THE WILL





CHAPTER I

WILL, is an activity which, like life itself, is so pervasive, so many-sided, so incalculable, as to resist definition, since to define we must make distinctions and set limits. In attempts to characterize will, one is most likely to err through emphasizing one of its two leading aspects at the expense of the other. Some investigators concern themselves altogether with the influence of will upon outward action; they conceive it as a control or co-ordination of bodily movement. This conception of volition primarily in terms of organic behavior suggests an explanation of voluntary action in terms of mechanical causation, and leads to a neglect of that

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other most notable and distinctive feature of volition, the ability to choose between ends and to originate courses of activity. Absorption in this second, the “spiritual” side of voluntary activity leads, on its part, to a conception of the will equally abstract. Impressed by the fact that will is free from the shackles of natural causation, that its activities are in some sense self-caused, moralists have often been led to an empty and negative conception of will, as essentially characterized by its lack of any determination whatsoever.

If we would understand the character of will as an actually existing power of human nature, we must for the moment turn away both from the principles of biology and the metaphysics of freedom, and look directly at it as it operates in the conduct of man, both in the evolution of human society and in our own choices and pursuits. This we shall, of course, be doing when we review the principal stages in man's social development, but

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a preliminary statement will be useful III clearing the ground for this survey. When we thus look directly at the workings of will in our experience we find it acting in two capacities. We find, first, that it is a factor in the physical world of bodies and of motion, that it directs the movements of the physical organism which it inhabits, and in consequence determines the movements of other bodies both living and non-living. Through the instrumentality of his physical organism, man combines the materials and harnesses the forces of nature: thus he builds habitations and conveyances, fashions tools and weapons, constructs machines; he also assembles other human individuals for purposes of intercourse, industry, war, and government. But all these actions he performs as a means to the attainment of ends, that is, personal satisfactions. Thus we find will acting in a second capacity quite different from the first: that of choosing between different objects in accordance

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with their value as ends. Now, these objects which are chosen as sources of personal satisfaction differ in many ways, notably in their degree of comprehensiveness. Some are specific and temporary, such as an article of food desired at any particular moment; others are more general and lasting, such as wealth or family prestige; others are still more inclusive, such as national welfare or the knowledge of truth. But whenever will is exercised continuously and is thus given opportunity for self-expression, we find it selecting and seeking the most comprehensive ends, those ends which include the largest number of particular satisfactions and promise to produce the fullest and richest personal life. Thus, will, viewed in the light of human history and experience, appears as a power constantly striving so to control the forces of nature and to adjust the tendencies of social life as to bring about the most comprehensive satisfaction of human personality.

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When we consider the abilities which are prerequisite to the operation of will, a voluntary action seems a notable achievement. So, in fact, it is; among living creatures only man is, as far as we know, capable of volition. Yet any child of three or four years, of sufficient mental development to have a desire and to seek its fulfillment, possesses this power. Indeed, a simple act of volition, such as any child is capable of, may illustrate in an effective way the different factors which co-operate in all voluntary activity.

Suppose that a child of four, tired of play outdoors, comes into the house. The room which he enters contains familiar toys which excite the play impulse in him, and packages as yet unopened which awaken his instinctive curiosity .. This pressure of instinct . and impulse he is able to resist, however, because a definite desire has seized him. In obedience to this desire he, disregarding everything else, walks straight across the room to his

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mother's side and asks her to tell him a story, a new story with soldiers in it (for he has just seen soldiers passing). When she demurs he continues to urge; finally, he gains her consent and sits down satisfied by the prospect of the coming tale. In such a case of action from desire we have a simple instance of that voluntary activity which is the root and source of all personal life. For the child who thus acts from conscious desire refuses longer to permit nature, in the form of inborn instinct and involuntary impulse, to act through him; he asserts his right as a free being to determine his own action as his intelligence approves. Now, even in our example, which illustrates will at the earliest stage of its development and consequently in its simplest form, we can distinguish in the operation of willing or volition three factors.

The first of these is thought and imagination. The boy imagines his mother telling him a story, and this, his idea of something

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which does not yet exist, sets itself in sharp contrast to objects actually present to his senses, such as toys or books. Unless the human individual is able to conceive or imagine objects not yet existent, he will be unable through his own initiative to realize such objects. The idea itself, the imagined story-telling, that is, is the outcome of previous experience, of memories of stories asked for, told, and enjoyed. But in thought past experience is not merely revived and opposed to present fact; it is taken to pieces, altered, recombined. Thus, the story asked for need not be identical with the one last told, but may be a new one whose subject had been suggested by that day's play. Thought, reinterpreting rather than reproducing past experience, gives expression to the unitary self or personality which is developing throughout the course of such experience.

The second factor is feeling. Because he has enjoyed the stories told him in the

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past the child finds the idea of listening to a story very pleasant. But while the story told him remains merely an idea, it conflicts with the actual facts. This conflict between what is wished for and what actually exists produces strain and tension in the child's consciousness, which is felt as painful. When he wins the desired consent, however, and the story begins, he feels pleasure in “getting his wish,” thus removing from his mind the conflict between idea and actual fact. Feeling reflects the effect upon the self of seeking and attaining new objects.

Action is the third factor. Moved by the idea of the story which he desires but does not hear, the child takes steps which, he believes, will bring the longed-for result. He intercedes with his mother in the manner which promises to be most effective, meeting objections with the best replies he can devise, until at last the result is gained. In action, the individual grapples with the actual situation, and so

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transforms it as to provide for the realization of his idea.

But while thought, feeling, and action are all essential to the operation of volition, in none of them do we find its essential quality revealed. No one of them may be said to determine the will; for, in the first place, volition is more than the execution of a program thought out beforehand in every detail. It is impossible through thought to foresee the actual course of events at every point. No amount of thinking-even if he possessed all the wisdom of his elders-would assure the boy of our illustration of his mother's consent, or anticipate her every objection. Then, secondly, volition is more than the resultant of feelings produced by past experience and influencing present conduct, for the pleasures of the past have all of them arisen from special situations, and the past guarantees their repetition only when the situation itself is reproduced. But our wills are always facing

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new situations whose pleasure-giving possibilities are uncertain. If it is not a new story that the child wishes for, it is an old story on a new occasion and the enjoyment it will furnish can only be ascertained by trying it. Finally, volition is more than the outcome of action. To attain such result as the circumstances permit, in the most skillful manner possible, is not to exercise volition. A result must be gained in order to satisfy the will, surely-but it must be such a result as appeals to the doer because of his own personal experience and, for this reason, such a result as satisfies himself. To be able to persuade his mother to tell the story will not satisfy the will of the boy unless, because of his own experience, he has come to enjoy story-telling.

The true nature of will is revealed only when we understand it as embracing thought, feeling, and action equally, not merely assembled as parts, but merged by their co-operation into a vital unity . We

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discover the essential quality of volition when we think of it as an activity which is ever striving, through a variety of chosen objects, toward a general end or result, and this result is self-expansion, the expansion of the boundaries of conscious life until it shall include and assimilate everything that is real. Will is, therefore, the cause of all our human development, being both the demand which we as intelligent persons make for more life and a larger world and also the power to attain such life and to realize such a world. Subjectively, it manifests itself as the capacity for faith, belief in the ability of conscious personality ultimately to master and absorb all that exists, and thus gain for itself permanence and reality. Such faith does not contradict reason or disregard fact; it is based upon reason and utilizes such facts as a rational interpretation of past experience furnishes. But it refuses to be limited by past experience; it proposes to discover new facts that

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shall enlarge the scope and enrich the content of personal life. Objectively, it appears as the ability to venture, the willingness to abandon objects already attained and proved satisfactory for the sake of other objects as yet unattained and uncertain, which promise larger possibilities of satisfaction. This venturing is not the foolhardiness which contemptuously flings aside hard-won and certain goods in the pursuit of objects whose promises are alluring but deceptive; it is rather that true courage which dares to jeopardize the limited although secure satisfaction of the present in a deliberate and strenuous attempt to attain new objects which, in the larger life they involve, make permanent place for, and impart new significance to, the satisfactions at the time surrendered. Even in our trivial instance we find the essential character of volition illustrated. The child resists the appeal of surrounding objects to his senses and asks for a story because his germinating

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personality demands expansion in an object which shall express himself. He shows faith, for he believes in what no wisdom, human or divine, could predict for a certainty-that his mother can be persuaded to tell the story. He is able to venture, for he gives up the assured pleasure which his toys would furnish in order to seek an object which, although it contained larger possibilities of self-satisfaction, was at the time remote and uncertain.

It is this activity of volition, maintaining faith in the power and permanence of personality, and daring to venture for the sake of a fuller life and a larger world, which is the true cause of all man's progress. In the pages which follow we shall see it determining the successive stages of human development.

“We cannot kindle when we will
The fire which in the heart resides;
The spirit bloweth and is still,
In mystery our soul abides.
   But tasks in hours of insight will'd
   Can be through hours of gloom fulfilled.

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“With aching hands and bleeding feet
We dig and heap, lay tone on stone;
We bear the burden and the heat
Of the long day, and wish 'twere done.
   Not till the hours of light return,
   All we have built do we discern.”

(Arnold: “Mortality.”)