PART ONE
ETHICS AS THE SCIENCE OF GOOD CONDUCT
CHAPTER I
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1. The Meaning of Conduct.--2. Essential Features of Voluntary Action.--3. Voluntary Action Defined.--4. In Voluntary Action an Object Is Conceived as End.--5. Is Distinguished from Present Actuality.--6. And Chosen in Preference to Other Ideal Possibilities.--7. Because of Its Appeal to the Character of the Agent.--8. Which Gains Expression Through Its Attainment.--9. Ethics Is Concerned with the Whole of Human Conduct.--10. Objections to This View.
1. The Meaning of Conduct.
Ethics may be described as the science of conduct, provided that conduct itself is defined with sufficient strictness. It is natural to think of the term “conduct” as synonymous with the word “action.” But action is defined by Psychology as movement having conscious antecedents and concomitants,1 and evidently is possible with animals as well as men; while the field of morality has always been limited by the common reason of mankind to the sphere of human action. The same difficulty arises if with Spencer2 we define conduct as the adjustment of acts to ends; since when thus defined it includes the action of all living creatures. If the word is used to signify the subject-matter of Ethics, therefore, conduct must be defined as voluntary action and thus limited to the human sphere. For only to such action does responsibility attach and are the moral predicates properly applicable. Ethics is then the science of conduct when by conduct is understood voluntary action.
1 TITCHENER: Outline of Psychology, § 61.
2 SPENCER: Data of Ethics, Chap. 1, § 2.
3
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2. Essential Features of Voluntary Action. It will assist us in our present undertaking--that of determining the nature of voluntary action--if we consider briefly some of the essential features of this type of action before attempting its formal definition.
In the first place, voluntary action always involves some kind of activity or change. Usually it involves change of position in space, or movement. So generally is this the case as to suggest that movement is a universal and necessary accompaniment of all volition. Yet such is not the fact if visible movement is meant. For thinking--the thinking of one who aims to reach a definite conclusion--which is certainly voluntary, and deserves to be classed as conduct, may be unaccompanied by any visible movement. It is true that even here many psychologists maintain that small invisible movements occur within the body of the thinker,, and constitute an essential element in his activity.3 However this may be, it is certain that activity of some sort, a series of changes possessing a measure of continuity and direction, characterizes all voluntary action.
Now a stream which rushes down a hillside, turning away to avoid large boulders, making a quiet pool here and a rapid torrent there, exhibits this feature of activity; it passes through a series of changes which are continuous and all directed towards one result. Yet no.,one would think of regarding the activity of the stream as voluntary. The reason most obvious is that the movement of the water has no conscious conditions or accompaniments. We discover then a second feature which is essential to voluntary action--the presence of consciousness. Because they are not conscious, all changes occurring in inanimate objects
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(and in plants as well) are excluded from the sphere of voluntary action.
Suppose, in the second place, that consciousness of a comparatively simple form should be present and produce activity. A bull, aroused by the sight of a scarlet jersey worn by a man who is traversing the pasture, rushes upon him, goring and trampling him. Here we have activity with conscious conditions and concomitants. The perception of the red object “angered” the bull and prompted him to attack the person displaying the obnoxious color. Yet we should not call the action voluntary or hold the animal morally responsible for it. If asked why not, we should probably reply that the animal did not “know what it was doing,” and our meaning would be that while the act had its source in certain images and feelings in the animal consciousness, still it was accompanied by no knowledge which could foresee the suffering and death of the man or understand any of its consequences. Evidently, therefore, foreknowledge involving some ability to generalize upon the past and to anticipate the future is a necessary feature of Voluntary action. The addition of this element of foreknowledge to volition rules out of the field & conduct all animal action except possibly occasional acts of a few species of the higher animals such as the dog and monkey, which some authorities believe to be capable of an elementary form of judgment and hence able to act with a limited degree of foreknowledge.4
Finally we can imagine activity conditioned by consciousness and accompanied by foreknowledge, which is nevertheless not voluntary. Imagine a motorist turning down the center of a road in the middle of which some children are playing, expecting, if they do not run out
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of the road, to turn his machine to one side or bring it to a stop. Suppose that the children do not move and the driver, owing to some break in the machinery, is unable at the last moment to stop or turn his car. The ensuing action might with fairness be said to have its condition in the consciousness of the driver, since he consciously gave direction to the machine, and was accompanied by a second's clear foreknowledge of the results on his part. The same situation would exist if we imagined a prisoner of war having his finger pressed forcibly by his captors upon a key which he knew would explode a mine and destroy one of his own country's ships. We have in both of these cases-which, to be sure, make somewhat extravagant demands upon the imagination but are quite possible-acts conditioned by consciousness and accompanied by foreknowledge. We should not dream of regarding them as voluntary, however; because they are not intentional. A fourth feature essential to voluntary action has been found. Not merely must the act have its source in a conscious process, and its results be in a measure foreseen, but the act and its results must be intended, i.e. they must be consciously chosen, be preferred and sought after as ends.
3. Voluntary Action Defined. At least four factors then enter into voluntary action: (1) activity, (2) consciousness, (3) knowledge, and (4) intention. In order to be voluntary an action must have its source in consciousness, its results must be in a measure foreknown, and also intended. The fourth of these factors of course includes the second and third; an act can be intended only if it is conscious and its result is foreseen. When the outcome of action is thus intended it becomes an end or aim and, as chosen by the agent, determines the nature and course of his activity. To the pursuit and attainment of this end all his action is made a means. Gathering up in a single statement these different characteristics, voluntary action
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may be defined as action in pursuit of a consciously chosen end,. Let us consider in further detail this mode of activity, distinguishing the steps which enter necessarily into its regular procedure.
4. In Voluntary Action an Object Is Conceived as an End. All voluntary action is determined by the idea of an object conceived as an end. This end or aim by which the will is directed in its activity is of necessity a product of thought and imagination. Usually the object which is sought is not present to the senses, and hence must be imagined or thought of. But even when the object desired is present in perception, if it is to act as an end it must be related in an intelligible way to certain ideas. With the object sought, whether perceived or imagined, must be associated ideas of the means or movements necessary to secure it, and some conception of the satisfaction which will result from obtaining it. Ideas of the two classes last named serve to relate the object to the agent himself, make it an object for him, i.e. an end. Because the object has this connection with the needs and capacities of the agent it interests and attracts him. This Attractive quality belonging to the end is signified in the consciousness of the agent by a pleasant feeling which suffuses and colors the whole complex of ideas which we have been describing. An illustration will make clearer the nature and relation of these different constituents which go to make up the end. Suppose that after I have settled down to my evening's reading I discover that I have not a needed book in my possession. At once the idea of going to the library for the missing book occurs to my mind. The book in the library thus comes to be thought of as an end of action. The book itself as a specific object is imagined-the image may be reproductive and I see in my fancy the back of the. book as it appears on the shelf or feel the roughness of its binding when in my hand, or I may have a verbal image, seeing the words of
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the title printed out or hearing them spoken. With the idea of the book as thus imagined are associated ideas more or less vague of the movements I must make to procure the book-motor images of the movements incidental upon rising from my chair, leaving the room, walking across the campus, and even of reaching up to take the book from its accustomed place on the shelf. Finally there is added an idea of the result of the action, of the opportunity which the possession of the book will give me to complete successfully my evening's work. The thought of thus finishing my work pleases me and its pleasantness spreads over the whole combination of ideas which thus becomes interesting and attractive to me. This complex of ideas with its pleasant tone, which is formed in much less time than it takes to describe it, may be accepted as a typical end.
5. Is Distinguished from Present Actuality. The end as conceived or imagined belongs strictly to the ideal sphere and thus is set in sharp opposition to objects which actually exist or are in present possession. This opposition of the end as ideal or imagined, to the present and actual, is essential to its nature and office as end; for precisely because it does not actually exist, while it does interest and attract, the thought of_ the end arouses the agent to action. The opposition between the ideal and the actual, due to the thought of an end unattained, introduces strain and tension into the consciousness of the agent. His present condition is rendered unpleasant or even painful because its continued existence precludes the attainment of the object. He is made restless and uneasy in the actual by the possibilities held forth by the ideal. Thus, in the illustration of the book wanted from the library, the thought of securing it makes me discontented with the facilities of my own library, distracts my attention from other tasks I might perform, and causes me genuine uneasiness and discomfort.
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6. And Chosen in Preference to Other Ideal Possibilities. Voluntary action requires that the end be not merely distinguished from actually existing objects but also be chosen in preference to all other ideal possibilities. These possibilities may take the form of several clearly imagined alternatives to the end finally realized. Then deliberation ensues over the desirability of these rival ends, with an attempt to foresee the consequences involved in the various possibilities of action, as when one debates between different possibilities of route and destination in a coming holiday excursion. Or the alternative possibilities may be present only by implication. In many cases of voluntary action there is no debate between conflicting objects; indeed it is often true that only one possibility of action is consciously considered. Yet in all action truly voluntary, the possibility of not performing the action, of not seeking the end, enters in some form into the consciousness of the agent. His present condition, contrasted as actual with the idea of the end, becomes, in the idea of its continuance into the future, itself an ideal possibility. I am aware, with more or less conscious clearness, of the possibility of continuing to sit in my easy-chair before the study-fire as an alternative to going to the library in the rain for the needed book. Consequent upon this feature of voluntary action, the feelings which accompany it are further complicated. While the idea of procuring the needed book is itself' pleasant, the steps which must be taken to attain this end--those of leaving my comfortable chair and going out on an inclement night--are in thought highly unpleasant. And while my present condition of need for the book is unpleasant and irritating, the thought of remaining where I am in contrast to going after the book is very pleasant. Hence arises that baffling confusion of pleasant and unpleasant feeling which is attendant upon hesitation and decision.
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Besides being contrasted with other possibilities of action, an end must be chosen or selected from among them if it is to be voluntarily realized. This choice consists in fixation of the attention upon one end, to the exclusion of all other alternatives. Thus to hold attention upon one end requires effort, since it involves a resisting of the attractions of other objects which are often very powerful. Modern psychology has taught us that the effort involved in volition is effort of the attention in holding an idea in the focus of consciousness despite all influences working to crowd it out, and not effort exercised in energizing unwilling muscles and in moving laggard limbs to carry out the fiat of consciousness. Let the idea be attended to, the psychologist tells us, and it will work itself out. This does not mean, however, that only effort enough need be exerted to bring the idea of the end once within the circle of clearest consciousness, thus forcing out for the time being all other attractive possibilities. On the contrary, protracted effort is often required to hold the idea fast in the focus of attention while the steps necessary for its realization are serially thought of and taken--else the idea of a conflicting aim will seize the attention and interrupt the action in its performance. Thus I may have to keep the idea of the desired book in the forefront of my thoughts until well on the way to the library, lest the thoughts of the comforts of chair and fire be sufficient to turn me back before I have passed the door.
7. Because of Its Appeal to the Character of the Agent. Such choice of an end of action must itself have some cause or ground. Selection can occur only where there is some basis or criterion for comparing the different alternatives. In voluntary action choice is determined by the character of the agent, as this is reflected in his consciousness at the time of decision. The conscious processes
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which thus represent the character of the agent in determining his choice vary greatly in the degree of their complexity and of their adequacy to the character they express. At the one extreme we have choice determined by the simple memory-image of a past experience in which the individual sought and gained a similar object with pleasant results to himself, as a person might select and purchase a certain kind of fruit because it had particularly pleased his taste on a former occasion. The opposite extreme is given in instances of selection based upon a large purpose or comprehensive ideal which has been built up as the result of years of thought and experience, and whose bearing upon the present situation is discovered after a period of deliberation. The decision of a man to accept public office at a pecuniary sacrifice, because in his ideal of life public service stands higher than private ambition, would be an illustration in point. The important fact is that the nature of the agent determines his choices. Hence if action is really voluntary it is, as Aristotle recognized, an expression of character--of some comparatively permanent disposition or attribute in the nature of the individual who performs it.5 This is the reason why we are justified in holding individuals responsible for their voluntary acts. If I decide to go to the library in search of the missing book the ground of my choice must, rest in my own nature. It may be my interest in the subject I am studying, or a habit I have formed of pursuing to completion a task I have undertaken, or some other trait or disposition which influences my choice, but in any case the act, if voluntary, has its source in myself.
8. Which Gains Satisfaction Through Its Attainment. When the end chosen is attained through action the tension between ideal aim and actual condition is
5 ARISTOTLE: Nicomachean Ethics, Bk. II, Chap. III (Welldon's trans., p. 42).
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relieved and its unpleasantness allayed. The end which is thought of and desired is made an actual possession of the agent, and thus unity and equilibrium are restored to his consciousness. This state of unity, regained through the inclusion of an object desired and sought for, is itself pleasant and is experienced by the agent as satisfaction--the pleasant consciousness of success in giving expression to his character. With such feelings of satisfaction I begin my work again after returning from the library with the object of my quest, pleased that I have not allowed an obstacle which could thus be removed to interfere with the prosecution of my evening's labors.
Finally, it should be observed that the steps just described are not in any sense separable or independent, nor is voluntary action merely the sum or sequence of them thus conceived. On the contrary, each voluntary act is a vital unity within which the different steps or activities just distinguished are joined in. close organic interdependence. Each voluntary act is a pulsation in the life of intelligence, a moment in the expression of personality.
9. Ethics Is Concerned with the Whole of Human Conduct. If conduct, thus understood as voluntary action, is taken for the subject-matter of Ethics, then it is obvious that this science will be limited in its scope to the field of human action; for man alone among living species is capable of acting in pursuit of a consciously chosen end. Within the limits of human life, however, Ethics is concerned, not with a part, but with the whole of conduct. It is the comprehensive science of human practice,' and, since all intelligent life has its source in will, may be said to be the science of human life itself. In a real sense, then, conduct is not a fraction, but the whole of human life, and all of the activity by which man's personality gains expression falls within the field of Ethics. Necessarily, Ethics is general in its treatment, leaving a detailed
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consideration of special activities to subordinate sciences and confining itself to the essential characteristics and fundamental principles of conduct.
10. Objections to This View. Objections of two different kinds may arise to this view of the subject-matter of Ethics. According to the first we have made the field. of Ethics too narrow in thus limiting it to voluntary action. For, it is urged, we hold men responsible for actions that clearly are not voluntary. Acts done from fixed habit, such as the striking of a blow or the utterance of an oath when angry, might be cited as examples. Certainly such acts are frequently without intention, and hence, when considered in isolation, appear as involuntary. They are not properly understood when thus isolated, however; but must rather be conceived as the outcome of a series of acts, the first of which were intended, and voluntary, and for which the agent was responsible. The habit itself is voluntarily initiated if not the single act, and we properly hold the agent responsible for it and for all the action it entails. Much the same can be said of acts recognized as “accidental” but for which we hold the individual responsible and inflict censure or punishment. While the act itself is strictly unintentional and involuntary, it results from a lack of care and attention which has voluntary origin and for which responsibility is justly incurred.
The second objection is of just the opposite character and rests upon the opinion that not all voluntary action has moral significance. Hence, it is claimed, we make the field of Ethics too broad when we identify it with the sphere of voluntary action. Herbert Spencer was of this opinion, and his illustration of conduct which is ethically indifferent has become classic.
As already said, a large part of ordinary conduct is indifferent. Shall I walk to the waterfall today? Or shall I ramble along the seashore? Here the ends are ethically indifferent. U I go
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to the waterfall, shall I go over the moor or take the path through the wood? Here the means are ethically indifferent. And from hour to hour most of the things we do are not to be judged as either good or bad in respect of either end or means.6
Professor Dewey agrees with Spencer on this point.7 He believes that when one end is taken for granted and out of its connection with other ends, the question of the means employed in its realization is one of technique rather than of morals. “It is a question of taste and of skill--of personal preference and of practical wisdom, or of economy, expediency.” Thus if the matter of the afternoon walk stand alone and have no bearing upon, or conflict with, other aims or interests, then the choice of a path to follow is an affair of individual taste or practical expediency and has no ethical significance. Only when the value of the proposed end is felt to be incompatible with that of another, appealing to a different kind of interest or tendency, do we have a truly moral situation in the view of the latter writer. But, as a matter of fact, ends can be thus considered out of relation to other ends, and to their ultimate consequences, only by artifice and abstraction. All the ends consciously chosen by an individual, along with the activities they call forth, belong together, since they are expressions of a unitary personality and are interwoven by threads of common interest and meaning. Thus, in Spencer's illustration, the afternoon walk gives mental diversion and physical exercise, and these in their turn are necessary to the health of mind and body,--ends of high moral worth. As a means to this end the walk itself possesses moral value and, since it is difficult to imagine, that with a given person and at a certain time, one path would not fulfill the purposes of the walk a little better than any other, we have in the choice of route a
6 SPENCER: Data of Ethics, Chap. 1, § 2. 7 DEWEY AND TUFTS: Ethics, p. 206.
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question of real, although not momentous, moral significance. Whether I shall have my house painted white or brown seems on first thought merely a matter of taste or economy and to have no ethical bear g whatever. Yet further reflection shows me that the painting of my house contributes in an important way to the purposes themselves of undoubted moral value, which the house itself subserves, and that the advantage gained by painting is measured largely by my success in selecting the “right” color. As the field of conduct is thus a unity, the different ends being inter-related and the single acts connected in the chains of their consequences with the most inclusive purposes, it is impossible to draw a line within it which shall exclude certain actions as morally, indifferent. Of course, it is not meant that ends are never considered out of relationship with other ends nor that in every case of choice we should raise the issues of eternity and try to determine the ultimate bearing of our action. In many cases the bearing of an action upon the attainment of other ends--itself important enough--is thoughtlessly overlooked when it should be taken into consideration. But manifestly time alone forbids that the whole field of conduct should be surveyed at every instance of choice. Hence, in selecting A tool or choosing a method for our work, we follow approved technical procedure which, while it is now habitual with us, was first adopted because representing what in the experience of the race was the most effective way of securing the end desired.
REFERENCES
SPENCER, Data of Ethics, Chap. I.
DEWEY AND TUFTS, Ethics, Chap. X.
SETH, Ethical Principles, Introduction, Chap. I, § § 1, 2.
ALEXANDER, Moral Order and Progress, Book I, Chap. I.
ARISTOTLE, Nicomachean Ethics, (Welldon's trans.), Book II, Chap. III.
GREEN, Prolegomena to Ethics, Book II, Chap, II.
