CHAPTER V
THE APPEAL OF THE GOOD
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1. Objects Appeal to the Will Through the Feelings They Arouse.-- 2. Appeal of the Good as Inclination.--3. Appeal of the Good as Obligation.--4. Conditions Under Which Feeling of Moral Obligation Arises.--5. Significance of the Feeling of Moral Obligation.-- 6. Kant's View of Moral Obligation.--7. Goodness Not Always Different from Inclination.--8. The Duties of Morality Command Not as Categorical but as Teleological Imperatives.--9. The Summum Bonum Alone has the Authority of a Categorical Imperative.
1. Objects Appeal to the Will Through the Feelings They Arouse.
Knowledge that an end is good does not insure its choice and pursuit. We may know that an action is right and still not perform it. To be realized as an end of action an object must make a certain appeal to the self. It must engage and hold the attention-i.e. be attractive, possess interest. Now the interest or attractiveness of an object is measured by the feelings which it arouses. These feelings color or tone the object when thought of, and, as they endue it with life and influence, are sometimes called its dynamic or motive-power. The character of these feelings seems to vary considerably. When very hungry, the idea of food which attracts me, as an end to be sought, is altogether pleasant. The feeling aroused is one of simple, although very intense, pleasure, and I should describe my feeling as one of strong liking or desire for food. The idea of having a tooth filled, which as an end prompts me to go to the dentist's, is not thus simply pleasant. Of course the idea of having the tooth repaired and thus saved from further decay pleases me,
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else it would have no power over my attention, no attractive influence. Yet there are closely associated with it other ideas of the discomfort and pain of the filling process, which are very unpleasant. These fears and apprehensions will divert me from my original intention unless by continuous effort I hold my attention on the course decided, upon. Such effort involves strain, which is unpleasant. Hence the feeling aroused by the end in question is one of mingled pleasantness and unpleasantness, which I describe as a feeling of compulsions saying that I do not like to go to the dentist's, but feet that I must. Again when an audience at the close of an address is led to rise and join in singing the national anthem it is impelled to the deed by still another emotional complex of which the feelings of ” enthusiasm “ and ” reverence ” are perhaps the chief components. Since such variation exists in the feelings which propel us to action it is next in order to ask what constitutes the interest or appeal of good conduct.
2. Appeal of the Good as Inclination.
First let us take a simple case. A man who is thinking of how he shall occupy several hours of leisure happens to remember a friend who is ill and whom he has not seen for several days. ” It is only decent that I should go to see him and cheer him up a bit on this holiday,” he says to himself. No reason why he should not go occurs to his mind, nor does any contrary impulse arise. He thereupon takes hat and coat and sets out for the friend's house with a thoroughgoing sense of spontaneity, of ” doing just what he likes.“ Evidently, then, conduct which conscience pronounces good sometimes arouses simple feelings of pleasure and its appeal is the appeal of inclination.
Besides action of this kind which proceeds from a moral judgment, although of an abbreviated type, are others which result from unreflecting impulse and seem to involve no
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activity of conscience whatever. I might act thus in purchasing a paper or magazine, the illustrated cover of which catches my eye when passing a shop window. Many of these acts of thoughtless inclination must be considered as in their own slight way good. Often a moral judgment is implied in a recognition, dim but present in the margin of consciousness, that the conduct in question does not fall within any of the prohibited classes of actions. The agent if challenged would immediately state this fact and then perhaps go on to show how the action contributed to some approved end. Again, an inclination is followed without thought because it has been so often followed in the past-its immunity from criticism or disapproval during that time constituting a kind of moral validation. Habit of course enters as an important factor here. It causes actions, at first performed only after careful thought and long deliberation, to he done with the promptness and simplicity of mere impulse. It even makes conduct, which at first was exceedingly difficult and opposed by urgent desire, as easy and effective as the expression of natural inclination.
3. Appeal of the Good as Obligation.
But such a case as the first mentioned, where conscience and inclination are in perfect agreement, impresses one as the exception rather than the rule. More frequently the appeal of goodness is opposed as obligation to inclination, as what one ought, in contrast to what one inclines, to do. To keep our thought in close touch with the facts of moral experience, let us take another commonplace illustration. Suppose that a young man employed as a clerk is left for several weeks in charge of his employer's business while the latter is away from home. He promises his employer that he will be faithful in his attendance at the office during the stated hours. But on a warm summer's afternoon, when there is no prospect of a client's appearing, he is urged by friends
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to accompany them to see a ball game or boat rue. Being very fond of sport he is exceedingly anxious to go, but is restrained by the thought that such action, in violating a promise made to his employer, would be wrong. There is no doubt in this instance, which certainly exemplifies a large class, that inclination and conscience are in sharp conflict. He inclines ” with all his heart “ to join in the afternoon's sport, yet is deterred by a feeling still stronger than his inclination which enforces the conduct judged right by conscience. This is the feeling of obligation or ” oughtness,“ Which stands contrasted to that of inclination as a feeling of constraint, of coercion. The individual who feels moral obligation feels constrained to certain acts by a power or authority external to himself. The Good in this guise of authority over the inclinations of the individual is known as the Moral Law, a rule imposed upon the actions of all individuals. But while obligation differs
thus widely from inclination on the one hand, it differs as widely from real compulsion on the other. For since the individual is always conscious of freedom to choose or not to choose the right, he recognizes, that in another sense this is not an external authority, but one created by himself. He describes his experience after this manner, ” I wanted to do thus, but my duty required me, my conscience compelled me, to do otherwise. ”
As far as its essential characteristics are concerned, the feeling of moral obligation is the same whether the conduct to which it attaches is judged good on rational or on emotional grounds. In conventional morality this feeling is aroused by those forms of conduct which the individual
has learned through his training and experience to approve, -to the familiar ” duties of life “ in fact. The tendency to feel the deliverances of conscience as the exactions of a foreign power is increased by their association in customary morality with the commands of authority-divine,
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civil, parental. The moral law is thought to have its source in the highest of all authorities, the will of God. Yet even here, a consciousness of freedom to obey or disobey, leads men to distinguish the requirements made by conscience from the actual compulsion exercised by the forces of nature or the civil authorities. In rational morality the feeling of obligation attaches primarily to the idea of the Good itself, and secondarily to the actions believed to be means to its attainment. It would perhaps appear that Goodness must lose somewhat in authority through the enlightenment of conscience-being dissociated from thoughts of the Divine Omnipotence, and the Day of Judgment with its rewards and penalties, and associated only with the satisfaction of the human will. But while unenlightened morality may, through its appeal to the instinct of self-preservation, arouse the intense emotions of fear and dread, rational morality, through its appeal to higher interests and capacities, awakens feelings of inspiration and enthusiasm more permanent and reliable as the motive power of conduct. On this point Mackenzie says, with true ethical insight: ” The more we advance in the development of the moral life, the less possible does it become to point to any single rule that seems to carry its own authority with it, to any law that stands above us and says categorically, You must do this. What we find is, more and more, only the general principle that says, You ought to do what you find to be best: And what is best may vary very much in its external form, and even in its inner nature, with changing conditions, But this does not in any way destroy the absoluteness of the moral standard. It remains as true as ever that we are bound to choose the right 'in the scorn of consequence,' though it may be more difficult for us to say at any given point what precisely is right. The authority, indeed, must come home to us with a far more absolute power, when we recognize
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that it is our own law, than when we regard it as an alien force.”1
4. Conditions Under Which the Feeling of Moral Obligation Arises.
It is not difficult to explain why so remarkable a feeling as that of moral obligation, which is at once a feeling of coercion by an external authority and of attraction by a desired end, should arise in such cases as we are now discussing.. As far as present action is concerned, the agent is faced by two alternatives, one pleasant and attractive, the other unpleasant and hence unattractive. The youth in our illustration is confronted k,.v the alternative possibilities of an afternoon of sport and pleasure in the open-air or one of monotony and discomfort. in a hot and dusty office. Now had the two possible courses of action no further connections or consequences in the conduct of the individual, he must perforce choose that which in itself is pleasanter and more desirable. Our clerk would not hesitate a moment to abandon the routine of his employer's office for the freedom of the water and the field. Yet he does hesitate, and finally resolves to remain at his post. It is a fact of moral experience familiar to us all that we do often select the unpleasant alternative, the hard and unattractive course-- that we do select what we do not like or desire. Now this undoubted fact that we choose the less pleasant course shows-paradoxical as it may sound-that it is not the less but the more pleasant after all. Since it does not possess interest and attraction in its own right, it must derive them from other sources. This is precisely what it does. While the idea of being shut up within the four walls of an office during a bright summer's afternoon is not attractive, that of fulfilling the pledge to the employer, or of rising in business or profession is so, and these future ends, these more remote interests, transmit some of their
1 MACKENZIE: Manual of Ethics, Bk. 11, Chap. VI, §8.
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attractiveness to the action which is seen to be the present means to their attainment, more than counterbalancing its own unpleasantness. Thus constantly does the pleasure which attaches to the thought of performing the recognized duties of conventional morality, or attaining the Good discovered by moral reflection, communicate itself to actions in themselves unpleasant and make possible their performance ” contrary to inclination.” But in such cases the agent identifies himself with the object of present desire and treats these larger ideal considerations enforced by conscience as external influences, the exactions, in fact, of a foreign authority which he must obey. When, therefore, Goodness requires the pursuit of some larger end extending to the future or including the welfare of others, and this contrary to present inclination or selfish interest, its appeal is that of obligation.
Our view must encompass still another case in which moral obligation is felt before we can hope to reach any generalization concerning its essential significance which will apply universally. Again let us avail ourselves of the help of an illustration. A man is giving his afternoons to the systematic study of a certain subject with the intention of writing a book about it eventually. He hears of a series of concerts to be given two afternoons a week in his town. He has no particular liking for music and is disinclined to spare two afternoons a week from his study. Yet he feels that he ought to cultivate his taste for music and to develop a liking for it if possible. Hence, led by a sense of duty, and with a consciousness of contrary desire, he purchases a ticket and attends the concerts. Now in this case-and there are many resembling it-both of the conflicting ends are in the future; if there is any difference the end of inclination (writing the book) is more remote than the end of obligation (cultivating the musical taste). How does it happen, then, that the latter appeals
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as the command of an external power, the former as the fulfillment of the agent's own nature? The answer to this question reveals the fact that in last analysis the difference between obligation and inclination hinges, not upon the distinction of future from present, or of social from selfish, ends, but in a difference in the relation of the end to the human will itself. In the example used, the one end-- of writing the book--although its attainment might be postponed to the far future, was already adopted, had been for a time pursued, and was thus in a measure identified with the will of the individual. The other end, on the contrary, was entirely new and untried. It represented new territory to him, a field unexplored. Hence its appeal, in contrast to that of the end already tried and so far found satisfactory, is that of an external authority which commands the agent ” against his will. “ And so in a sense it does; for his will, -finding satisfaction in the pursuit of an object already chosen, is disinclined at first to relinquish it in order to seek another object whose nature is not well known and whose capacity to yield satisfaction is untried.
5. Significance of the Feeling of Moral Obligation.
The feeling of obligation proves, therefore, to be a necessary accompaniment of all activity of volition. The human will, in order to gain the satisfaction it seeks, must go forward from achievement to achievement. It cannot afford to remain content with any end already attained, but must ever press on to the attainment of larger and more adequate ends, until its own possibilities for achievement and satisfaction are exhausted. When the pursuit of such new and untried ends requires the sacrifice of objects able to yield present satisfaction, the feeling of obligation arises. In its essence this feeling is unique, unanalyzable, irreducible -an original and necessary factor in the process of volition. It is the call which the human will makes upon itself
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to venture into new and unknown fields, at the expense of satisfactions already achieved. It is the imperious command which intelligent volition lays upon its own nature to seek a larger and more comprehensive good. And like the appeal of the trackless ocean to the adventurous explorer, this feeling contains something of fascination in the alluring prospects of achievement held forth, something of fear in the hardships and perils suggested, and something of pain in the thought of the comfortable home left behind.
6. Kant's View of Moral Obligation.
Among moralists Immanuel Kant has given the most illuminating interpretation of the facts of moral obligation. We are now in a position to understand his famous theory--both to appreciate the profundity of his thought and to detect some of the errors which, it contains.
In Kant's view the Good always presents itself in the form of Duty. Duty is the obligation to act from reverence to law.2 That is, good action is action whose end is obedience to the Moral Law. But the Moral Law as an end appeals to the human will through the feeling of reverence which it awakens. In good conduct, therefore, the will is determined objectively by the Moral Law itself and subjectively by pure reverence for the law as a principle of action. Now since conduct is good only when prompted by pure reverence for the Moral Law it follows that action done from natural inclination can have no moral value. This Kant explicitly maintains. Even in the case of an action which is in accordance with duty-such as for instance safeguarding one's life-if it is not done for the sake of duty, but from natural inclination, it has no moral worth whatever. Duty is a principle which is not dependent upon natural inclination, but overmasters it, or
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at least allows it to have no influence whatever in determining the course of action.
The sense of obligation thus signifies the constraint exercised by the Moral Law over the human will in opposition to, or regardless of, inclinations.3 This constraint appears to thought as a command, a command which, when expressed in words, takes the form of an imperative.4 Hence it follows that the duties of morality come to us as imperatives. ” Now all imperatives command either hypothetically or categorically. A hypothetical imperative states that a thing must be done if something else which is willed or at least might be willed, is to be attained. The categorical imperative declares that an act is in itself or objectively necessary, without any reference to another end.5 5 All men by a natural necessity seek happiness. Certain actions a“re generally recognized by human intelligence to be productive of happiness. To these actions, then, when chosen as a means to happiness, a hypothetical imperative attaches. They are valued for the sake of the happiness they are expected to bring. But ” there is an imperative which directly commands an action, without presupposing as its condition that some other end is to be attained by means of that action. It has to do, not with the matter of an action and the result expected to follow from it, but simply with the form and principle from which the action itself proceeds. The action is essentially good if the motive of the agent is good, let the consequences be what they may. This imperative may be called the imperative of morality.6 Here we have before us Kant's celebrated doctrine of duty as the Categorical
3 Critique of Practical Reason, Bk. 1, Chap. III (Abbott's trans., 165).
4 This account of Kant's doctrine of the Categorical Imperative is drawn from the Metaphyic of Morality, See. 2.
5 Ibid.
6 Ibid.
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Imperative. This imperative, which bids us obey without any regard for consequences, attaches to the Moral Law. Every duty as a categorical imperative is an end sufficient in itself and never a means to anything else.
7. Goodness Not Always Different from Inclination.
Kant is certainly in error in believing that acts done from inclination never possess moral value. It is indeed little less than absurd to hold that the conduct of a person who, gladly and from a sympathetic inclination, helps another in distress, possesses no moral value, while the conduct of one who renders the same assistance reluctantly and from a hard sense of duty deserves to be called good. To be sure there are acts done from thoughtless impulse which, although productive of good, possess a minimum of moral value, as when a man from kindly impulse tosses a coin to a beggar who importunes him, without a thought as to whether the recipient is deserving or undeserving, or whether the money will go for food or intoxicant. But, oil the other hand, there are actions which, once performed with a feeling of obligation and contrary to inclination,, have through long habit become a ” second nature, “ and are, now done gladly and from desire, as in the case of a public-spirited citizen who in earlier years becomes so used to subordinating private interest to public concern that in later life he turns from the pursuit of his own ambition to the service of his country gladly, and with no sense of hardship. Such conduct, while it involves no conflict with desire and hence is accompanied by no feeling of obligation, is superior in moral value to that which is prompted by the constraint of duty, because it represents a higher level of attainment. The saint, from the stand. point of morality, is the person who having, through long years of painful self-denial and heroic struggle, subdued the flesh and overcome the world, finds the pursuit of goodness his only desire.
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Nevertheless, the facts of the moral life justify in a large measure the view of Kant. Obligation, not inclination, is the characteristic form in which the Good appeals to the human will. Moral obligation is temporary in the sense just explained that the regular performance of duty creates a new disposition which in time makes the practice easy and natural. But when this new interest is thus incorporated in the character of the agent, still further ends arise which forbid him to remain satisfied with what he has already achieved. Hence again the constraint of duty and the suppression of inclination. As long as possibilities of attainment open before man's will which require the sacrifice of present satisfaction, the pressure of obligation will be felt by the human individual. And such possibilities will be exhausted only when the Good itself is attained and the goal of moral development reached.
8. The Duties of Morality Command Not as Categorical but as Teleological Imperatives.
It is also a mistake to maintain that duty as we usually understand it has the authority of a categorical imperative. The recognized duties of morality, as important as they are, are not ends in themselves. If they were, why then, to be sure, we should tell the truth ” if the heavens fall “ or (what is more likely) we needlessly wound the feelings of our acquaintances and create continual irritation and discord; we should be honest even if the food and clothing which we will not take without the owner's permission would restore self and relieve suffering comrades; we should be brave even if in entering the burning building injuries were to be received that cause suffering and expense to self and family far outweighing the value of the articles we were able to save. But in truth these duties possess value only as means to higher ends, to human happiness and well-being--ultimately to the full satisfaction of the human will. They have no authority in their own right, but derive what they
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possess from the summum bonum, the supreme and only authority in the field of conduct. Only in conventional morality does obedience to these approved modes of action appear as an end in itself; reflection discovers it to be instrumental to the attainment of further ends. The imperative of duty is therefore not a categorical, but a teleological, imperative.
9. The Summum Bonum Alone Has the Authority of a Categorical Imperative.
When we turn to the summum bonum itself, to the realization of which the duties of conventional morality are but instruments, we find that which in truth is an end in itself and a means to nothing else. The value of the summum bonum does not depend upon its ability to lead us to some further end, but resides in its direct appeal to the human will itself-its own compelling attraction. The summum bonum, therefore, and that alone, possesses absolute authority over human conduct. And since the summum bonum must always be construed in terms of the conduct required to realize it, the absolute authority denied to the several duties in their independence is extended to them so far as they prove necessary to the attainment of the Good. In this way, the whole of the moral life is invested with the dignity and sublimity which aroused such noble enthusiasm in Kant.
“Duty! Thou sublime and mighty name that dost embrace nothing charming or insinuating, but requirest submission, and yet seekest not to move the will by threatening aught that would arouse natural aversion or terror, but merely boldest forth a law which of itself finds entrance into the mind, and yet gains reluctant reverence (though not always obedience), a law before which all inclinations are dumb, even though they secretly counter-work it; what origin is there worthy of thee, and where is to be found the root of thy noble descent which proudly rejects all kindred with the inclinations; a root to be derived from which
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is the indispensable condition of the only worth which men can give themselves.” 7
The Good is indeed worthy of all the reverence which Kant claimed for it-as an ideal it has drawn men upward with promise of a larger life and a deeper satisfaction, as an authority it has exacted obedience and sacrifice, as possessed in part it has yielded the most perfect happiness which man has experienced.
REFERENCES
KANT, Metaphysics of Morality, (Abbott's trans.).
PAULSEN, System Of Ethics, Book II, Chap V.
MACKENZIE, Manual of Ethics, Book II, Chap. III.
SPENCER, Data of Ethics, Chap. VII.
TULLY, Introduction to Ethics, Chap. V.
MUIRHEAD, Elements of Ethics, Book II, Chap. II.
GREEN, Prolegomena to Ethics, Book III, Chap. II.
MILL, Utilitarianism, Chap. III.
7 KANT: Critique of Practical Reason, Bk. I, Chap. III (Abbott's trans., p.180).
