CHAPTER II

THE METHOD OF ETHICS
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1. Ethics as a Practical Science.--2. Ethics as a Normative Science.--3. The Human Will the Ground of Moral Value.--4. Other Practical Sciences: (a) Technical.--5. (b) Intellectual, and-- 6. (e) Aesthetic.--7. Other Normative Sciences.--8. Conclusion.

1. Ethics as a Practical Science. The method of Ethics is consequent upon the character of its subject-matter. As the science of conduct, Ethics is necessarily a is “practical ” science. In order to make clear what is meant by such a practical science we may contrast it in aim and method with theoretical science, although-as will appear later-the distinctions we make are only provisional. A theoretical science is concerned with the knowledge of objects as facts. It investigates the conditions under which they exist, seeking to discover the other objects with which they are necessarily connected. The aim of such science

is to ascertain in this way the nature and connection of all existing objects, explaining the existence of each one as a necessary consequence of the existence of another, its antecedent or cause. Geology is a science of this kind. It seeks to know the facts concerning the earth's structure, to discover the order of events in its history. It explains the existence of objects at present observable, e.g. sedimentary rocks, by connecting them with other objects and agencies which preceded them in the past and stand as their causes. A practical science, on the contrary, is concerned primarily with the realization of objects a§ ends of action. To be sure. purposive action is a fact, the

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conditions of whose existence may be investigated according to the method of theoretical science. The work of Ethics is greatly aided by a -knowledge of the history of the different forms of conduct and of the natural agencies that have influenced their existence and development. But such knowledge is only prefatory to ethical science proper, which is interested in conduct, not as a series of events causally connected, but as a means intelligently employed in the realization of chosen ends. As a practical science, then, Ethics seeks to discover through what actions the ends of human conduct may be realized. With the introduction of objects as ends to be realized a new conception enters, of great importance in all sciences of practice, i.e. value. Value is possessed by objects, not in their mere existence but in their relation to conscious intelligence. Whatever is required to satisfy a need or fulfill a capacity of an intelligent being has value. The fact that an object is chosen for pursuit by a voluntary agent shows he is unsatisfied without it, and that, in promising relief to his want, the object has value. Objects whose realization is sought by mankind in general may, therefore, be regarded as necessary for the satisfaction of the human will and, hence, possessed of value. This value is communicated to all actions which are required as means to their attainment. The work of Ethics as a practical science may then be said to be the discovery of what conduct thus has value or, more definitely (although the criterion of distinction has not yet been supplied), moral value. Ethics is a practical science, therefore, whose aim is to discover what conduct has moral value.

2. Ethics as a Normative Science. Upon the distinction between existence and value hinges the difference in method between the descriptive and the normative sciences. Descriptive sciences are composed of judgments of fact or existence. These judgments are so organized in each

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science that the resulting body of knowledge correctly reflects the nature and connection of objects existing in a certain field of human experience. The “natural” sciences thus aim at a complete description of the phenomena of nature, each investigating the behavior of objects and the order of events in a particular part of the world. Normative sciences are composed of judgments of worth. Their aim is to evaluate, to appreciate. They are concerned, not with what is, but with what ought to be. They imply the possibility of a choice between objects differing in value, with consequent obligation to choose the best. Now it is possible to estimate the worth of objects or actions only when we have some standard to which they should conform, by which their value may be measured. Indeed, when the true standard of value in a field is once clearly defined its application is comparatively easy. Hence the first and most important task of any normative science is to discover the standard or norm by which worth may be estimated in its field.

Ethics belongs in the group of normative sciences. It has work of description to accomplish, to be sure, in describing existent practices and beliefs of human society and explaining the manner of their evolution.. But this work is of minor importance as compared to the task of evaluating conduct, which falls to the duty of Ethics. When the normative method is thus accepted as proper to Ethics, the question of the standard of value in the field of conduct is immediately raised to the greatest prominence. For conduct cannot be evaluated without some standard or criterion by which the worth of different actions may be tested. As that to which all actions should conform, such a standard must itself be some form of conduct, or end, realized in action. An end of action in order thus to act as a standard must itself possess full value, that is, completely satisfy the will which seeks it.

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That end, which in its realization possesses full value, and hence may be used as a standard for evaluating conduct, is called the Good. To discover what action or end of action may be accepted as the Good or standard of value in the field of conduct, and then to apply this standard, judging those actions which conform to the standard to be good and those which do not to be bad, is the task of Ethics as a normative science. In brief, it is the science of good conduct. This conception of the task of Ethics is essentially the same as that reached when we considered it as a science of practice. It has been suggested that there. is a real difference between the two methods, inasmuch as the normative science is occupied exclusively with discovering the ideal or standard, while the practical science is concerned only with the conditions of its realization. But this difference is simply one of emphasis; the two kinds of inquiry cannot be separated. It is - impossible to determine how human conduct shall achieve its end unless we have adequate knowledge of the end itself, and a complete understanding of the end includes knowledge of the actions involved in its realization.

3. The Human Will the Ground of Moral Value.-- Ethics is a practical and normative science, and its business is to determine what conduct satisfies the human will and hence is. good, and what conduct fails in this respect, and is therefore bad. Moral value thus attaches to all voluntary action and is grounded in the will itself, the source of all such action. It should be recognized, however, that when in this way we base moral value upon the demands of the human will we do not, as might appear, prejudge the whole question of what conduct is good. Good action may be action which promotes social welfare, or increases selfish pleasure, or glorifies God, for all that is known at the present stage of the investigation; the fact which we now emphasize is the fundamental psychological one, that if

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any of these objects is to become an end of action it must appeal to the human will. All value, that is to say, in the whole field of conduct refers back to that capacity of intelligent volition of which conduct itself is the expression. Now' we have knowledge of this power of volition only as it is manifested in our own human experience. Hence any scientific investigation of moral value, all empirical study of Ethics in fact, must be based upon an analysis of the needs and capacities of the human will and of the conditions of its expression in human life.

4. Other Practical Sciences.- (a) Technical.

In describing Ethics as a practical science we put it in the class of such sciences as agriculture and medicine, generally recognized as practical. It will throw further light upon the task of Ethics if we consider its relation to these other sciences which are more obviously practical, or even technical, in their method.

Since Ethics is concerned with the whole of human conduct, it is evident that the other practical sciences must have their fields within the inclusive domain of Ethics. Such is the case, each of these sciences being occupied with a certain department of human conduct and attempting to. determine what actions are necessary in order that the ends peculiar to this department of life be realized. Indeed, the fields of all the well-known practical sciences fall within one large department of conduct-that of “practice,” in the narrow meaning which excludes both the intellectual and the emotional, or aesthetic. It is in this sense that we use the word when we speak of a person as eminently i i practical. “We do not mean that such a person is equally skilled in all departments of life, in the activities of thought as well as outward performance. Our reference is rather to a particular kind of conduct-to skill in a certain mode of activity-that of adapting means to the ends of intelligence. It will prevent confusion to call

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this mode of conduct the technical rather than the “practical.” Technical activity consists, not in thinking of ends or ideals, nor in enjoying them in contemplation, but in devising methods, in inventing instruments, for their attainment. It is exercised chiefly in the outer world in adapting the objects and forces of nature to the uses of human intelligence. The prominence of this kind of activity in human life has been so great that it has seemed to cover the whole field of conduct itself--“action” and “practice” being identified with outward performance, visible execution. But even technical activity--not to mention conduct itself with its still greater scope--cannot be limited to the manipulation of material objects and physical forces in the external world. It is exercised in the political and social as well as the mechanical spheres. A plan for workingmen's compensation or a system of life-insurance is as much. a product of intelligent technique as a steam engine or a mining process.

There are many practical sciences concerned with the use of technical skill in the different special fields of human experience. These sciences aim to prescribe in detail the rules which must be followed, the methods which must be used, the agencies which must be employed, in one special field or another, if the purpose appropriate to that field is to be realized. Thus the science of bridge-building tells of the material which must be employed and of the plan which must be followed in construction, in order that a bridge may be built adapted to the purposes of human intercourse and commerce. Any plan or device required as a means or instrument in a special field--whether it be a tool, or machine, a medicine, or a political institution--has, of course, technical value. As technique is a branch of conduct, so technical value is a species of moral value. In fact they are riot distinguished in name, and we speak of a good engine or a good remedy,--that the cantilever,

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say, is a good bridge for this situation, when we mean that the device in question is an effective instrument for accomplishing its end. It would contribute to clearness if we adopted a term distinctive of technical value, such as efficiency, and spoke of an efficient engine, remedy, law, etc. The technical sciences fall into groups in accordance with the fields to which they are applied. In the inorganic sphere, the world of matter and motion, we find many technical sciences, all concerned with the conquest of nature and the employment of its forces in the service of man. The science of mining prescribes the methods which must be followed if ores are to be extracted from the earth most efficiently. The science of agriculture tells how the soil must be treated if it is to yield the largest returns. The sciences of engineering are discovering how materials may be utilized, and natural forces employed, for the increase of man's convenience and comfort. Besides these, there are others in the same group too numerous to mention, such as carpentry, bridge-building, etc. Coming into the organic or animate sphere we find the practical sciences of animal husbandry, which tell how animals must be housed and fed and bred if they' are to be most serviceable to man as sources of food, carriers of burdens, etc. In the closely related field of human life are found the sciences, of hygiene which prescribes the rules which man must observe if he is to retain his health, and of medicine, which indicates the remedies he must use to cure disease. Going on to the still higher fields of society and politics, we find still another group of technical sciences--those of trade and commerce, of the practice of law and government, of education, etc.

5. (b) Intellectual.

Another department of conduct is that of thought, or intellectual activity. We so frequently contrast the theoretical with the practical that it is difficult

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to think of thought or theory as a branch of practice. Yet, if by conduct is meant voluntary action, it is certainly such; for ends are chosen and pursued in the field of thought and imagination as well as in the field of technique. The work of the scientific investigator, who spends years of thought over a problem with the purpose of discovering the truth about it, and thus adding to the sum of human knowledge, is sufficient proof of this. The aim of intellectual activity is to gain ideas which ” agree with reality,“ i.e. are true. The end of thinking is always the discovery of truth. A practical science of thought is needed, therefore, which shall state the requirements to which thinking must conform if it is to reach true conclusions. We have such a science in Logic, the science of correct thinking. Moreover, all of the special sciences, commonly designated as theoretical or descriptive, are in a sense practical, inasmuch as each tells the conditions under which facts may be experienced in a particular field. Thus such a science as Chemistry, which has been termed theoretical in contrast to a practical science like Ethics, because its aim is to describe existent objects rather than to tell how objects may be realized as ends, may itself be regarded as a practical science in so far as it seeks to discover the ways in which material substances must be regarded in order to reveal the facts of their constitution. There are, of course, as many of such sciences as there are different parts of the experienced world, each concerned with the discovery of truth in its field. The distinction between theoretical and practical as applied to the method of the sciences now appears neither absolute nor final. Theory turns out to be a department of practice, and the theoretical sciences to be themselves practical sciences concerned with the attainment of a distinctive end--Truth. The difference between Ethics and the theoretical sciences is not, consequently, that Ethics is

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concerned with the realization of ends while these sciences are not, but rather that Ethics is concerned with all the ends required to satisfy the will in every department of its activity, while they are interested in the attainment of one special end alone.

6. (c) Aesthetic.

A third department of conduct is the aesthetic. The aim of aesthetic activity is the production of a type of feeling--not that pleasure which always accompanies the attainment, of desired objects, but pure or disinterested pleasure. Such ” disinterested “ pleasure and it is the only case where pure feeling is made an end. is produced through the contemplation of certain objects which set the perceptive and imaginative faculties in free and harmonious play. Perceptions and images (mostly of sight and sound) able to effect this end and produce the enjoyment in question are recognized as having Aesthetic value and are judged beautiful. In order that aesthetic pleasure may be experienced it is necessary that objects of a definite character be present and that their presence be accompanied by such subjective conditions as interest, attention, etc. The practical science of Aesthetics endeavors to determine the conditions, both objective and subjective, which must be fulfilled if the “sense of beauty” is to be awakened. Thus on the side of the object Aesthetics investigates, for example, what proportions figures must have to please the eye, and how tones may be combined to give pleasure to the ear; while on the subjective side it studies the effect that psychic conditions, such as love for the object and intimate knowledge of it, have upon the aesthetic experience. Besides the general science of Aesthetics there are many particular sciences, which prescribe the rules which must be followed if the effect of beauty is to be produced in various special fields. Such are the sciences of Drawing, of Music, of Architecture, etc.

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7. Other Normative Sciences. The fact that thought and feeling are fields of conduct in which. ends are chosen and attained is witnessed by the classification of normative sciences which is generally adopted. Besides Ethics two other normative sciences are recognized--Logic and Aesthetics-Logic seeking to discover the requirements of Truth as the intellectual ideal and to evaluate modes of thinking by this standard; and Aesthetics in a like manner attempting to define the ideal of Beauty and, with this criterion, to pass judgment upon natural objects and artistic products. This classification of normative sciences is somewhat misleading, however, since it places Ethics upon an equal footing with Logic and Aesthetics, and makes the ideal of Goodness coordinate with the ideals of Truth and Beauty. Thus man, as an intelligent being, is said to possess three capacities, those of Thought and Will and Feeling; intellectual value or Truth belongs to those ideas which satisfy him as a thinking being, moral value or

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Goodness belongs to those actions which satisfy him as a voluntary agent, Aesthetic value or Beauty belongs to those presentations which satisfy him as an emotional being.

Such a division of man's psychic capacities, while useful for certain purposes, has unfortunate results when applied in the present connection. It does not indicate the true relation of the fields of Logic, Ethics, and Aesthetics, nor of the ideals that govern in each field. When will is thus put on an equal footing with the other faculties it is necessarily taken as exclusive of thought and feeling, and hence made identical with action in the narrower sense. The sphere of Ethics then becomes that of outward performance, of what we have called technical activity--adjustment and adaptation--and, in consequence of this limitation, its ideal of Goodness loses all authority over the intellectual and aesthetic fields. Now the truth is that will is the inclusive factor; value attaches to objects only as ends of volition, and this applies in the spheres of thought and feeling as well as that of “action.” Hence all value is primarily moral value or Goodness. But volition is exercised in different departments of life, in the pursuit of various classes of objects; there are, consequently, special kinds of value, included within, and subordinated to, moral value. In the intellectual sphere ideas are sought which agree with reality and, to such ideas, intellectual value or truth is attributed; in the technical sphere agencies are sought which subserve the purposes of intelligence and,

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to such instruments, technical value or efficiency is attributed; in the aesthetic sphere objects are sought which in mere contemplation awaken the feeling of pleasure, and, to such objects, aesthetic value or beauty is attributed. But in each case the value is also, and primarily, moral value because it attaches to the objects as ends chosen and pursued by will. Goodness belongs to all objects which as ends satisfy the capacity of volition; truth to those ends which satisfy volition in its intellectual sphere, and beauty to those ends which satisfy volition in its aesthetic sphere.

Ethics as a normative science is not coordinate with Logic and Aesthetics, therefore, but comprehensive of them; and the ideal of Goodness not of equal authority with those of Truth and Beauty, but supreme over both.

8. Conclusion.

Our brief survey of the practical and normative sciences other than Ethics has served to emphasize its inclusive and fundamental character. Special practical sciences cover, as we have seen, nearly the whole field of conduct in its three departments of thought and feeling and action. The need and importance of Ethics is not due to the fact that its subject-matter is new and unexplored, therefore, but to the fact that to Ethics alone belongs the task of investigating the field of conduct as a whole, of discovering its governing principles, and making clear the relation of its essential parts. Ethics is the comprehensive science of human life itself.

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REFERENCES

SETH, Ethical Principles, Introduction, Chap. II.
WUNDT, Ethics (English trans.), Vol. I, Introduction.
MUIRHEAD, Elements of Ethics, Book I, Chaps. II, III.
PAULSEN, System of Ethics (English trans.), Introduction.
THILLY, Introduction to Ethics, Chap. I.
SIDGWICK, Methods of Ethics, Book I, Chap. I.
MACKENZIE, Manual of Ethics, Introduction, Chaps. I, II
MEZES, Ethics, Descriptive and Explanatory, Chap. I.