention and performance, motive and consequences. The possibility of such disagreement has impressed many writers on Ethics as so real and important that it has affected their whole conception of goodness. They have felt obliged to choose either intention or consequences, the one to the exclusion of the other, as determining the moral value of an act. Either it is only the intention that counts in morality and the consequences do not matter, or it is the actual consequences which make an act good or bad, without regard for the motive of the agent. Kant is the leading representative of the former extreme. He held that ” Nothing in the whole world, or even outside of the world, can possibly be regarded as good without limitation except a good will. . . . A man's will is good, not because the consequences which flow from it are good, nor because it is
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capable of attaining the end which it seeks, but it is good in itself, or because it wills the good.”1 J. S. Mill and others of the Utilitarian school take the opposite view, believing that the consequences of an act, in increasing or diminishing the sum total of human happiness, make it right or wrong.2 Thus Mill says: “Utilitarian moralists have gone beyond almost all others in affirming that the motive has nothing to do with the morality of an action, though much with the worth of the agent. He who saves a fellow-creature from drowning does what is morally right, whether his motive be duty or the hope of being paid for his trouble: he who betrays the friend that trusts him is guilty of a crime, even if his object be to serve another friend to whom he is under greater obligations.”3
Everyday human experience gives ample warrant, one may think, for thus contrasting the intention with the consequences of action. It is proverbial that good intentions often go with poor performance. Persons who mean well, but do ill are easily found in every community. We are all acquainted with men and women who, although working with best intention for others' welfare, nevertheless do harm and mischief among them through ignorance of their needs, their abilities, and the conditions under which they live. Such well-intentioned altruists are frequently condemned as meddlesome busy-bodies. Conversely human life and history can show us many cases of good consequences issuing from intentions either bad or indifferent. Excellent laws-laws that do much to advance human welfare-are sometimes enacted through the influence of political leaders who seek only party success
1 KANT: Metaphysic of Morality, See. 1.
2 MILL: Utilitarianism, Chap. II.
3 The distinction made by Mill and other Utilitarians between intention and motive is ignored here as tending to produce needless perplexity in the mind of the student. Intention is here contrasted, according to popular usage, with actual results,--consequences.
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and personal preferment. Many a war undertaken from love of conquest and plunder has in its outcome increased human liberty and happiness.
3. Good Intentions When Accompanied by Adequate Knowledge Are Usually Productive of Good, Consequence's.
Does the logic of our view compel us to hold that any act whose motive is the attainment of the Highest Good is itself good, no matter what its consequences may be? Before giving a final answer to this question let us consider whether the possibility of a real discrepancy between the intention and the outcome of action is as great as it has been made out to be-whether it is possible for the inner and outer aspects of conduct to enter into such sharp conflict.4 In the first place, good intentions which result in evil do so usually because the agent is ignorant of the conditions in which he acts, of the true character of the situation. The ultimate end conceived, the final object aimed at, is good, but there is almost complete ignorance of the means which must be employed in its attainment. In such circumstances can the intention be said to be altogether good? Scarcely. Conduct is good in intention when it intends the attainment of the summum bonum. But the summum bonum is an object of action, to be realized in conduct. Hence, if the agent is truly to understand the Highest Good, he must see it in its bearing upon his own situation, as the outcome of his own conduct, the expression of his own will. In other words, for the Good fully to determine an action as motive, it must be known, not abstractly as the faraway goal of endeavor, but concretely in terms of the conduct required to attain it. To make an intention good, then, it does not suffice that it have goodness for its final end, that it aim at human
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happiness or social welfare,--it must also include a knowledge of the means necessary for its realization. On the other hand, when these conditions are fulfilled, and an action has for its motive the realization of the Good, accompanied by a knowledge of the means requisite to this end, we may reasonably expect that its consequences will be good also. Thus far, at least, do good motives guarantee good consequences.
The objection must arise at this point that, in many cases, a person is not responsible for his ignorance of means and methods whereby to realize his ideals. Where it has not been possible for the agent to gain the needed knowledge, should his lack of it affect the moral value of his intention? Certainly, in judging of moral values, care should be exercised to distinguish between cases where opportunities for acquiring the information in question have been neglected and those in which no opportunity has apparently existed, and to make due allowance in cases of the latter sort. Yet it is difficult to see how a motive can be regarded as altogether good when not accompanied by as much knowledge as human experience can furnish as to the ways and means by which the ends of Goodness are realized. Certainly intelligent public opinion is growing more unwilling to accept ” good intentions “ in the ordinary sense as an excuse for ignorance of actual conditions that brings disastrous consequences. We tend more and more to hold the engineer responsible for his ignorance of the conditions of his air-brakes which., failing to work, caused the accident--the physician responsible for his ignorance of the injurious after-effects of the medicine he prescribes--the orator or publicist responsible for ignorance of the misleading and inflammatory character of certain doctrines when accepted by unenlightened and prejudiced minds.
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4. Good Consequences in Most Cases Indicate a Corresponding Degree of Goodness in Intention.
Much less frequently than is popularly supposed--we find upon examination--is there any wide difference in moral value between the intention and the consequences of action. Given a good intention, accompanied by all available information as to how it may be carried out, i.e. given an intention that is altogether good, and good consequences may be expected to follow. Moreover, when we move in the reverse direction, from consequence back to intention, we find agreement, not discrepancy, the rule. In the vast majority of cases good consequences indicate good intentions. In order properly to understand the situation here one must make an allowance for a natural tendency to exaggerate the goodness of those results which do seem in any degree good, when the intention behind them is believed to be bad. Our surprise is so great to find goodness produced in this way by an evil motive that we incline almost irresistibly to heighten the _contrast and thus exaggerate the amount of resulting good. We tend, for instance, to over-estimate the amount of good resulting to Europe from Napoleon's campaigns of conquest, when once our attention is caught by the fact that good did result. Now when we do make this allowance and reduce the consequent good to its true proportions, we usually discover that the intention is good in a corresponding degree. The scheming politician secures the passage of good laws, say you, in order that his party may remain in. public favor and he may retain office and influence? Yes, but since he is clear-headed enough to understand that fame and fortune will come to him only as he proves a loyal servant of his party, and that his party can retain its power only so long as it obeys the popular will and secures the general welfare, is his motive altogether selfish? He seeks his own interest, to be sure,. but is shrewd enough to see that it
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is inseparably bound up with the success of party and the welfare of country; hence he seeks these also. The conduct of the man who gives to charity in order to advertise his business is probably as good in intention as it is in result. That also springs from an insight into the connection of private interest with public welfare, which possesses moral value in degree probably equal to the amount of actual good which is likely to result from such forms of charity.
5. But Goodness of Motive Cannot Absolutely Insure Good Consequences Because of Inability of Reason to Foresee All Future Developments.
Returning now to the question whether the moral value of conduct is not determined wholly by the motive, and not at all by consequences, we see that its difficulties have been largely removed. There is no possibility of such radical discrepancy between intention and consequences as would compel us to choose one and ignore the other in evaluating conduct. The two are inseparably joined in the unitary process of volition, where they reciprocally determine one another. When the motive is good, therefore, it is entirely probable that the consequences will be also. Can we not go still farther and assert without reservation that where the motive is good the consequences must be good? Suppose the motive were good in that complete sense suggested above--an excellence of motive not often attained, it must be confessed. Imagine an individual seeking the summum bonum with all the knowledge that human experience has been able to gather as to means and methods of pursuit, concerning conditions to be met, and contingencies apt to arise. Would such a motive necessarily and without the possibility of exception produce consequences of the same degree of goodness? Or might fate or accident still intervene to frustrate expectation, set plans at naught, and bring evil out of good? The whole problem turns upon the ability of human knowledge, when as
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complete as possible, to anticipate the future. Is a knowledge even theoretically possible that will enable one to foresee every contingency that may arise in prospective action? It is true that knowledge enables us in an astonishing manner to foresee and to predict. But this very knowledge, now the possession and advantage of the race, was gained through experiments of which no one knew the outcome until it occurred. Action has not, then, followed a program prescribed by thought; thought has rather recorded and systematized the results of action. Volition is the primary, the original, capacity; intellect is secondary and derived. Hence it is impossible that knowledge should ever foresee in detail all the possibilities of achievement, or anticipate every emergency which a voluntary agent may have to meet. Entirely novel situations arise; the totally unexpected happens. New discoveries are made, fresh developments occur, which upset every human calculation. The best of motives may, through such a novel turn of events, have results in action which are not wholly good. In such case the agent is only responsible for his motive--for aiming at the Good with the fullest information human experience can furnish. For the consequences, so far as they are determined, not by his will, but by the mew and unexpected course of events, he is not responsible except in future actions, when the new facts which at first surprised him and upset all calculation can be foreseen and provided for.
REFERENCES
MACKENZIE, Manual of Ethics, Book 1, Chap. 11.
DEWEY AND TUFTS, Ethics, Chap. XII, §§ 1, 2.
MILL, Utilitarianism, Chap. 11.
LESLIE STEPHEN, Science of Ethics, Chap. 11.
ALEXANDER, Moral Order and Progress, Book 1, Chap. 11, §§ 1, 2,3.
