CHAPTER III

THE PROBLEM OF ETHICS

1. How Determine What Is Good Conduct?--2. Many Ends Actually Sought Are Good only as Means.--3. To Satisfy the Will an Object Must Be an End in Itself.--4. The Problem of the Summum Bonum.--5. The Summum Bonum as the Moral Ideal. --6. The Formation of the Moral Ideal.--7. Characteristics of the Ideal.--8. Source of the Power, of the Ideal.

1. How Determine What Is Good Conduct? The aim of Ethics as a practical and normative science is to determine what conduct is good--or, as we now understand, what conduct will completely satisfy the human will. Through what line of inquiry may this aim be most effectively achieved? At the outset it should be noticed that ethical science is not compelled to invent or imagine forms of conduct that may possibly meet the requirements of goodness. Human experience presents many types of conduct or (since actions are distinguished by the ends they seek) many ends of action, and it is the business of Ethics to scrutinize these existing ideals and practices. Certain ends have been pursued by men in all periods of human history; others are characteristic of particular races and times. Among these latter sharp rivalry has frequently existed and one set of ideals has replaced another only after a bitter struggle, as when the ideals of Christianity replaced those of classical antiquity. But while Ethics should thus draw its material from the facts of human experience, it is by no means limited to a description and classification of the various forms of conduct and ideals

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of action that have figured in human history. Its work is to criticize these different ends, and such criticism requires some knowledge of the nature and demands of that power of volition which is seeking satisfaction through them--requires the presence, at least implicitly, of some standard of moral value. As it becomes more explicit, this standard of Goodness will take shape as the end or ideal which in its realization completely satisfies the human will; and although the elements which enter into the constitution of this ideal may all be drawn from existing human conduct, they may be so combined as to acquire a new meaning and a supreme importance.

2. Many Ends Actually Sought Are Good only as Means. If we look out on human life we see men engaged in the pursuit of ends which appear infinitely diverse. A closer look will show, however, that of chief ends, of leading purposes, a comparatively few, as Aristotle observed, hold the attention of the majority of mankind. Such popular ends are money and reputation and pleasure. Yet these ends prove upon examination to have value not in themselves, but only as means to something else. Take money, as an instance. It is good only for what it will buy, and not in itself. This is apparent to every one except the miser, to whom his gold seems an end in itself because his thoughts have been perverted by ceaseless efforts at money-getting. Nor is it otherwise with reputation, in the sense of fame or popularity. To be widely known in society, to be favorably spoken of by one's fellows, is good only if it bring more real and substantial benefits. Otherwise it is but a hollow sham, an empty mockery, as many who attain it have testified. In the same class are most of the objects which we behold men pursuing. Here a man is bending all his energies to secure a home for himself and family; there one is working early and late to win professional success. But all such things are good

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only as means to other things and not at all in themselves. Hence while ends of this class may well be a part of the good, their attainment can never represent the whole of goodness: they can of themselves never satisfy the human will, because they ever point further on to other ends more satisfactory than themselves.

3. To Satisfy the Will an Object Must Be an End in Itself. In contrast to the ends just mentioned stands another class of objects which, although not sought by a large proportion of mankind, are nevertheless earnestly pursued by a few. These objects do not appear as means to further ends, but as ends in themselves--or if they do serve as instruments in the attainment of other objects, then these latter turn out to be only fuller and more complete expressions of themselves. Examples of this class of ends are the knowledge pursued by the scientific investigator, and the welfare of country as sought by the patriot. In both these cases the end seems to possess value in itself; it is difficult to imagine a further good which would demand the subordination of truth or of the public welfare. Where the interests of truth appear to be thus subordinated, as in the telling of myths to children or the deception of sick persons, it is really done for the sake of a more complete truth. And a sacrifice of national welfare is demanded only when necessary for the good of humanity with which the larger interests of the nation are identified. This contrast between different classes of ends brings to light an important characteristic of the end which is entirely good. It must be an end in itself, existing for the sake of no other end, and so complete as to require the addition of no other object. For only such an end can in its realization afford full satisfaction to the human will. All other ends,, while they may afford a partial satisfaction, direct the will on to the pursuit of other objects to which they are merely instrumental.

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4. The Problem of the Summum Bonum. This object, which is an end in itself, and hence able to satisfy the human will completely, is called, in distinction from all lesser or lower goods, the Highest Good, or the summum bonum. Now the discovery of the summum bonum may be taken for the chief problem of Ethics. For only conduct which realizes this end is good conduct, and all conduct which does realize it is entirely good. Moreover, a thorough knowledge of this end must include a knowledge of the means necessary for its realization; since the supreme end, like all other ends, is an end of action, and can exist only as it is realized in conduct. Hence in discovering the summum bonum we solve the problem of what conduct is good, and thus fulfill the aim of Ethics. It is not strange, therefore, that ethical inquiry should have centered on this problem and that most discussions of morality should, since the beginning of ethical reflection, have borne

more or less directly upon the question, ” What is the summum bonum? “ The fact that the problem, not finally solved after many centuries, is still discussed, testifies both to its great import and many difficulties. For besides other difficulties the problem of the Highest Good has this one, peculiar to itself, that while the value of other ends is proved by reference to the further ends to which they contribute, the summum bonum is a means to no further end and its value can be proved only by a reference back to the will which is its source, and a demonstration of its power to satisfy completely this capacity of intelligent volition.

5. The Summum Bonum as the Moral Ideal. Since the summum bonum represents the maximum of human attainment and thus the goal of moral development for man, it has seldom if ever been realized in human experience. It is frequently realized in part, and hence one may, by a study of the different achievements of many

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individuals, observe in actual existence a large number of its constituent elements. It is also in process of realization by a multitude of lives which, while they never attain their end in the world of our experience, have discovered the direction of the goal, besides traveling a long distance towards it. The summum bonum in its completeness, therefore, does not exist actually, but only in thought and imagination--is thus an ideal. An ideal is a conception of what is most desirable in life. It is an end the thought of which arouses feeling and enthusiasm because promising largest satisfaction. Now while there are ideals in every department of human experience; yet supreme over them all is the Moral Ideal, the idea of the summum bonum. By the Moral Ideal we mean that type of conduct or character which represents the highest attainment for man, the most complete fulfillment of his nature, the fullest satisfaction of his will. As such it is none other than the Highest Good and identical with the standard of moral value. Consequently ethical inquiry is often described as a quest of the Moral Ideal.

6. The Formation of the Moral Ideal. Every end is, as we know, a product of thought whose existence depends upon the ability to judge and generalize. But many ends chosen for pursuit are particular objects limited both in time and in place to the present environment; hence they call only for the most elementary activities of cognition, such as those involved in perception and the perceptual judgment. Ideals, on the contrary, are of a universal or typical character, and are projected into the distant future; their formation, therefore, requires a degree of intellectual grasp and some constructive imagination. One might expect that as a consequence of this fact ideals would be restricted in their existence and influence to a comparatively small fraction of mankind, as alone possessing the intellectual power requisite to their formation. Yet

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such is not the case; it appears rather that the majority of men possess at some time during their lives moral and religious ideals--forecasts of future attainment, visions of excellence they hope to attain. Proof of this is furnished by the method which revivalists and mission-workers among the submerged classes frequently adopt and find effective as a means of moral betterment. They seek by devices of rhetoric and music to awaken in the minds of their auditors memories of old ideals--boyhood dreams of noble achievement, youthful aspirations for honor and integrity. With many, these ” ideals “ seem, to be sure, scarcely more than passing fancies, fleeting visions. Yet they indicate the presence in the normal human being, particularly during the period of youth and early maturity, of imaginative and intellectual ability sufficient to the formation of ideals which can give direction to life and conduct. Authorities in genetic psychology¹ tell us that the period of adolescence is the time in human life when ideals are most readily and frequently formed. It is at this time, when the higher powers of intelligence at first develop, that they play most freely and spontaneously--that imagination wings its loftiest flight and thought makes its widest sweep. At this period the individual first becomes conscious of, the present in its relation to the past ever receding behind, and the future stretching away before. Awakening also to a sense of his own selfhood in its connection with other selves, he is led almost inevitably to project into the future an idea of himself achieving what he most desires, and thus attaining his Highest Good. Then it is that the boy sees himself in possession of great wealth and owning houses and lands, yachts and horses; or as a statesman influencing the policies of nations; or as a physician, alleviating the ills of thousands of his suffering fellow-beings.

1    STANLEY HALL: Adolescence, Vol. 11, Chaps. XI-XVI.

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7. Characteristics of the Ideal. An ideal in order to be effective in moral development must be an expression of what, is latent in the character of the agent and within the range of his possible attainment. It must appeal to the individual as the legitimate outcome of his own nature, the realization of the possibilities inherent in his own situation, the fulfillment of his own deepest desires. If these conditions are not fulfilled, the ideal will either prove unattainable and the agent in his discouragement will abandon all endeavor, or its attainment will fail to bring the expected satisfaction and he will be rendered skeptical of all moral values. For these reasons it is necessary that each individual construct his own ideal. While he may be assisted in this task by information given and influence wisely exerted, yet when this influence extends so far as to cause him to adopt as his own an ideal which is not rooted in his own nature and capacities, it does far more harm than good. The ideal should always represent the unrealized possibilities of the actual. As Professor Dewey says with truth. “To set up ideals of perfection which are other than the serious recognition of the possibilities of development resident in each concrete situation is in the end to pay ourselves with sentimentalities, if not with words, and meanwhile it is to direct thought and energy away from the situations which need and which welcome the perfecting care of attention and affection.”²

Although it is true that the ideal should be based upon the actual abilities of the agent and be relative to the existing circumstances of his life, it is equally true that in order to awaken enthusiasm and inspire effort.the ideal must be raised far above the actual and represent a height of attainment which appears impossible enough to all save the enraptured idealist. It is this height of the ideal above the actual with all its negations that invests it with

2    DEWEY AND TUFTS: Ethics, p. 422.

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such fascination and glamor--that makes the pursuit of it a romantic adventure. It is indeed unfortunate when a human being stakes his life upon the realization of an ideal which is altogether beyond his capacity to attain if he had a dozen lives to live; for then a bitter disappointment, a crushing sense of failure, are the reward of his life's endeavor. But the fact never to be forgotten is that we cannot predict what is possible or impossible with a human individual before he actually tries it. The greatest of human achievements have been due to the promptings of ideals which sensible, practical people would have denounced as visionary and absurd in their first adoption. If man is really to attain, therefore, he must have the courage to venture; he cannot afford to wait until assured of success before making his endeavor. Emerson's familiar maxim, “Hitch your wagon to a star,” is sound, both psychologically and ethically. A lofty ideal, even when accompanied by no knowledge of how it is to be realized, may provoke enthusiasm and effort sufficient to devise new methods, overcome old obstacles, and finally to place the agent upon a level of attainment far higher than he would have reached had he chosen a lower ideal, the road to whose realization lay open before him.

8. Source of the Power of the Ideal.

No intelligent student of history can doubt the tremendous influence of the Ideal upon human conduct. The ancient ideal of civic virtue led large numbers of Greek and Roman citizens to devote their lives wholly to their country's welfare. The Christian ideal of service and self-sacrifice has inflamed the hearts of later thousands with missionary ardor, causing them to dedicate themselves to a life of labor for humanity's good. The modern ideal of loyalty to Truth has prompted a multitude of men to pursue scientific investigations with unflagging zeal, and in the face of hardship and persecution, in order that, as the result

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of their efforts, man's store of available knowledge should be increased. The secret of the power of the Moral Ideal over the lives of men lies in its appeal to the larger possibilities of man as a spiritual being--ultimately, in these higher psychic capacities themselves, which enlarge man's horizon beyond the limits of his present situation and organic needs and bring him into touch with Universal Reality. The Ideal attracts and inspires because it represents the complete fulfillment of man's powers as a voluntary agent--the attainment of the highest human good.

REFERENCES

ARISTOTLE, Nicomachean Ethics (Welldon's trans.), Book I.
MACKENZIE, Manual of Ethics, Book I, Chap. I.
SETH, Ethical Principles, Introduction, Chap. I, §§ 3-7.
PALMER, The Nature of Goodness, Chaps. I, II.
GREEN, Prolegomena to Ethics, Book III,.Chap. I.
LESLIE STEPHEN, Science of Ethics, Chap. II.